Karl Jaspers
PHILOSOPHY AND SCIENCE
Philosophy has from its very beginnings looked upon itself
as science, indeed as science
par excellence.
To achieve the highest
and most certain knowledge is the goal that has always animated its
devotees.
How its scientific character came to be questioned can be un–
derstood only in the light of the development of the specifically mod–
em sciences. These sciences made their greatest strides in the nine–
teenth century, largely outside philosophy, often in opposition to philo–
sophy, and finally in .an atmosphere of indifference to it.
If
philosophy
was still expected to be a science, it was in a different sense than be–
fore: it was now expected to be a science in the same sense as those
modem sciences that convince by virtue of their accomplishments.
If
it were unable to do so, it was argued, it had become pointless and
might just as well die out.
Some decades ago, the opinion was widespread that philosophy
had had its place up to the moment when all the sciences had be–
come independent of it, the original universal science. Now that
all possible fields of research have been marked off, the days of
philosophy are over. Now that we know how science obtains its
universal validity, it has become evident that philosophy cannot
stand up against judgment by these criteria. It deals in empty ideas,
because it sets up undemonstrable hypotheses, it disregards experience,
it seduces by illusions, it takes possession of energies needed for gen–
uine investigation, and squanders them in empty talk about the whole.
This was the picture of philosophy .as seen against science con–
ceived as methodical, cogent, universally valid insight. Under such
circumstances, could any philosophy legitimately claim to be scienti–
fic? To this situation philosophy reacted in two ways:
