622
HENRY DAVID AIKEN
to defend the national "integrity" of South Vietnam against "aggres–
sion." Now I am certainly no friend of aggression (whether by
Com–
munists or by democrats), but at this stage I am a little skeptical of the
virtue of such commitments as a general rule. In most instances, more–
over, they do not seem to me to be sincere. (What
is
at stake in most
such cases is the hegemony of the United States itself. And
be~een
the
hegemony and the legitimate self-interest of the American people, I draw
a ready distinction.) Rarely have the new nation-states been capable
either of self-government or of self-defense; in all but a very few the
possibility of democracy or even of a genuine rule of law is remote. In
most parts of the world, let us face
it,
the choice, all sadly, is between
rival tyrannies, and as between tyrannies, the one to choose is that which
least threatens the conditions of existence. Hence while I weep for the
Vietnamese, I can spare scarcely a tear for South
·Vietna~.
The formulation in PR takes it for granted that reflection about the
present u.S. policy in the Far East should be restricted to alternatives
that would lead to a negotiated peace in Vietnam. On the contrary, one
should first examine the importance of a
negotiated
peace. Other
things
equal, no doubt a IJegotiated peace is better than one which is not. How–
ever, few
governm~nts
negotiate until they are obliged to do so: winners
make poor negotiators. In the present instance, where "we" are so
0b–
viously not winning, a secondary value for ourselves would be that a
negotiated peace would help to save the great American face. But
surely
this is a secondary good in the circumstances. Great nations, almost
by definition, can afford more loss of face than small nations.
As matters stand it is doubtful whether more than face-saving can
be gained from negotiated peace, but for
good
measure let us add the
possibility of safeguarding "our friends" in Vietnam from reprisals. The
point is that a negotiated peace is quite obviously impossible without
radically increasing the scope and the intensity of
the
war in Vietnam
for an indefinite period. Is this justifiable? It seems to me that, all
things
considered, it plainly is not. The result would be a great increase in the
already terrible suffering and demoralization in the whole area
and
on
all sides without seriously improving the chances of stopping the spread
of Communism in Southeastern Asia. In order really and effectively to
stop the spread of Communism, the American government would have to
set up in South
Vi~~permanent
military enclave capable of defend–
ing indefinitely
w~~t~~e
remains in "our" hands. The result would
not vaguely impro\ e the chances of a free or democratic society emerging
anywhere where it does not now exist. And I submit that it does not
