MR. WHEELWRIGHTS WISDOM
41
heelwright assumes a remarkable prescience as to what
will be
the
structure of physical theory
in
terms of which human behavior may
"ultimately" be explicable. He is convinced that no
practically ade–
quate
physical explanation
will
ever be forthcoming. He m,ay of
course be right. But a hundred years ago he would doubtless have
claimed with the same assurance that no practically adequate theory
of mechanics would ever explain the phenomena of heat; and in this
case he would most certainly have been wrong. Like everyone else,
I do not
know
whether an explanation of human behavior in terms
of some general theory of physics will ever oe achieved. I do believe,
however, that the hypothesis that such explanations may be given,
has been, and continues to be, a most fruitful one, and is worth
exploring to the utmost. But in the second place, Mr. Wheelwright
introduces a glaringly red herring when he raises the question of the
contingency of human behavior. In what way is the "openness" of
time more relevant for the discussion of human behavior than it is for
the study of inorganic phenomena? Is not his poiJ?t concerning the
alleged impossibility of an all-comprehensive formula just as pertinent
for a philosophy of natural science as it is for a theory of human
nature? The clear answer is that his observations are just as relevant
and pertinent to the one case as they are to the other; he
is
therefore
guilty of an obvious
non-sequitur
when he concludes to the inadequacy
in matters of morals of the logical canons operative in physical inquiry.
What has the alleged fact that the decisive actions of men defy the
best laid predictions to do with the question whether there are other
canons of cognitive validity than those employed and recognized in
the positive sciences? Do best laid predictions in matters physical never
go astray? And does he believe that the "human canons" he finds
expressed in great works of literature enable us to anticipate the
"epoch-moulding" acts of men? Surely his answer to this last question
must be in the negative. But if the answer is negative, precisely what
limitations of scientific method are exhibited by the fact that works
of literature have a special subject-matter? Mr. Wheelwright has
certainly produced no competent evidence to show that the "wisdom"
he finds in such books as Plato's
Symposium
or
Hamlet
is not capable
of "verification by the strict techniques of science"-unless, indeed,
he begs the question at issue by equating "the strict techniques of
science" with "the techniques of physical measurement."
Mr. Wheelwright is primarily a moralist whose chief concern is
