THE LENINIST MYTH OF IMPERIALISM
649
Quai d'Orsay, if the latter had not seen in the establishment of the
Tunisian protectorate an appropriate complement to the conquest of
Algeria.
Nor is it otherwise in the case of Morocco, in relation both to
Germany and to France. The Wilhelmstrasse took the Mannesmann
Brothers' concession under its protection not because it was under
orders of the concessionaires, but because
it
was glad to have a pretext
for intervening. It regretted the fact that banking circles and big
industry showed themselves so unconcerned with Morocco:
Die
deutschen Banken streiken geradezu aile, sobald man von Marokko
spricht
("All German banks simply go on strike the moment one
mentions Morocco"). After the agreement of 1911, when negotia–
tions were opened between the representatives of capital of the two
countries, it was the objections of the chancelleries and the political
apprehensions that brought about their collapse.
This survey could easily be extended. The celebrated Berlin–
Baghdad railroad was a political idea, and the German banks con–
sented to interest themselves in it-with great reluctance--only under
pressure from the Wilhelmstrasse. The bank of Rome extended its
operations in Tripoli at the instigation of the Italian minister of
foreign affairs.
It
was granted discount privileges on condition that
it would invest capital in Tripoli. Once these interests had been
created, the relationship was reversed, and the banks campaigned in
favor of an active policy. The diplomats created economic in–
terests, in the hope that the defense of these interests would result
in territorial acquisitions.
The legendary interpretation can readily be accounted for.
Colonialist statesmen, for instance Jules Ferry, constantly invoked
economic arguments--the prospect of acquiring naval bases, markets
for products, reserves of raw materials, etc. Nothing was easier
than to take such arguments literally and transform them into the
real causes. It is of course possible that such long-range interests were
among the motives of the statesmen. But what the documents dis–
close is that the initiative came from them. And it is a fact that in
each epoch conquerors have found different formulas for dissimulat–
ing the will to power, which appears to be one of the constant traits
of the European communities.
It is incontestable that once a territory has been acquired, enter-
