LETTER FROM ITALY
89
of thought control. The Prime Minister has underlined the meaning of
this measure by declaring that something must be done to prevent
freedom of the press from "degenerating into licence."
There should be no misunderstanding about these moves. De Gasperi
is no more ready to go neo-fascist now than he was willing to go
social democratic in 1945. He is neither a fascist nor a democrat, but
a moderate Catholic and a scrupulous bureaucrat of the old Austro–
Hungarian school at which he was formed before the First World War.
Believing as he does in administration by bureaucratic rule, he loathes
the degeneration of government into dictatorial irregularity much in
the same way that the accomplished career officer dreads the disruptive
influence of war on army discipline. Nobody can accuse De Gasperi
of boldness, or even of the slightest political imagination. When he
makes concessions to the right, his real intention is that they remain
as empty as the concessions he used to make to the opposite side. The
result is that, after having alienated the left, he is now considered a
rather clumsy appeaser by the right. ("White carnations are no weapon
against the Red Danger," say the fascists. The white carnation is the
emblem of Catholic youth.)
If
the Demochristian party were anything like a homogeneous
political formation, the position of honest and moderate De Gasperi
would remain strong indeed, simply because he is the only man of any
stature and political ability the party has been able to muster until
now. But the Demochristians constitute a very peculiar and treacherous
organism: an amalgam of a mass party, a political machine, and a
medley of conflicting economic interests, each component depending
on a different center of force. The mass party is supplied by the Vatican
and Catholic organization; the political machine is based on the huge
network of key positions the party has been able to build up throughout
the country during the six years it has remained in power; the economic
interests are simply the big vested interests of Italy, plus Catholic labor.
These ingredients are held together by only one agent: the fact that
the party is
in
power. Any shift
in
the political situation within the
country at large will threaten the whole structure. More particularly,
now that the Stalinists are politically neutralized, both the Vatican and
the economic monopolies are becoming very sensitive to the mounting
solicitations from the right for an authoritarian trend which would,
among other things, take care of the possible danger of an increased
Popular Front vote in the 1952 elections. In any case, for them, De
Gasperi's moderation is only an expedient. For his part, the present
Prime Minister would probably refuse to govern with the support of
the neo-fascists, should this become necessary to secure a majority.
