THE AFTERMATH OF WAR
93
pace than most other countries and gradually exceeding the combined
output of Western Europe. In the light of these developments one
can scarcely go on maintaining that the institutions set up in 1945
are adequate, or that they can be shored up by the establishment
of a series of regional defense systems resting on nothing better than
a combination of outdated nationalism and airborne imperialism.
One can indeed argue that even in 1945 these dangers were
foreseen and that a conscious attempt was made to guard against
them. Was not one of the prime purposes of the United Nations
Charter the integration of the Soviet Union into the framework of
an international society, precisely because it was felt that failure in
this respect would split the world in two? And did not the U.S. gov–
ernment's atomic control proposals in 1946 spring from a similar
perception? One can only say that in both instances the scheme as–
sumed a balance of power which did not in fact exist, or which
ceased to exist after China had passed through revolution, and after
Russia had recovered from the war and developed her own atomic
weapons. It is no criticism of the planners to say that even their
most idealistic schemes presupposed effective American control of
the new world organization, including the projected international
atomic control commission. It is a simple tribute to their common
sense to note that even at the height of enthusiasm they did not
altogether overlook the fact that someone would have to make the
new global machinery work. That someone, needless to say, was to
be the United States, just as in the nineteenth century it had been
Britain. There is no discredit in admitting this; indeed, it would have
been better if it had been stated more plainly, instead of being con–
cealed behind a great deal of rather spurious rhetoric about the new
world society. \Vhat was wrong with the system was not that it
contained a built-in device for keeping it in touch with politico–
military reality, but that the calculation left out too many imponder–
ables. These included the totalitarian character of Soviet society, the
Stalinist drive to make capital investment in heavy industry prevail
over all other considerations, Russian mastery of the atom bomb,
the strength of Chinese Communism and its attraction for other
Asian revolutionary movements, and the inadequacy of neo-liberal
solutions in Europe, especially in countries like Italy, but also to
some extent in France. Last but not least, the planners trusted too
