BOO KS
711
I find that whenever an American suggests that we act in accordance
with the needs of our own security he is apt to be called a god-damned
fascist or imperialist, while if Uncle Joe suggests that he needs the
Baltic Provinces, half of Poland, all of Bessarabia and access to the
Mediterranean, all hands agree that he is a fine, frank, candid and
generally delightful fellow who is very easy to deal with because he
is
so explicit in what he wants.
And, like Kennan, he feared above all the creation of "vacuums"
which could only serve to attract the restless and expanding power of
the Soviet Union.
Yet he lacked Kennan's brooding tragic sense; somewhere along the
way his compassion had been eroded. There was a narrowness to his
immediate reactions, as when he argued with Truman that Henry
Wallace, then on his zany trip to Europe, should have his passport
withdrawn; or, as when he assumed that all who opposed him in the
bitter Palestine controversy were concerned with the Jewish vote in
the United States- an assumption as unworthy as that of his opponents
who said that he was acting on behalf of the oil companies. As against
this narrowness, one notes the moderation and wisdom of Harriman,
who of all the characters mentioned in the diaries, perhaps comes out
best. From the start, Harriman's analysis and predictions, as noted
down by Forrestal, were remarkably clairvoyant; Harriman under–
stood the full implications of the Soviet menace; yet he never succumbed
to the hardness which was the face Forrestal's insecurity wore to the
world. Forrestal was all drive; and there was no surcease in
him.
Lack–
ing inner serenity, he came to find it harder and harder to make deci–
sions. Indecision, in the end, tore
him
down and drove him on to the last
decision, terrible and irrevocable. Still, he was a man of courage and
character. The nation remains greatly in his debt.
The bitter experience of the past generation will be entirely wasted
if
Americans do not accept Kennan's and Forrestal's basic point–
that the only solid foundation of national action is national interest.
But they must understand, as Kennan does, that this point is the
beginning, and not the end, of wisdom. They must accept it within
the framework of a larger acceptance of the complexity, indeterminacy,
insolubility, and above all, deep sadness of history. Only such an accept–
ance can prevent a sense of national interest from turning into a con–
viction of national infallibility.
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
