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LEO BERSANI
styles; it
is
not the natural consequence of a self-evident truth. More
specifically, Rubin's "instant confrontations," precisely because they
are symbolic, require a critical reading of the messages dramatized
in the symbols. It is true that critical distance
is
never ideologically
neutral, and even the most sympathetic "analysis" of Rubin
is
in
itself
a chosen alternative to Rubin. But
if
the first job of radical
criticism is to examine the assumptions and commitments which in–
evitably restrict and give shape to the field in which it attempts to
conduct an "open inquiry," the recognition of one's commitments
does not have to be used as an argument for making them immune
to scrutiny. And we must demonstrate that a kind of dialectic of
passion and distance in criticism is fundamentally different from the
intellectual virtuosity with which many liberal minds use the prin–
ciple of free inquiry in order to justify their intolerance of free inquiry.
Lewis Feuer is an extreme example of sham in the conduct of
rational analysis. Unlike some of his more controlled colleagues in
academia, he puts his prejudices on the line, and his vulnerability
to counterattack makes of
The Conflict of Generations
a rather sad
if
nasty book. Feuer does have some sort of hope for the young:
"If
social understanding can isolate and study [the demonic com–
ponent in student movements], perhaps the hatreds, projections, and
guilts of generational revolt may be rendered less dominant, and a
higher idealism emerge." But to say that there are "obscure un–
conscious workings of generational conflict" in student movements
is
not to say much more than.. that the idealism of the young
is
idealism
embodied
in
the young. Feuer of course doesn't see
it
that way:
"The most crucial test [of the hypothesis of generational struggle]
is
the character of the emotions which prevailed at the moments of
decision, the moments of action." Even if we agree that the nature
of the motivation
is
the most appropriate criterion for judging the
value of behavior (a very big "if" ), how can we know what "the
young's" unconscious motivations are? They rebel, Feuer suggests,
because they hate their fathers, and that hatred accounts for the
amoral and suicidal elements of the rebellion. But Feuer ignores
studies which have shown that many activists have the sympathetic
support of their parents. In such cases, the evidence for generational
conflict
is
at least as much in the mind of the observer as in the
observed. Feuer himself suggests as much when he writes that the
r
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