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this is often the truth. Such a situation presents rather difficult questions.
The influential newspapers which served the Nazi cause have not yet
been formally confiscated. Every capitalist who is charged with collabora–
tion proves that he "protected his workers," and produced for the Wehr–
macht only to "save French industrial equipment." The profiteers of
defeat and treason have kept their booty.
The nationalization of the mines in Northern France and the com–
mandeering of the Renault factories are symbolical gestures, serious at
that. The large-scale measures of economic planning and nationaliza–
tion, still remain on the agenda but the government apparently wants
to await the election results and the end of the war; in short, to gain
time while remaining indecisive, all of which favors the survivors of the
influential bourgeoisie and the profiteers of darker times. The French
Government is obviously afraid of displeasing the Allies and of entering
a period of internal crisis in the course of which it would remain to be
seen whether the Communist Party would lean towards social planning
or toward a maximum restoration of capitalism. As for the Communist
Party itself, it does not even know the answer to this question and has no
power to decide upon it.
The new Franco-Soviet pact did not bring forth anything very sub–
stantial in its polished text and only repeats the policy of a similar pact
that Pierre Laval concluded in Moscow in 1935. This agreement was,
however, hailed by all parties without exception as a great diplomatic
achievement. Its main result was the appeasement of the Communist
Party which, within a few days, returned to very moderate language.
Stabilization and procrastination of internal politics have been given
new life. For the time being, there is much more talk of rebuilding France
as a military power than of social and economic reorganization. But this
military strength will be used against whom, and why? Germany of to–
morrow will be crushed. The war effort, however, allows the postponement
of other plans, and finds its justification in the following reasoning:
If
we do not resume our position as a military power, we risk being treated
in the same way as the small nations. Another point: a strong army
would necessarily become an important factor in internal politics, and
might even decide, in case of civil war, between public opinion and the
government. Survivors of the Right can hope to find good jobs in the
high command, and the party in power, acting in accordance with a
certain foreign policy, and using totalitarian ways, can build high hopes
on the existence of a strong army.
On the other hand, it is also obvious that if France is resuming the
productiDn of arms, she has no illusions on the possibility of a world or–
ganization capable of assuring her security. France is consciously sacrific–
ing the possibility of rapidly resuming a high standard of living.
In conclusion, let us summarize what I have said. Firstly, no large
political movement will be able to make itself known without the support
