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the democratic cause in France. Still, on grounds of principle there is
a certain bond between them and other moralists, and one would there–
fore expect some sympathy for them from writers who hold that political
institutions are grounded in natural law, and that the majority must be
compelled to be virtuous. But Jacobinism has a bad press at the mo–
ment, largely for reasons connected with the cold war, and Mr. Lipp–
mann is severe on it.
He seems to have been unduly impressed by Dr. Talmon's overrated
work on French revolutionary origins. It is becoming the fashion now
to discern two conflicting trends in French eighteenth-century "thought":
one liberal and tolerant, the other totalitarian and leading to Lenin.
This kind of game can be played endlessly, but when all possible varia–
tions have been exhausted there remains the problem of accounting for
Clemenceau, and through Clemenceau-in many ways the archetypal
French democrat-for the fact that Jacobin tradition has repeatedly
proved to be the mainspring of whatever public spirit there is in France;
much as the demand for a stronger executive, which runs through Mr.
Lippmann's book and causes him to be described as a "conservative" in
America, is in France put forward by Gaullist and neo-Jacobin heirs of
the revolutionary tradition. The best way to escape from these seeming
contradictions is to admit that the "public philosophy" is not the sole
property of disillusioned liberals.
That there
is
ground for concern over the present state of demo–
cratic institutions no one would wish to deny. Mr. Kennan, who
is
any–
thing but doctrinaire, in his new book adduces some very good additional
reasons for doubting whether democratic legislatures are really compe–
tent to formulate policy, especially "foreign" policy; although his sharp–
est criticism is reserved for the practice of passing high-sounding but
meaningless resolutions at the intergovernmental level. Perhaps the two
problems are connected. It is certainly the case that the British and
other Europeans were constantly baffled during the Second World War
by the American demand for generalized slogans of the "Four Freedoms"
type. But since the British were likewise fighting for democracy, and
the House of Commons maintained fairly close control over wartime
policy, it is arguable that this tendency is traceable not to the growing
pressure of public opinion upon the executive-Mr. Lippmann's chief
worry~but
to factors peculiar to the American political climate. In
any case the "Four Freedoms" did not interfere with Yalta, though they
apparently caused Roosevelt to demand some kind of face-saving for–
mula with regard to Poland-something to show the voters, in fact. With
the exception of this slightly discreditable episode it is difficult to think