VARIETY
477
ernments. I still do. Before the
war I supported, as internal pol–
icy, a
United Front
on military
goals with any democratic govern–
ment fighting a Fascist counter–
revolution or invasion
(e.
g.
Spain).
I still do. But before
the war broke out I was opposed
to support of foreign war against
Hitler for two reasons.
(l)
There
still seemed some chance that in
!<ranee and elsewhere labor and
its allies might come to power on
an anti-fascist and pro-socialist
program; (2) I believed that Hit–
ler could hardly stand up against
the military alliance of democratic
countries. The coming of war
invalidated the first reason, and
within one year Hitler was at the
English channel, in possession of
the strongest force in history. It
was then that I urged that military
aid he sent to England even at the
risk of our involvement. For
though I realized that the risk to
democracy and to the possibility
of socialism was very grave as a
result of the war, I was then, as
now, convinced that a Nazi mili–
tary victory would destroy existing
democratic institutions and cut off
the hope for socialism, whereas a
Nazi defeat might well produce
conditions favorable to the revival
of the workers' movement in Eu–
rope. Merian's program not only
opposed military aid to England
but actually called upon the Eng–
lish workers to refuse military
support to their own government.
This program, if adopted, would
have insured Hitler's conquest of
England. Finally, in the past as
well as the present, I have opposed
a
National Front,
a one-sided truce
that binds labor to accept in
advance whatever interpretation
other classes put upon the national
emergency and which hampers the
cli"Qt1
tQ
JP!dc<'
l~
1JDequal the
burdens and sacrifices of the com–
mon struggle.
Merian explains his statement
that the question of political
support of the war has no prac–
tical significance on the ground
that "the military victory of the
Allies" is now practically assured.
If
this is so, then it is precisely
because the labor movement of
England and the United States did
not
follow Merian's line; because
aid
was
sent to countries fighting
Hitler; because the workers of
democratic countries at war with
Hitler did
not
contend, as Merian
did, that their
chief
enemy at the
moment was their own govern–
ment.
In one breath Merian
counts upon the military victory
of the Allies, not only for his life
hut for his right to agitate for
socialism; in another, he advocates
a policy which would make that
victory impossible. Or is he en–
tering a plea of avoidance on the
ground that he doesn't expect any–
body to listen to him?
The main question I put to
Merian he has evaded.
If
refusal
by the labor movement to support
the military war against Hitler
were to lead to a Fascist victory
would Merian favor this policy?
If
he says "no," he is wasting our
time. (For the program I out–
lined provides for the necessary
activities of an independent labor
movement against domestic reac–
tion within the framework of those
democratic forms whose continued
existence depends upon the defeat
of Hitler.)
If
he answers "yes",
which is the consequent Bolshevik–
Leninist position, I have already
shown in ample detail how foolish
such a policy would be from the
point of view of the interests of
democracy and socialist action
throughout the world. Merian
faH~;~
tQ
COJlle to grips with
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sin-
