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actor's intentions are concerned. One of these, apparently characteristic of
American society, is the collectivizing in which the particular is subsumed by
the conventional. And the other, apparently characteristic of at least certain
tribal and peasant societies, is the differentiating in which the conventional is
subsumed by the particular. Wagner calls the context that prevails the con–
trol; its primacy is of course both necessary and illusory.
Wagner illustrates the dialectical interplay between convention and
invention, controlling context and implicit context, collectivizing mode and
differentiating mode, through a series of often insighrful, occasionally banal,
analyses ofsuch
constructs-I
don't know what other word to use-as Ameri–
can advertising, Daribi magic , the self, the personality, and the soul, and of
course nature, culture, and society . To take one example, and probably not
the best: Wagner argues that the whole productive technique and literature,
the "knowledge" ofAmerican technological and scientific culture' 'is a set of
devices for the invention of a natural and phenomenal world" ; that by ac–
cepting the conventional belief that the measuring, predicting, and harnes–
sing of a world of ' 'natural" forces is artificial, part of the domain of human
manipulation and inherited tradition, "we precipitate the phenomenal world
as part of the innate and inevitable."
The significant aspect of this invention , its
conventional
aspect , is that its
product must be taken
very seriously,
so that it is no invention at all, but
reality.
If the inventor keeps this seriousness firmly in mind ... ' while
doing his job of measuring , predicting , or harnessing then the resulting
experience of "nature" will sustain his conventional distinctions.
Wagner adds, interestingly, that' 'our technological culture must 'fail' if it is
to succeed, for its very failures constitute the thing that it is trying to measure ,
harness , or predict."
Science and technology" produce" our cultural distinctions between the
innate and the artificial
to
the extent that they fail
to
be completely exact
or efficient, precipitating an image of "the unknown" and of uncon–
trolled natural force .
It is not surprising that at the beginning of his book, he draws a parallel be–
tween his theory and the philosophies of Buddhism and the Muta'zilla of
Islam .
Wagner's vision is extreme ; his theory is confused. He lacks philosophi–
cal sophistication. He lacks, too, the irony to occasionally mock his own edi–
fice. His work is courageous though. Unlike other anthropologists he has tried
