RELIGION AND THE INTELLECTUALS
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These ideas seem to me mistaken. The only thing relevant to
the validity of the revival is the validity of each conversion; my im–
pression is that the revival is stronger among semi- and non-intellectu–
als than among intellectuals; the conversion of intellectuals is of
interest but of only superficial importance; those whose primary
concern with religion is to make it useful are as wide of the mark as
those who try to use art for purposes other than its own. And al–
though most people (including myself) seem bound to try to judge
the validity of a given conversion (I am dubious of nearly every one
I have seen, and that's not to mention the atrocious quality,
and motive, of most of the Press on the whole matter), I doubt
that anyone short of God can judge that anywhere near correctly,
and suggest that there is probably no apparent cause, however
trivial or suspect, which may not bring a genuine conversion, and
no conversion, however well-arrived at it may appear, which may not
be spurious.
I do, however, very much doubt that the intellectual or anyone
else can become converted through pragmatic reasons, or ideas of
historical propriety or necessity; religion can be so utilized and
rationalized, but that isn't what it is. Certainly the final difficulty,
for the intellectual only a little more so than for others, is that the
crucial gap between religious belief and non-belief cannot be closed–
still less kept closed-rationally.
HANNAH ARENDT
1. The belief that "all events have their causes" is not
specific for a "naturalistic point of view"; naturalism attempts to
demonstrate that all events have
natural
causes but takes the principle
of causality itself for granted. This is more than a mere quibble be–
cause causality has played a very important role in all theological
discussions of the past. Medieval arguments, "proving" the existence
of God, were frequently based on it, i.e. on the notion that every–
thing that is, must have a cause. Genuine atheistic positions, on the
other hand, are frequently characterized by the denial of a chain of
causality and the assumption of the accidental and coincidental
character of all events.
If
no chain of causality linking one event
