THE OPPENHEIMER CASE
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basis for the final verdict against Oppenheimer. And to this task both
liberal critics addressed themselves-but with such fundamental differ–
ence that the unsophisticated reader must feel bewildered at the spec–
tacle of these two species of liberal criticism. Both critics adopt the
same (and legitimate) method: first, they provide some background
material which they believe is relevant, though not part of the official
transcript; next, they inquire into Dr. Oppenheimer's motives for be–
having as he did.
Nothing provides a better clue to the different readings of the
case than the choice of the background material. The Alsop brothers
recall the personal pressure upon Dr. Oppenheimer. In 1943, the pro–
ject at Los Alamos was still in its initial, most hectic stages. More im–
portantly, they invite us to consider the political climate of 1943. They
cite
Time Magazine,
which "was then criticizing the choice of Charles
E. Bohlen to accompany Cordell Hull on a mission to Moscow on the
ground that Bohlen was full of stuffy prejudices against the noble Rus–
sians." In short, they try to remind us that solid and respectable conser–
vative forces, in this country and abroad, showed an overwhelmingly
favorable attitude toward the USSR during the war.
Mrs. Trilling's background material looks quite different. She in–
vites us to consider "the liberal culture of the time." Her point-and
only
point- is to cite "the dominant liberal sentiment from the White
House down" as relevant material for explaining Oppenheimer's be–
havior. The implication is that, since this liberal culture consisted in a
flirtation with Communism and the Soviet Union, why should Dr.
Oppenheimer not have thought he was doing right by his Communist
associates when he protected them against security investigations? Mrs.
Trilling uses much stronger language: "Our current acute relations
with Russia . . . would very likely never have reached their present
point of crisis had not so much of the energy of liberalism been directed,
in the very period in which Dr. Oppenheimer failed to report Chevalier,
to persuading the American people that Russia was our great ally in–
stead of the enemy of democracy and peace . . ." That's going pretty
far in distributing causal and moral responsibility. But does it make
sense? Of course not. It is a terrible simplification of history. It is ab–
surd to blame, in causal or moral terms, American liberal thought in
the '40s for our "current acute relations with Russia." It is even more
absurd to suggest that, in 1943, "the dominant liberal sentiment from
the White House down" should have exposed Russia as the enemy of
democracy and peace. It would have been political suicide to do so.
I have news for Mrs. Trilling: we had other enemies then. And if
