506
PARTISAN REVIEW
on the stage grin knowingly (the Poles were particularly amused) and
then applaud vigorously his peroration in behalf of God's path as the
only way to peace, was to see in miniature the maddening absurdities
of our political-cultural situation. What preposterous reasoning could
have led a retired clergyman from Utah to share, with beaming self–
delight, a platform with a commissar from Russia ? And the worst of
it
was that the poor man
(he looks so much like the Dean)
seemed totally
oblivious to the indecency of the farce in which he played the pious
jester.
The other speakers, Harlow Shapley, O. John Rogge, and T. O.
Thackrey, then editor of
The New York Post,
began with slurred cri–
ticisms of Russian "restrictions on liberty" and then launched detailed
denunciations of U.S. foreign policy. This political line, while extremely
useful to Stalinism, is not to be identified with it. It is something rather
new, and on the following day received its most sophisticated intellect–
ual development by Frederick Schuman.
If,
as seems probable, there will not be a war in the next two or
three years, and if, as also seems probable, the Marshall plan does not
solve the fundamental problem of European economy, the Schuman–
Rogge position may become a serious factor in American political life.
The cold war rankles-why not reach a cold agreement? Why not
divide the world on a bluntly imperial basis, allowing the Russians free
reign in "their" sphere of influence in order to be rid of the annoyances
of the western Communist Parties? The idea of formalizing the world's
split-in the name, of course, of one world-will be attractive to those
who fear war and feel no sense of rebellion against either Stalinism or
capitalism. Hence the Schuman-Rogge position, half a cynical imperial–
ist proposal for the U.S. and half a proposal for the appeasement of Rus–
sia, could be advanced alternately or simultaneously
in
the name of peace
and
Realpolitik.
To gain large popular support, such a position would
have to be presented by politicians untainted with Stalinist associations;
various new leaders or semi-isolationists might find useful the position
Schuman and Rogge have prepared for them. The Russians might then
find powerful new allies in the U.S.-allies, not apologists. For Fadeyev's
polemic against Schuman notwithstanding, they are likely to feel that
powerful allies are more useful than powerless apologists. The possibility
of such a new political formation a few years hence may have been one
reason why the Stalinists tolerated the anti-Russian remarks of the con–
ference speakers to an extent that would have been impossible dur–
ing the 'thirties.
Then again, the Stalinists had no alternative. Few prominent Ameri-
