282
AND REWM
c
l AUG H II N
OF MICE AND MEN
BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY. By B. F.
Skinner. Knopf.
$6.95.
It isn't remarkable to finish a book and regret having spent
the time reading it, so Skinner's book can't be distinguished from many
others that way. But what is really distressing is that the book deals
badly with a very important set of questions. I approached it with some
optimism because
Walden Two
is an important statement on utopias
and Skinner's work in experimental psychology is of considerable com–
petence and interest. But
Beyond Freedom and Dignity
is a poor treat–
ment of the problems of a comprehensive science of man. It is dogmatic,
shallow in its discussion of issues and vague where clarity is needed.
.Skinner had the opportunity to confront the profound questions raised
by the possibilities of controlling human behavior; instead he has written
a cranky work which he uses to peddle covertly hi5
own
values under
the aegis of science.
There isn't space here to discuss all the issues .which Skinner raises
but fails to deal with seriously, so let me illustrate my charges .with
Skinner's treatment of the role of ideas and rational argument in his
behaviorist framework. Skinner thinks that the "literature of freedom
and dignity" is a positive evil since it stands in the way of the effective
utilimtion of methods of behavior control. It prolongs the use of inef–
fective and objectionable modes
of
punishment, "stands in the way of
further human achievements," fosters, for example, the use of resources
in the deSign of automobiles at the expense of life in city ghettos and,
in sum, is tied to the problems of population and ecology and enhances
the prospects of nuclear war. What might be pointed out here is not
the falsity
of
these ideas, although I think them almost certainly false;
but rather that Skinner attributes enormous power to this "literature"
and yet such power of ideas seems for a Skinnerian behaviorist impos–
sible in theory.
In fact, Skinner spends only ten pages on the in£h,lence of ideas on
behavior, and all he really says is that the processes of rational thought
can be understood by relating them to "contingencies of reinforcement."
What this means is that
all
man's cognitive activity can be explained
by reference to previous rewards and punishments. Perhaps, but Skinner
gives neither evidence nor sustained argument to support his claim.
Indeed, it is difficult to understand the process of rational argument–
as opposed to coercion and psychological persuasion - as a function of
