30
IRVING HOWE
existence. Despite the Berlin cnSIS, the long-range trend in Europe
is toward stabilization of the current political divisions, and this im–
plies a serious check to the expansionist ambitions of Communism. The
socio-economic recovery of Western Europe is a major and, on the
whole, a hopeful fact of the post-war years: it means that in a
number of countries with the highest level of political culture there
remain opportunities for experiment and initiative, even if these are
not being exploited at the moment.
2) Obviously it is desirable that the
U.S.
reorient its policies to
help movements of social reform, especially in the underdeveloped
countries. But this is not quite so easy as many liberals suppose. Far
more is needed than money, good will or even a new set of "images"
for America abroad. The Kennedy administration has been unimpres–
sive in this respect, as in so many others, and not because some of
its technical projects (e.g., Latin America) are unworthy of support
but because it has not thought out the implications, or shown a willing–
ness to face the risks, of presenting a new "image" to the world.
A new image requires a new substance, and a new substance
means first of all a sharp tum leftward
at home.
One reason the
New Deal aroused strong feelings throughout the world was that
Roosevelt, despite his frequent opportunism, was at several crucial
points ready to fight against his domestic opponents. He aligned
himself with, or took advantage of, significant mass movements and
sentiments, so that the dynamism of American political life in the
thirties came to seem an earnest of our intentions. By contrast, Ken–
nedy works almost entirely through a slick bureaucratic style: he is
committed to the politics of caution and compromise. One trouble
with his administration is that it is too damned clever, too clever in
the manner of Irish ward politics and too clever in the manner of
Harvard intellectual parties. It fails to understand that there are
times when a good hard fight, even if momentarily lost, is of greater
political and educative value than brilliant but confusing maneuvers.
(Perhaps, however, it doesn't see much to fight about ... ) It pro–
poses to create political images of America through a rhetoric with
little risk: no one is fooled, nor much impressed. At home all this
approach does is to incite the far right just enough to give it a new
confidence and aggression. In foreign policy there have been some
sensible achievements, apart from the Cuban disaster, but these tend
