LIONS AND FOXES
191
tries to put over his political faith with a great show of moral right–
eousness which he often substitutes for analysis. In addition, as
I shall show later, Macdonald is remarkably adroit at side-stepping
the problems raised by Burnham-or, for that matter, by the events
of the last few decades. All of which makes it only more difficult to
come to grips with these problems.
1.
Let us begin with Burnham's argument. It consists of two
main points distinct in themselves but formally and rather arbitrarily
tied together by Burnham: namely, that Stalin is a "great man" and
not the mediocrity and supreme ward-heeler of the left painted by
Trotsky, and that there is no reaf historic break between Leninism–
or Marxism- and Stalinism. Burnham's other observations, which
seem to make such neat targets for Macdonald's moral artillery, are
largely subsidiary to Burnham's premises and conclusions.
If
they of–
fend one's radical sensibilities, still the question remains whether
they are true or not- and that brings
u~
right back to Burnham's basic
argument.
On the question of Stalin's capacities I find nothing "menacing"
in Burnham's pointing to the discrepancy between Stalin's undeniable
achievements and a certain boldness, or at least, ruthlessness, of
action, and Trotsky's image of Stalin, still accepted in most left–
wing circles, as a dim-visioned, plodding, over-cautious, petty
schemer: the "outstanding mediocrity in the party." I do not propose
to go into the question of just how "great" a man Stalin is, which
seems to have intrigued Macdonald and others, for it can lead only
to endless quibbles, involving prior definitions .of "greatness." True
enough, Burnham seems to have overstated his case, but, here too, it
is
his
case
that we are primarily concerned with and not with any
gratuitous psychological speculations about Burnham's
motives
or
compulsions. The fact is, to return to the question of Stalin's poli–
-tical leadership, it has become more and more obvious in the last
years that the standard conception of Stalin and his regime could
not account for its "successes." In this respect, I am inclined to go
even further than Burnham in reexamining the question. We must, at
this point, ask ourselves why so many predictions and revolutionary
expectations of the left opposition to Stalin have been belied by his–
tory: why, for example, many of us expected a disaffection of the
Soviet people, especially during the strain of a major war; why we
did not count on Russian industry or the Red Army standing up as
