256
PARTISAN REVIEW
who place feeling above science, he speaks of science as the only discipline
with "truths about existence that command the universal assent of all
investigators". This criterion of universal assent rules out the possibility
of a revolutionary social science. Of course, one could obtain such
assent for harmless conclusions about all sorts of interesting social
phenomena which are not directly involved in class conflict. It is in·
conceivable that all investigators accept the findings on which the pro·
posals for eocialism are based. It is inconceivable that more than a few
of them support Mr. Hook's arguments for a new labor party, even if
these arguments were well-founded. He has either to admit that where
irreconcilably conflicting interests exist no scientific program is
possibl~
or to assert that in such cases each group tries to achieve its purpose
by the most effective means consistent with its goals, and to show that
the aims of labor are compatible with the life-needs of the overwhelming
majority of mankind today and will ultimately reduce human conflicts,
while the purposes of the ruling class can be realized only by the in·
creasing frustration of these needs and misery of mankind. But the line
between the two groups would then be sharply drawn. It would
be
utopian to propose under such circumstances, as Dewey does in his article
in
Partisan Review,
that we all get together and work out a common
scientific plan for solving our problems: "The problem of attaining
mutual understanding and a reasonable degree of amicable cooperation
among different peoples, races, classes, is bound up with the problem of
reaching by peaceful and democratic means some workable adjustment of
the values, standards, and ends which are now in a state of conflict".
The lambs have nothing to gain from such seminars with the wolves, but
the wolves have every reason to encourage such hopes.
This statement of Hook's about "universal assent" is no mere slip
due to his enthusiasm for the imposing victories of physics. For he
definitely excludes Marxism, as a scientific theory when he writes in the
same article: "Every vested interest in social life, every inequitable pr1v·
ilege, every 'truth' promulgated as a national, class or racial truth,
denies the competence of scientific inquiry to evaluate its claims". He
knows very well that Marxism has for generations claimed to be a class
science (
cf.
his own reference to "Marx's insight that in a class society all
social sciences are class sciences"-From
Hegel to Marx,
1936,
pp. 28, 59,
60), and that Marxism has not denied the competence of scientific inquiry
to investigate its claims. By lumping together as unscientific all doctrines
arising from special interests, as if Nazi racialism, bourgeois economics
and socialist theory were alike in this respect, he disregards the most
essential point, that not all group values necessarily rest on falsehood
and
that the interests of some groups are more humane and progressive. But
Hook rules out the relevance of science to these differences of value.
In
replying to a critic in the same issue of P.
R.,
he tells us that "Science
is not concerned with making either better men or more efficient men",
and that it is therefore wrong to criticize contemporary scientists for their
helplessness before ethical, esthetic and social questions. I must differ
from him on this point, not as a matter of opinion as to what should
be,
but as a matter of fact; there are also non-political sciences which are
concerned with making better and more efficient men: medicine, psy·
