ORTEGA
267
history. Historical reason is taking the place of vital reason. Basically,
however, the subject is still the same; only the perspective has
changed.
Life--our own life and others' lives-is given us immediately.
It can be contemplated, felt, intuited, consummated. But it
is
never
completely comprehended in thought. The concrete opposes an
unconquerable resistance to abstraction. It
is
exactly the same with
history. History is the realm of chance events.
It
is chance that a
Napoleon was born. And it is chance that Corsica was sold to France
by the Genoese in 1768, so that Napoleon could be born French.
The historian can later attempt to construct a meaningful sequence
from the chance events of history. That is why history has been said
to "give meaning to the meaningless." The immense material of the
past must be organized and made intelligible. In late antiquity and
the middle .ages this was accomplished by the concept of the four
successive world empires, of which the last was supposed to be the
Roman. This concept was later replaced by the very unsatisfactory
division into Antiquity, the Middle Ages, and the Modern Age.
Next, Spengler and Toynbee (the latter using improved methods)
showed cultures to be the subjects of the historical process. Toynbee's
doctrine of history is the latest and most impressive synthesis that we
possess. By such a method the material of history can be mastered,
the causality of events can be comprehended. But what can never be
successfully done is to demonstrate that the course of history has a
logical necessity. To be sure, Hegel made a profound attempt to
accomplish it. But he had to create a new logic for the purpose, in
which ideas were given the power of movement. And this logical
system he posited as the substratum for the movement of history. It
is with
this
that Ortega reproaches
him.
He himself repeats Hegel's
attempt with other means. History-not physics-is for Ortega the
basic reality. Stars, plants, and animals have nature. Man, instead of
nature, has history. Hence it is the task of thought to raise history
to a system. The evolution of man is not merely change, it is growth.
Each stage includes those which preceded
it.
Hence man under–
stands himself only when he understands the entire past. History is,
or ought to be, a systematic knowledge of the basic reality which is my
life. But the intellectual activity which puts us in touch with truth
is reason. Hence history must become a science of reason. When it
