COMMUNIST INTENTIONS
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war; the question is rather whether the present Soviet leaders have
in fact done so.
If
they have, we may be sure that they have only
done so gradually, reluctantly, and, probably, only half consciously.
We may be sure that for a long time, even after the second World
War, they still adhered to the two Leninist propositions (a) that
further general war between Russia and "the Imperialists" was in–
evitable, and (b) that it should be postponed, by every possible
means, for as long as possible.
Let us notice at once, however, that the practical policies of a
government that believes that general war is inevitable, but must be
postponed by every possible means, will probably be very similar to
those of a government which supposes that war may be averted al–
together. This is especially true if one of the main hypotheses on which
the prognosis of inevitability is based begins to prove more and more
doubtful. That hypothesis was that, as the curve of communist
strength ascended, the curve of the strength of the rest of the world,
hopelessly bedevilled by the "inner contradictions" of capitalism,
would equally descend. For it was upon the basis of this hypothesis
that the communists concluded that the despairing capitalists would
be certain sooner or later to attack, foreseeing that if they delayed
too long their position would become hopeless.
In the real development of events over the last quarter century,
one part of this prognosis has been fulfilled. Communist strength has
grown greatly. But the other part of the prognosis has gone hope–
lessly astray. The non-communist world is unquestionably in a far
healthier and far stronger state than
it
was in, say, 1932. The ad–
vanced, industrialized, capitalisms are thriving instead of sinking into
intolerable stagnation. Consequently, as every Marxist ought (but
refuses) to accept, their wage earners have largely ceased to be open
to revolutionary propaganda. Their empires, which tum out to have
been a source of weakness, not of strength, to them, have become
"the underdeveloped world," which, with varying but appreciable
success, is at least striving to progress. The curve of the strength
of the non-communist world, instead of descending to intersect the
rising curve of communist strength, is running upwards somewhere
roughly parallel to it.
To what extent have the rulers of Russia noticed all this? Of
course it would never do for them to acknowledge any of it. We
