EDITH KURZWEIL
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a special subject of study, an "objective" rational tale or something that is
tied to a specific era, becomes a part of its current existence. This makes every–
thing seem preordained-and arbitrary; and every interpretation becomes as
valid as another, because there is no accounting for change or evolution.
Leach, the English anthropologist, explains it well when he compares Levi–
Strauss's "human brain" to a very complicated computer that sorts out
information according to an "adjustable program": unlike Kant's
a prion'
principles, which are philosophical, Levi-Strauss's system works like a com–
puter because its built-in structures impose order upon all social variables. But
again, it is unconscious order, which until its final unveiling appears-to me,
at least-as a kind of planned disorder.
Sartre doesn't recognize any such order-or the' 'destiny" it implies. For
Sartre, says Verstraeten in
Temps Modemes,
"the world is outside; [and for
him] neither language nor culture are in the individual, like a 'brand' regis–
tered by the nervous system, but the individual is in his culture and in his
language, which means in a special sector of
instruments.
To manifest what it
[history] unveils, it disposes of elements which are at the same time too rich
and too numerable." And' 'for Sartre consciousness of self and of things,"
says the French philosopher Pouillon, "is discovered by itself in praxis, and is,
for this reason, no more than an apprehension of reality. " That means, of
course, outer reality, not inner structure. For Sartre, liberty and necessity are
one and are achieved by people through their free actions-through their
engagement.
But Levi-Strauss's natives are bound: their actions emanate
from the same structures that explain kinship patterns, social life , and lan–
guage. Sartre's dialectic is between men and their surroundings; and pro–
cesses of interiorization and exteriorization of these surroundings are tied to
their very existence. This closely approximates Marx's view that economic
circumstances determine people's ideas and beliefs. But Levi-Strauss's
dialectic is between men as social heings and their unconscious thoughts,
which, in turn, derive from the undiscovered structures. Clearly, existentialist
"shallowness" opposes structuralist "depth."
Inevitably both positions have their proseletyzers and followers, and
both are argued in characteristically French fashion, though in different
modes of abstraction. Both represent abstract visions-or theoretical models
-and are nonpragmatic. And all translations into American idioms-popu–
larized or academic-are bound to result in genuine misunderstanding
and / or distorted applications of structuralism and of existentialism.
III.
Levi-Strauss's reading of Freud is also different from ours. He clearly–
and explicitly-bases his conscious and unconscious structures on Freudian
