VIETNAM
639
Vietnamese.
If
the battalions are understrength the figure may be half
the size. But, con,tinue with McNamara:
"At the same time the government of South Vietnam has
found it increasingly difficult t>o make a commensurate increase
in the size of its own forces, which now stand at about 545,000
men, including the regional and local defense forces but exclud–
ing the national police.
"Clearly, the time
has
come when the people of South Vietnam
need more help fr.om us and .other nati'ons if they are to retain
their freedom and indetpendence.
"We have already responded to that need with some 75,000
United States military personnel, including some combat units.
This number will be raised to 125,000 almost immediatel,),.
...
But, more help will be needed in the months ahead .
..
to back
up the hardpressed army of South Vietnam."
"Responded to that need." McNamara is the best thing to come
along since Elmer Gantry. Let me give a little more. From a news
conference, two months earlier, June 16.
"In
1964
alone .
..
about 10,000
men were brought from North Vietnam to fight in South Vietn,am."
Whereas
in
1965 we will only bring in 100,000 Americans.
Well, McNama:a is on record (again June 5) about ratios:
"The South Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces facing
the Vietc.ong t.otal something in excess of 500,000 men. And
they're facing, as I mentioned, about
i
65,000 guerrillas, a ratio
something on the order of
4
to
1 [sic].
That's considerably less
than
is
recognized as required to effectively deal with guerrillas!'
The Pentagon's argument is that a government army must out-
number guerrillas in the ratio of ten to one if they are to h.old the
countryside and administer it well. But in South Vietnam, it happens
to
be the Vietcong which holds most of the countryside and proceeds
each year with its 30,000 political troops, its "tax collectors," to occupy
and
govern
more land than the year before, against an army-depending
on how you count-from three to eight times its own size. Only an army
fighting a war in which the agricultural population is near to unanimous
behind them
(.or
near to unanimous
against
the South Vietnamese) can
do thus well. Can you conceive of another explanation?
N.ow,
our entrance in force will shift this imbalance. It will certainly
prolong the war. It will also shift the moral center
.of
America. I quote
a piece by Charles Mohr,
New York Times,
August 9.
"The attempts by public information 'Officers to de-emphasize
the importance of civilian deaths and the burning .of village
huts at the hands .of United States marines have not been dupli–
cated by senior Marine Corps officers here.
...
