448
PARTISAN REVIEW
France and
in
Europe a certain number of critical remarks about
American and French foreign policy, and by generalizing them into a
formula. The state of mind is real and deserves serious attention. The
critical remarks are often pertinent, and in any case worth discussing.
The term is equivocal.
Let's start from the state of mind. Its substance is sick disgust at the
prospect of war. To realize the impact of this feeling on the French
and European mind, one must realize that the war that threatens the
world appears to most people in Europe as a kind of neutral fact-a
cosmic accident that would occur not so much because some ruler wanted
it, but because one ruler was unable to prevent it. Which is one reason
why "neutralism," as a catchword and a pretendedly possible course of
action, is entirely inadequate to express the feeling (Aron's considerations
are much more pertinent).
Aside from the feeling, there are two main arguments, which are
simple enough to impress public opinion in general, and not just people
of a certain political persuasion. They h ave been repeated by the
press not only in France, but all over the world. The first was expressed
by a British M.P. in the following way: "We are telling each other
that in two years we shall h ave an efficient army. But, if such is the
case, why should the Soviets wait two years?" The second consists of
the simple observation: "America can afford to lose a battle, and even
all the battles except the last. But Europe can give only one battle.
If
that one is lost, everything is lost." With this sort of apprehension we
touch the rock bottom of French and European morale. Call it "de–
moralization," call it "defeatism," or call it "common sense," it is a
fact. Nothing can change it, except facts that would give both hope
and strength.
If
"neutralism" as an answer to such apprehensions is so
weak, it is because it is the rationalization of European fears rather than
a possible fact, or a convincing argument.
The most pointed criticism of Atlantic policies has been voiced,
during the last few months, in
Le monde,
by Etienne Gilson, the
scholar, and Hubert Beuve Mery, the editor of the paper. Whereas
Gilson has even recently insisted on the notion that French and
European neutrality, the constitution of a kind of international Third
Force, could be a way of softening the rigors of the cold war, Beuve
Mery, on his part, has never appealed to such a notion. In any case,
both Gilson's and Beuve Mery's arguments can be expressed without
having recourse to the theory of neutrality. Fundamentally, Gilson's
position consists of one simple statement: "France must have a (foreign)
policy corresponding to its means." In other words, rearmament is
