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and qua lity of th eir terror, permit not onl y facile pa rall els with Nazi
terror. The hi torical amnesia of the terrorist also expla ins the differ–
ence between the German terrori st and compa rable counterpa rts in
other Wes tern nations. One useful case in po int, especiall y for the
American , is apparent when one compares the German terrorists with
their closest American counterparts, the radicals of the la te 1960 and
earl y 1970 , many o f whom reso rted to vio lence. Cl earl y, the German
terrorist of middl e-class ori gin and the American middl e-class radical
are not equivalents, but the contras ts themselves, no ma tter how
enormous, illumina te the meaning of German terrorism.
A general contrast between German and Ameri can middl e-cl ass
radi calism has been a topi c of interest ever since the late 1960s. Herbert
Marcuse and Jurgen Habermas, both di stingui shed political phil oso–
phers, had occasion in 1967 to make a compari son as o bserver of
student movements in both countri es. Habermas saw a bas ic common–
ality between the two radi cal movements. The German student radical
of 1967 was one "whose memory i not determined by the Nazi period,"
whose experi ence was exclusively with afflu ence and a sta ble post–
World War II politi cal order. Their li ves were therefore comparable to
tho e of Ameri can students. A ma in source of politi cal di scontent for
both , apart from specifi ca ll y student-rela ted issues, Habermas argued,
was the di screpan cy between rhetori c and reality, between the idea ls
and potenti al of the industri ali zed Western democracies, and the
oppression and poverty of masses in the world. The idea ls o f equality,
freedom and prosperity expli cit in democracy contras ted w ith rea l
conditi ons in the world;' the promise of science and techno logy with its
abuse against humanity. Habermas saw the student protes t of a decade
ago in both na tions as evidence of "outrage against th e doubl e
standards of the older genera ti on 'S morality."
Habermas' an alysis holds true when one considers the beh avior of
American radi cals. T heir outrage was directed against a stabl e democ–
racy in Ameri ca whi ch to lera ted a compromi se in domestic social
conditions, and which, a broad , ma inta ined a foreign po li cy whi ch cast
severe doubt on the credibility of the rhetoric of democracy and
con equentl y on the appeal of the society itself. Poverty and racism in
Ameri ca and the Vi etnam War evoked rage and res istance. However,
the vi olence they bred was never compa rabl e to today's terrori sm . Mos t
of the radi cal vio lence in the la te 1960s and ea rl y 1970s was directed a t
property, a t symboli c obj ects-draft cards, fil es, buildings, fl ags.
If
peopl e los t their lives, as they did , it was no t the expli cit o bj ect. The
personal violence of assass in ati on in Ameri ca, as well as phenomena
