PAUL SCHWARTZ
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Habermas welcomes the open discussion of this period of German
history. Acknowledging that a "pluralism of readings" of history
"mirrors the structure of an open society ," he argues that this
pluralism creates "the chance to make clear the ambivalence of in–
dividual identity-building traditions." The freedom that pluralism
can bring is contrasted with a "closed history picture entirely decreed
by governmental historians." Habermas proceeds to warn against a
"German national monotone NATO philosophy." He states, "The
sole patriotism that does not alienate us from the West is a constitu–
tional patriotism. A binding to universal constitutional principles,
anchored in conviction, could only first form itself, unfortunately, in
the culture nation of the Germans after - and by means
of-Auschwitz." Those individuals who wish to call the Germans to
a conventional form of national identity will, according to Haber–
mas, destroy the only real dependable basis of the German
allegiance to the West-"constitutional patriotism."
There is nothing in itself wrong with a comparison of Nazi and
Soviet behavior. The danger is not in historical comparisons, pro–
vided that they are intelligent. Yet this condition cannot be taken for
granted, because all kinds of comparisons of all sorts of things are
possible. Even when comparisons are apt, there is a danger in the
measures for which they will provide a foundation . In fact, the com–
munist menace as pretext surfaced quickly in postwar Germany. In
America in the 1950s, the communist menace paved the way for
Senator McCarthy's domestic activities. In West Germany during
this time, the communist menace provided an opportunity for ab–
solution-not only by giving Germans the chance to remit their sins
by participation in the struggle against the Soviet Union and its
Eastern bloc allies, but also by creating an emergency-like at–
mosphere in which denazification could be called off. Nolte breaks
new ground for the 1980s by providing a pretext for those who want
to end the discussion of the Nazi period. After all, he says, the
destruction of Jews was just a reaction, not a first action.
Use of the communist menace as a pretext in Germany even
predates the 1950s. Hitler himself was ready to justify all sorts of
misdeeds , including his destruction of the Weimar republic, by the
threat of communism. When Max Planck visited Hitler to plead on
behalf of Jewish scientists, Hitler assured him that communists, not
Jews , were the enemy. Nolte takes Hitler at his word and begins, at
least to some extent, to accept his estimation of the threat to Ger–
many at that time and what means were acceptable to combat it.
