PARTISAN REVIEW
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part of the myth of concern, but is a part that stresses the importance
of the non-mythical elements in culture, of the truths and realities that
are studied rather than created, provided by nature rather than by
a social vision."
In Frye's literary terms, the tension between myths of freedom
and concern accounts for the history of Western culture, and he offers
US
a stunningly clever history. But what concerns us directly here is
his
notion of the role of the critic and poet in this history. With the
development of a writing culture, the poet's position becomes less
central, and others must transmit the myth of concern directly. Poetry
becomes more private and loses its power to articulate wide social
aims
and attitudes: "Those who express the ideas and symbols that
hold society together are no longer the poets; they are rather men of
action with power over the sententious utterance, operating mainly out–
side literature." And although the Romantics reasserted the mythic
as–
pect
of literature, poetic dealings with myth tended in fact to be sub–
versive and primitive, an assertion of human value against the inhuman
forces of society. The critic, then, assumes a major role as interpreter.
This role, most powerfully asserted, according to Frye, in the
Renaissance, reached its last full expression in Matthew Arnold. The
humanist critic "was in a superior position to the poet, not personally
or socially, but as the spokesman for the society which established the
norms to which the poet conformed." The critic, in effect, became so–
ciety's arbiter, and himself belonged to a select "community of scholars,
orators and intellectuals." Arnold, of course, became the great spokes–
man for Culture which, "by articulating right reason and developing the
best self, creates within society an inner elect group which mediates the
ideals of society." It rejects extremes and partisanship of any kind for
the
sake of correct and universal standards. It judges and interprets
literature with a view to locating and valuing that which transcends
the limits of class and self-interest.
But Frye does not allow himself or modern critics to stand with
Arnold because, as he says, the democratization of literature and society
makes the elitist terms of Arnold's criticism impossible. "The mediating
society which provides the norms for judging and evaluating literature
has
gone, and consequently each judicial critic can speak only for
him–
self."
And here we reach what is distinctive in Frye's position. His
antagonism to judicial criticism is already well known, but it has rarely
been articulated with such dogmatic energy: "Once the critic is released
from
the preoccupation of a moral and evaluating approach, he is
obliged to preserve a tolerance for every variety of poetic expression
and a respect for every poet's individuality. Such a phrase as 'of course,
