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PARTISAN REVIEW
this apocalyptic vision-well portrayed in recent literature by Silone,
Koestler, Camus, Milosz and others--is either dumb despair or a
suicidal readiness to die in the last ditch.
It
was to shake Europe out of this unhealthy frame of mind
that the Atlantic Pact was conceived. Within limits it may be said
to have done its work. But now comes the problem: suppose that
Europe, behind the NATO shield (including atomic artillery a..d all
the rest of it), begins to feel less exposed; assume further that Russia
abstains from overt threats, shows signs of adopting an "Asia First"
policy, and after a while perhaps, who knows, even begins to loosen
up internally and become less monstrous
as a society)·
cap these as–
sumptions by the thought that if peace is preserved for another decade
the Party regime may well be displaced by an Army dictatorship–
perhaps exercised in the name of Communism but nonetheless de–
voted first and foremost to the consolidation of the new socidy and
especially the new upper crust. What emerges from these by no
means purely academic thoughts is a hope that it may after
all
prove
possible to dissolve the present "ideological" alignment and return to
s~me
form of
Realpolitik)
with the rival powers pursuing limited aims,
coming to blows only for short periods and over restricted areas, and
even under the extreme provocation of war behaving with enough
circumspection to leave the fabric of civilization intact.
If
this pleasing prospect shows even the remotest sign of taking
on flesh, there is no reason to doubt that most of Europe will breathe
an enormous sigh of relief. Will the United States? That is perhaps
less certain. For the difference, it will readily be seen, is not quite so
radical from the American viewpoint as from the European. A "Bon–
apartist" regime in Russia-incidentally, why should
it
not be called
"Cromwellian?"-would still be an immense threat to the United
States; perhaps a bigger threat than the present "Directoire" whose
obvious lack of
charisma
must incline it to distrust the military
leaders and keep them on a short leash. A regime of this kind could
still battle America for control of Asia-and perhaps would. But its
impact upon Europe would no longer necessarily represent a com–
plete catastrophe. It might even discover reasons for playing up the
European element in the Russian heritage, at least to the extent of
purging itself of the more monstrous features of Stalinist totalitar–
ianism. It might, in short, do what Czarist Russia managed to do
