ON THE PHILOSOPHICAL BATTLEFRONT
sell's epistemology, especially since for Russell the meaning of state–
ments about such actions are theoretically expressible by complex
sets of statements about sense-data. Even the importance of Rus–
sell's work on the foundations of mathematics is minimized by Corn–
forth. He declares, for example, that the important discoveries in
pure logic (those by Goede! are intended) concerning the impos–
sibility of proving certain formal systems to be consistent, are "fatal"
to Russell's account of the nature of mathematics. But the fact
is that Goedel's researches do not bear on Russell's central thesis, while
on the other hand Goedel's own work rests squarely on Russell's previous
labors.
Cornforth devotes special attention to Carnap. However, he dis–
cusses only views held by Carnap prior to 1935, and ignores the fact
that the latter has abandoned his earlier identification of philosophy
with the syntactical analysis of language. This is a disastrous oversight
in the case of a school of thought still undergoing development. On the.
other hand, even the criticisms of Carnap's earlier doctrines fail to hit
any recognizable target. Cornforth asserts Carnap to hold that scientific
statements refer to nothing beyond the words contained in them, and
in consequence he easily convicts Carnap of gross absurdity. But un–
fortunately for Cornforth's case, nothing that Carnap said yields the
consequences Cornforth exhibits. For to say as Carnap at one time did
that the subject-matter of
philosophic
analysis consists of the statements
made in the sciences, is not to maintain that the subject-matter of the
sciences
consists of statements. Cornforth also attacks logical positivism
for holding that the "protocol statements" which formulate the outcome
of observations intended to test a scientific hypothesis are "arbitrary";
and he declares that for positivists scientific method is nothing but an
"arbitrary juggling with statements." Yet all that he can quote to
support this indictment, is the positivist characterization of protocols as
"needing no justification." Is there, however, no difference between the
claim that observations need no justification (because, as formulations of
brute, contingent data, no theoretical demonstration can be given for
them), and the claim that such statements are irresponsibly arbitrary? And
finally, Cornforth rejects as absurd the positivistic thesis of "physicalism"–
the thesis that all meaningful statements must be verifiable in terms of
observable traits of physical objects found in ordinary experience. He
rejects this doctrine, because it allegedly "reduces" everything to "mo–
tions of matter," and therefore prohibits the recognition of specifically
social behaviors and distinctions. In point of fact, however, and in spite
of its name, physicalism is not a metaphysical doctrine about the ultimate
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