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PARTISAN REVIEW
know?" and he italicizes the
"I."
He does not deny the egocentnc1ty
of his method (just as he does not deny: the charge of "atomism"), and
there is no doubt that it is central to his point of view. It is evident
enough, certainly, in his perennial attempt to track down psychological
primitives to serve as the ultimate warrants of belief and the simples of
traditional epistemology. But his egocentricity goes beyond theory of
knowledge-so far and so consistently, in fact, as to constitute. a state of
mind. It is practically the substance of his ethical theory, in which the
good and the bad are the objects of desire and aversion, respectively;
this is saying that the individual is the center, and the standard, of Mr.
Russell's ethical universe. His egocentricity is carried over int01 his polit–
ical philosophy as a matter of course, at least insofar as he feels the need
to ground historical analysis in individual instinct and impulse. With
regard to his treatment of Russia, incidentally, which condemned
Bolshevism as early as
1920
with a prescience generated as much per–
haps by the essential simplicity of his analytical tools as by genuine
sociological insight, the Stalinist apology by
V.
J. McGill is a masterpiece
of philosophic calm and irrelevance. It sometimes reaches this level:
"Increasingly it is being recognized, as the War progresses, that, just as
Hitler represents the predatory power of big German industrialists and
Junkers, so Stalin symbolizes the embattled power of the vast majority
of Russian people, workers of hand and brain, of the city and the coun–
try,'; a level which turns one in favor of Mr. Russell's brand of simplicity,
which, if it exists, is only methodological.
In very general terms, it is probably fair to say that Russell
is
ultimately unsatisfactory (apart from his contributions to symbolic logic
and the foundations of mathematics, of course, which are common
property) because he has no respect for the philosophic dignity of the
social event. This is not to say that as citizen or scientist he does not take
society seriously; it is obvious that he does and that in return certain
elements in society are very concerned about him. Rather, it is plain
that the social situation does not measure up to his notion of what a
proper starting-point, or a legitimate sovereignty, ought to be. He cannot
take the knowledge-situation as philosophically significant, informed as
it is by a common sense mainly social in character. In his political anal–
yses, the levelling off of power to the status of a primary motive shows
the same lack of respect for the. irreducibility of the social process. And
in his ethics and philosophy of religion, only the bare outlines of a
minimum personal expression are visible; there is no surrender to provoc–
ative social myth, and if a wisdom of the ages exists, Mr. Russell does not
speak for it.
As Mr. Schilpp points out in his editorial preface, Mr. Russell's re–
plies are brief, due apparently to his consternation at the lack of un–
derstanding of his philosophy exhibited by some of the contributors. Mr.
Schilpp takes this as a challenge-how seriously it is impossible to say-
