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PARTISAN REVIEW
atemporal logic of narrative, lying unperturbed behind the chrono–
logical flurry. In narrative, according
to
Levi-Strauss, the chronologi–
cal order of succession is reabsorbed by an atemporal matrix. So a
structuralist analysis of a novel would dissociate itself from the flurry
of chronology and consequence and try to find a purely structural
logic which would account for the temporal illusion . As Barthes put
it, "temporality is no more than a structural class of narra–
tive ... : from the point of view of narrative, what we call time does
not exist, or at least it only exists functionally, as an element of a
semiotic system: time does not belong
to
discourse proper, but to the
referent."
I am reasonably sure that structuralism is indeed hostile
to
the
understanding of the question in hand in terms of time, sequence,
consequence, and so forth; but it would be premature
to
settle for that
conclusion, while other conclusions are possible. Note, not at all
incidentally, that in the quotation from Barthes on narrative, the
structuralist is quick
to
say that something does not exist, or at least
that it exists only functionally, exists only as a function. Would it
explain anything in structuralism if we were
to
seize upon this
paradigm or cadence and find in it a characterizing tendency: to say
that something doesn't exist, or that it exists only as a. function? Is it
not the case that several words which a traditionally minded critic
would use and value are treated by structuralists in a certain way: the
structuralist does not deny these words, but he denies their inaugura–
tive power. They are not allowed to take an initiative; indeed, they are
merely illusory consequences of a system which has somehow cloned
itself into force.
Don't we find the same desire at work when Kristeva, Barthes,
and Sollers refer to the subject or the speaking subject or the author;
when Lacan refers to the self; when Barthes refers
to
characters in a
novel; when Derrida refers to virtually everything that has been
harbored within the terminology of Western metaphysics? I am aware
that there are differences. Kristeva denies that the speaking subject
exists in discourse, but she is willing
to
give him a chance to be
produced, brought into at least the illusion of existence, by the play of
signifiers within discourse. The process of production is correlated to
the process of the play of language. When Barthes, Todorov, Greimas,
and other critics feel bound to acknowledge the use of the word
"character," or at least to confront the question of character in fiction,
they refuse to acknow ledge such a thing on the basis of psychological
essence. They resent the privilege which fiction has often accorded, or
