MICHAEL NAUMANN
87
emotional gratification of nationalism. "To go it alone" -an idea
well known to American isolationists-has its attractions to many
Germans as well.
Seen from the outside, the idea of "Germany" has always been
too large. Even in its Bismarckian, compact version, a united
Germany was considered too awesome a hegemonial power by its
neighbors. Today, prospects of reunification still evoke memories of
German imperialism amongst those European nations that suffered
most from it. German foreign policy is still measured against the
crimes committed during twelve years of National Socialism under
Adolf Hitler.
If
there is one natural law in European foreign policy, it
seems to center on the future curbing of still more German growth,
power, and nationalism . Seen from Paris, London , or Rome, the
German question was settled in 1945; Konrad Adenauer's option
for a Western alliance provided a definite answer to the German
question in Moscow: the territorial status of the postwar period was
not to be doubted .
Only Germany's politicians are required to see their country in
less stable historical perspectives; the official political culture of the
Federal Republic rests on a
pro tem
basis. The
Grundgesetz
(literally,
the founding law) of 1949 decrees, "The whole German people are
called upon to complete Germany's unity and freedom in free self–
determination." And according to the last article of the
Grundgesetz,
its validity is lost on the day the Germans vote for a real constitution,
a
~rfassung,
in free elections .
In
other words, as long as communism
and Soviet domination prevail over East Germany, the political
institutions of the
whole
German nation remain provisional . And
yet, there is nothing provisional about the wall in Berlin (nor, in fact,
about the fate of those who tried to cross it and failed); two German
armies are not provisional and neither are two German economies,
two German governments, and, in many ways, two German lan–
guages. The idea of
one
German nation within one territorial bound–
ary, the
Nationalstaat,
suffered heavily from the normative force of
facts.
Yet, it did not evaporate completely, although the constitutional
call for a reunification of Germany within its territorial realm of
1937 (even the weather map on TV stuck to those borders , including
Konigsberg-Kaliningrad in East Prussia) lost its appeal to the West
Germans during the enriching experiences of the economic miracle.
