334
PARTISAN REVIEW
But for
whom
shall I fight? My end is to attain being; let us rei–
terate, this is not a question of egoism; the concept of interest reposes on
the concept of a completed self, towards which my subjective self might
transcend itself, taking it for a supreme objective; instead of aiming my–
self, by this scheme, towards different objectives of an I, which exists no–
where as given; to seek to be is to seek
the
being: for there is only being
by virtue of the presence of a subjectivity which veils it, and perforce the
essence of my subjectivity is that I press towards him. I struggle then
for being. I struggle to possess this plaything, this jewel, to make this
journey, to eat this fruit, to build this house. But that is not all. I dress
up, I travel, I build, among men. I cannot live mewed up in an ivory
tower. It is the error of such theories as those of art for art's sake to
imagine that a poem or a picture is something self-sufficient and inhuman;
it is an object made by man, for man. Certainly it is made neither for
diversion nor for edification; it corresponds to and satisfies no prior neces–
sity; it is the superseding of the past, a gratuitous and free invention; yet,
in its newness, it demands understanding and justification, men must
love it, desire it, and continue it. The artist cannot be detached from the
condition of the men around him. His own flesh is in pawn to others.
Then I will fight, that free men may give the necessary place to my
actions and my works.
But how return at this point to the struggle, since these men ought
to give me support of their own free will? It is absurd, certainly, to wish
to obtain spontaneous admiration and love by violent means: we laugh
at Nero who wished to seduce by force. I desire that others should recog–
nize the validity of my actions, that they should do their best for them
by reckoning with them for the future; but I cannot expect a like recog–
nition if from the start I contradict the schemes of others; they will only
view me as an obstacle. My calculation is bad
if
I compel any man to
live when he would rather die, under the pretext of needing a companion
who should justify my existence; he will live to be my slanderer. Respect
for the liberty of others is no abstract rule; it is a prime condition for
the success of my efforts. I can only appeal for it to the liberty "f others,
not achieve it by constraint ; I can invent the most pressing appeals and
attempt to charm men, but they will remain free, whatever I may do, to
answer or to ignore these appeals.
Only, to establish this relationship with others, two conditions are
necessary. First that I should be allowed to appeal. ,So I would fight
against those who would stifle my voice, would prevent my self-expression
and hinder my existence. In order that I might exist with free men I
should often be obliged to treat certain men as mere things. The prisoner
will kill his gaoler in order to rejoin his comrades; it is a pity that the
gaoler cannot be a comrade too, but it would be the more a pity if the
prisoner never had a comrade again.
