THE "GERMAN PROBLEM"
103
and deserters from the Reichswehr. The Resistance knows of the
existence of a German underground, for the millions of foreign work–
ers and prisoners of war in the Reich have had ample opportunities
to avail themselves of its services. A French officer, describing how
French prisoners in Germany made contact with French forced labor
and with the underground in France proper, speaks of the German
underground in matter of fact terms, emphasizing that such contact
would have been impossible "without the active help of German
soldiers and workers." He speaks, too, of having left "many good
friends among the Germans before we cut through the barbed wire."
Even more striking i<>
his
disclosure that the German underground
count<> on the help of Frenchmen in Germany "at the moment of the
final coup" and that organized cooperation between the two groups
had led to the divulgence to the French of the location of the arms
stored by the German underground.
These details are cited in order to make clear the actual expe–
rience underlying the programs of the Resistance with respect to
Germany. This experience has in turn made more cogent the attitude
that has for some years now been characteristic of European anti–
fascists and which has recently been defined by Bernanos as "l'espoir
en des hommes disperses
a
travers !' Europe, separes par les frontieres
et par la langue, et qui n'ont guere de commun entre eux que !'ex–
perience du ric;que et !'habitude de ne pas ceder
a
la menace."
4.
The return of the Governments-in-exile may quickly put a stop
to this new feeling of European solidarity, for the very existence of
these governments depends on the restoration of the status quo. Hence
their inveterate tendency is to weaken and disperse the resistance
movements with the aim of destroying the political renaissance of the
European people.s.
Restoration in Europe appears today in the form of three fun–
damental concepts. First there arose the concept of collective security,
which is in reality not a new concept but one taken over from the
happy times of the Holy Alliance; it was revived after the last war
in
the hope that it would serve as a check on nationalistic aspirations
and
aggression.
If
this system went to pieces, however, it was not
because of such aggression but because of the intervention of ideologi–
cal factors. Thus Poland, for instance, though threatened by Germany,
refused the help of the Red Army in spite of the fact that in her case
collective security could hardly go into effect without such help. The
