538
R osenberg:
o.
T umin:
Why?
PARTISAN REVIEW
R osenberg:
lL 's a phon y analogy which people who are educa ted in the
modern university keep trying to es ta blish, tha t is, th e analogy
between art and science. They're always looking for the same kind o f
precision, the same kind of consensus.
Tumin:
I agree with you tha t precision is quite different in the two
fields, bo th in painting and science, and in the criti cism of painting
and science, that con sensus is present in science and no t present in
a rt.
R osenberg:
No, as a matter of fact, there's a very strong con sensus in
art, but it does not necessaril y mean that it's accepta ble. That is, art
cr iti cism, as Baudelaire sa id, is polemical. Yo u es tablish your idea
about works of art, you don't accep t the consen sus. Because your
bas ic cr iteri on is your experience of the work o f a rt, and everybody's
experience o f the work of a rt is different.
T umin:
But th ey're not all wholly unique and fresh and innocent.
They're always operating within a cultural context.
R osenberg:
IL may come abo ut tha t some people agree about some
artists. And they may agree about th em for a certain len gth o f time,
LOO,
in whi ch case you wou ld have what appea rs
LO
be a consensus.
If
anybody carri es thi s furth er, and begins to inquire to what you and
he and X agree upon , when you think that Poll ock is a good artist,
you would find tha t you a re all ta lking about something else. Now
you must know tha t's true.
Tumin:
Is there no way in which to get consen sus on a set o f criteria by
which some works of a rt could be judged to be superi or to o th ers, in
the same fashi on as we get consensus on
crite~i a
by whi ch to judge
wor ks o f science?
R osenberg:
T here's no doubt tha t some works of a rt are in one sense or
another superi or to o ther works of art. We're no t a rguing tha t all
works o f art are eq ual. But th e no ti on tha t a consensus that woul d
app ly in th e di scipline, let's call it, of physics or bi o logy or some–
thing like that
~ould
necessa ril y have its counterpa rt in a rt seems to
me to tall y arbitrary. One of the reasons why the sciences have
become so important in modern techno logica l society, as aga inst art,
is precisely because the society is held together on a ra tional pl an e
and not held togeth er, as it used
LO
be, on a pl ane of a kind of
universal recognition. That is to say, we don 't assume tha t the
intelli gent person that we're ta lking to and with whom we might
agree abo ut various ideas has the same feelings th at we have. We
