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emphases, tracea bl e to their acceptance of pos iti visti c outl ook. T hey a ll
ho ld tha t na tura l science provides models of procedures that can and
should be cl osely fo ll owed by the socia l sciences; tha t if the soc ia l
sciences have no t yet produced an accumul a ted body of substanti a ted
and precise ly formul a ted laws, thi s is because they are onl y in the
initia l stages of their developement, as compa red to na tural sc ience;
tha t " no rma tive theory" can be cl ea rl y separa ted fr om the findin gs o f
empiri ca l socia l science, with the latter standing in a purely in strumen–
ta l rela ti on to the fo rmer. T hese ideas underpin the type of approach
whi ch domina ted socio logy until quite recentl y, and even now rema ins
an orthodoxy. But it has fail ed, in its own terms, to deli ver the goods
and looks increas ingly weak as a framework fo r socio logical method.
T here is no t a corpus of tri ed and tes ted theories, accepted by everyone;
and " norma tive theory" persistentl y intrudes into the sphere of the
empiri cal, however carefull y we may seek to keep them di stinct.
"Des pite a ll the ta lk of obj ectivity and value neutra lity," Bernstein
says, "social sciel) ce literature and so-call ed empiri ca l theory a re sho t
th rough with expli cit and impli cit va lue judgments, and controversia l
no rma ti ve and ideological cl aims."
When we look at a lterna tives to ma instream socia l sc ience, we find
some majo r convergences of opini on a bout what its sho rtcomings are,
and a bo ut the kind of sta ndpo int tha t should be put in the stead o f
pos iti vistic o r natura listi c soc ia l theory. Such a sta ndpo int has to be
sensiti ve to iss ues of language ana lys is and the interpreta tion of action ,
to the interconnecti on of theoreti cal ana lys is and mo ra l eva lua tion ,
and to the bas ic changes whi ch have ha ppened in the philosoph y of
na tura l sc ience. Bernstein p rov ides a good survey of the writings of
Winch and Lo uch , and of the critiques to which these have been
su bject. Certa in elements in the wo rk of these writers, he considers
(agree ing with T ay lor, MacIntyre and o thers) are very important , but
their views are sta ted in too extreme and dogma ti c a fashi on-a
consequence in some part of the po lemi cal context in whi ch they were
p roduced . Their ideas ca n be compl emented usefull y by o thers drawn
from Schutz's phenomeno logy, a ltho ugh thi s aga in has very definite
limita ti ons. Bern stein a lso di scusses at some leng th the relevance o f
Kuhn 's wo rk to the socia l sc iences. Wha tever the usefulness o f the
no to ri o usly ambi guous term " parad igm " in the phil osophy o f na tura l
sc ience, it has consistentl y been mi sappli ed , he shows, in the soc ia l
sc iell ces -mos t conspi cuo usly by writers in the ma instream trad iti on ,
who have a ppropri a ted it to their own ends. T he book concludes with a
leng th y di scu ss ion of Haberrnas, who Bernstein beli eves has contri–
but ed mos t to reworkin g of the iss ues with whi ch socia l and politi ca l
