PARTISAN
REVIEW
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particular that they could manipulate the environment almost at will.
At the same time it was tacitly assumed that what is innate cannot
be
changed for the better - or worse - by the scientist. Therefore, the
innateness hypothesis was construed as clashing with the optimistic at–
titude underlying the whole enterprise of developing a science of man.
Recently, as a result of new work in genetics and physiology, the idea
that what is innate cannot be changed has been shaken; and the way
is now open to reconcile the innateness hypothesis with the optimism
which is still characteristic of much of the American view of the social
sciences. It is possible, then, that while Chomsky's argument merits
attention on its own, his conclusions may gain currency
in
some quar–
ters or disfavor for largely irrelevant reasons - yet another illustra–
tion of the fact (deplorable as it may be) that the reception of a
scientific hypothesis often depends on factors that are scientifically
irrelevant and have only sociological and cultural explanations.
Chomsky's conception of linguistic competence and the human
mind provides a badly needed theoretical foundation for the humanities.
Too much teaching in the humanities rests on implicit assumptions of
subjectivistic individualism. Students are encouraged to think that they
have some kind of privileged access to information about the meanings
they assign to various terms in their language, that the syntactic con–
structions they use are their own inventions which vary greatly from
individual to individual. The exploration of creative uses of language
is assumed to
be
nothing more than an exploration into a realm of
phenomena where everyone is licensed to make a unique contribution.
And all of this is supposed to contribute to the preservation of human
dignity and the values of our culture. No wonder when the inevitable
questions are asked they are unanswerable. How do the humanities
help us understand human nature? Do they show us anything about
the species not otherwise known?
If
so, is it not something that the
sciences - especially the social sciences - could better demonstrate?
In what sense can one regard humanistic insights as objective and inter–
subjectively testable?
But once we abandon the assumptions now underying much teach–
ing in the humanities and apply Chomsky's theories, the answers are
readily forthcoming. To a great extent, the purpose of those branches
of the humanities concerned with language and literature is the re–
finement of linguistic intuitions, the development of awareness about
the nature of intuitions and the enlargement of what is considered
thinkable. The study of forms and content have to go together, and
the silly idea that we should get away from "dull grammar" and em–
phasize "mere content" should be discarded. When we explore a lan-
