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than science, which does not at any rate endeavor to conceal its
perplexity under high-sounding words?" True, the pathos of the '20s
is strange to our generation, but the actual situation as such is clear
and has long been perceived by critical observers. Rintelen empha–
sizes justly that the existential philosophers only very seldom come to
"determined decisions," but like to leave their attitude open, refusing
to answer, and showing determination only in their rejection of any
significant knowledge. He speaks of determined irresponsibility, de–
cisive indecision, and undecided resolution.
9
Thus existential philosophy forms one great circle which begins,
as its presupposition, with the truly "existential" perplexity over
against the objective world-and, logically, must end with it. Ob–
jectless resolution, vacuous vocation, the inexpressible and yet so much
talked-of existence, the withdrawal from the "world of premeditated
achievement" and the yearned-for "abiding in the neighborhood of
Being" beyond theory and practice are, in the last analysis, circum–
locutions for the fact that the existential philosopher cannot or will
not take part in the concrete tasks and problems of science and prac–
tical life. Before the actual decisions between true and false, good and
bad, right and wrong, friend and foe, he gladly retreats to the
il~dif
ference of personal existence. But since a being capable of action can–
not seriously stand "beyond theory and practice," the existential void
is then filled in with a particular attitude to life, and often the most
irresponsible: that of an aesthetic-romantic esotericism, which permits
the philosopher to "pass by, without despising them,'no the concrete
tasks of investigating and ordering the world.
v
It has been said that the problems of existential philosophy
are the expression of the present crisis of mankind. This proves on
closer examination however to be above all the crisis of a relatively
small group, namely of the European cultured class.
This cultured class, which is today exposed to a serious and
perhaps fatal threat, must be sharply distinguished from the groups
of scientific-technical experts, although in practice many overlappings
can occur. These two forms of European intelligence rely on entirely
different presuppositions. The position of the expert is based on objec-
