PARIS LETTER
165
as it creates situations that are both reactionary and inextricable. In
the third place, there is the conviction that "an anticommunist Left has
no chance of success whatsoever," since the Left today is condemned to
collaborate with vested interests against Stalinism, or to try to impose
some form of state socialism which in continental Europe would in–
evitably assume an authoritarian, that is a Stalinist, character. Finally
there is the fourth theme of "defeatism": "War is unthinkable and
anything at all is preferable to it." This proposition carries a lot of
weight especially if one remembers how difficult, and in certain cases
impossible, it already was for Europe to resign itself to the war against
Hitler. Now, the war against Hitler had at least a clear moral justifica–
tion, while a crusade against Communism would be crawling with
nasty ambiguities.
"Each one of these arguments," concluded Servan Schreiber, "con–
tains a part of hard truth which would be difficult indeed not to ad–
mit. Each one is moreover endowed with the form:dable property of
making its supporters look like men of good will or realists, and its ad–
versaries like wishful thinkers or criminals."
Servan Schreiber devoted the next four articles to the illustration of
the thesis that Europe cannot be saved by anybody if she doesn't her–
self take care of the salvation in the first place, and that the respon–
sibility for defeatism lies squarely on her governing classes. He went as
far as to write: "Finally, we must have the courage to state bluntly
that if the cowardice of her ruling classes should persist, Western Europe
would be better defended and Fascism made less probable under the
rule of American
Gauleiters."
Servan Schreiber's analysis of defeatism is basically correct. In spite
of a political regression that has undoubtedly had its repercussions
among the rank and file in the form of "titoist" grumblings, Stalinism
remains a compact mass in France. It has lost many sympathizers es–
pecially among the intellectuals. The circulation of Stalinist papers has
decreased steadily since 1947
(L'Humanite,
for example, has fallen
from 400,000 in 1947 to 246,000 in October 1949). But then the cir–
culation of all organs of opinion has gone down. Only the moderate
Figaro,
the vaguely pro-Gaullist but really Radical Socialist
Aurore,
the
reactionary
Parisien Libere
and especially the sensational
France-Soir
have increased their circulation, together with the sport daily
L'equipe.
Sartre had already said that the biggest party in France consists of
those who don't belong to any party and don't go to the polls on
election day. This is becoming truer and truer, but it is to the advan–
tage of nobody in particular. Hence a solid party machine like the
