112
PARTISAN REVIEW
ality' as against 'materialism.' On the one hand an uncritical reverence
for everything Oriental; on the other a hatred of the West generally,
and of Britain in particular, hatred of science and the machine, suspicion
of Russia, contempt for the working-class conception of Socialism. The
whole adds up to Parlour Anarchism-a plea for the simple life, based
on dividends. Rejection of the machine is, of course, always founded on
tacit acceptance of the
m~chine,
a fact symbolised by Gandhi as he plays
with his spinning-wheel in the mansion of some cotton millionaire. But
Gandhi also comes into the picture in another way. It is noticeable that
both Gandhi and Mr. Fielden have an exceedingly equivocal attitude
towards the present war. Although variously credited in this country with
being a 'pure' pacifist and a Japanese agent, Gandhi has, in fact, made
so many conflicting pronouncements on the war that it is difficult to keep
track of them. At one moment his 'moral support'l.s with the Allies, at
another it is withdrawn, at one moment he thinks it best to come to
terms with the Japanese, at another he wishes to oppose them by non–
violent means-at the cost, he thinks, of several million lives-at another
he urges Britain to give battle in the west and leave India to be invaded,
at another he 'has no wish to harm the Allied cause' and declares that
he does not want the Allied troops to leave India. Mr. Fielden's views
on the war are less complicated, but equally ambiguous. In no place does
he state whether or not he wishes the Axis to be defeated. Over and
over again he urges that an Allied victory can lead to no possible good
result, but at the same time he disclaims 'defeatism' and even argues that
Indian neutrality would be useful to us in a
militarV'
sense, i.e. that we
could fight better if India were not a liability. Now, if this means any–
thing, it means that he wants a compromise, a negotiated peace; and
though he fails to say so, I do not doubt that that is what he does want.
But curiously enough, this is the
imperialist
solution. The appeasers have
always wanted neither defeat nor victory but a compromise with the
other imperialist powers ; and they too have known how to use the mani–
fest folly of war as an argument.
For years past the more intelligent imperialists have been in favour
of compromising with the Fascists, even if they had. to give away a good
deal in order to do so, because they have seen that only thus could im–
perialism be salvaged. Some of them are not afraid to hint this fairly
broadly even now.
If
we carry the war to a destructive conclusion, the
British Empire will either be lost, or democratised, or pawned to America.
On the other hand it could and probably would survive in something
like its present form if there were other sated imperialist powers which
had an interest in preserving the existing world system.
If
we came to
an understanding with Germany and Japan we might diminish our
possessions (even that isn't certain: it is a little-noticed fact that
in terri–
tory
Britain and the U.S.A. have gained more than they have lost in
this war) , but we should at least be confirmed in what we had already.
The world would be split up between three or four great imperial powers
