420
DANIEL BELL
of the Jews, not the German people or mankind, not even anti-Semitism
and racism," she is negating her own conclusion as well.
We can admit and deplore the histrionics and excesses of Hausner;
they did detract from the extraordinary uniqueness of the trial. But
one should not confuse such theatrics with the question of
who
was on
trial and the rationale of the indictment. For both the Israelis and
Miss Arendt treated Eichmann as a symbol. And it is there that the
first issue is joined, and blurred.
Of what
is
Eichmann a symbol? Of anti-semitism, surely. Of
Nazism, certainly. That is easy. But what was Nazism? And what was
this particular anti-semitism? Something uniquely aberrant? An element
of German national character, involving, therefore, the guilt of
all
Germans? An aspect of all gentiles, and therefore endemic in Christian
history? A recurrent malady of human aggression? Eichmann, for the
Israelis, was seemingly all of these, but there was never a clear effort
to identify the interplay of these elements, for these historical and
sociological questions were ultimately subordinate to a political motive
in holding the trial, and in politics one can't always say what one
believes. (Can one say that one does not trust any gentiles or any
Germans?)
In her own way, Miss Arendt treats Eichmann as a symbol, too.
But her circle is more cleanly joined: he is an individual, Adolf,
son of Karl, Eichmann; but he is also Everyman. The partial identities
as German and gentile which were crucial for the Israelis are irrelevant
for her. Eichmann was only an "average person," neither "perverted nor
sadistic," only "terribly and terrifyingly normal." And what the case
did bring out was the question of "how long it takes an average
person to overcome his innate repugnance toward crime, and what
exactly happens to him once he has reached that point." (In the
case of Eichmann, four weeks of wrestling with his conscience.)
Thus, even for Miss
.A.:-2:::.d~, t..~ough
the trial by the canons of
justice should have dealt with an individual, Eichmann was historically a
"new type of criminal"-one who upsets "the assumption current in
all modern legal systems that intent to do wrong is necessary for the
commission of a crime," ar.::! so, who cannot
be
tried by the norms
of positive law which have prevailed, and which the Israelis sought to
employ. No intention to do wrong was present, argues Miss Arendt, not
because Eichmann was following orders-all soldiers do so-but because
Eichmann was obeying a different kind of law; and the definition of
this law leads us, as do so many other questions in the book, back to
her conception of totalitarianism.
