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MICHAEL HARRINGTON
Traditional radicalism, particularly in its Marxist form, also
theorized about the "paper economy." In this version, economic de–
cisions were made by owners whose concern was with profit rather
than production. At best, prosperity was mis-shapen because resources
were allocated without real reference to their social usefulness; at worst,
this alienated pursuit of money eventually created too much of the
wrong thing, or poverty through glut. Historically, the entrepreneur
was the first incarnation of the new mechanism. But the very operation
of the system concentrated and centralized the economy, and it was
even conceivable that the state could become a single stock company.
Obviously Bazelon draws heavily on this tradition, yet his amend–
ment is a major one.
If
the new class of managers has actually achieved
decision-making power, if the owners have been reduced
to
passive
rentiers or chief executives of themselves, why does the old waf of
thinking and acting persist? Bazelon's answer, it seems to me, must
ultimately rest on a theory of mindlessness, intellectual perversity and
cultural lag. The Cheshire cat's smile lingers after the cat is gone. And
that makes illusion a bit too real.
True enough, very important men in the society often act with a
stupidity which shocks the radical theorist. Top executives of General
Electric have proclaimed their support of the eighteenth-century think–
ing of the National Education Program. And, according to Emmet
Hughes, a Big Businessman in the Eisenhower cabinet wanted to make a
"package deal" with the Chinese Communists-in order
to
balance the
American budget.
But these simple-minded captains of industry are not the real source
of power in America, as any Taft or Goldwater delegate to a Republican
Convention can attest. Then why do the shrewd intelligences, Wall
Street rather than Detroit, continue to sponsor the paper economy?
Ultimately, it will take empirical research rather than grand theory to
answer the question. In recent years, few sociologists have even bothered
with it. C. Wright Mills, who did bother, concluded that at the top
levels of power, birth (or property) is much more important than
education. I would continue that thought and argue that the corporation,
like the Medieval Church, is a meritocracy within well-defined limits.
The intelligences in the system must adapt to the irrationality of
property. The latter has become quite devious, sometimes appearing as
a public Foundation, but it remains central.
Bazelon's thesis, on the other hand, leads to a certain optimism.
If
the fundamental change has already taken place, if power has shifted
from property to education, then the problem is essentially intellectual,
