10 PROPOSITIONS AND 8 ERRORS
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powers led to the abortive revolutions in Germany, Austria, and Hungary.
Lenin's reasoning, however, was based on two premises: first, the approxi·
mate identity of the social system in all the belligerent states and, second,
the expectation that the defeat of a country would not result in the loss of
its national independence, in its being swallowed up by the victor. Only
'on the basis of these premises can one justify, from a Marxist point of
view, the risks of a defeatist policy. The Versailles powers did not set up
a puppet regime in Berlin; they exacted reparations and sliced off certain
territories, but essentially they left the German people free to choose, and
if necessary to fight, for whatever internal regime they preferred. At Brest·
Litovsk the Kaiser's generals did not demand the complete surrender of
Russian sovereignty; and the signing of that onerous treaty still left the
Bolsheviks plenty of room for their Soviets. But today neither premise of
Lenin's strategy holds good any longer. The defeat of Poland, Norway,
France, etc., has brought about their total extinction as independent states
-and obviously a proletarian revolution in the face of Gestapo rule and
Nazi garrisons is unthinkable. The Kaiser fought for a re-partition of the
world's colonies and natural resources, whereas Hitler is fighting to con–
vert Europe itself into a colony. And a colonial status for Europe puts an
end to all Marxist hopes.
The Chances of an Anglo-American Victory
But the crux of Greenberg and Macdonald's argument is that the
Churchill and Roosevelt governments are incapable of organizing "an
effective war-effort against fascism outside" and that, therefore, the actual
choice is between socialism and Hitlerism. I venture to say that this pre–
diction of an Anglo-American rout unless socialism comes to the rescue
is not a little intermixed with wishful thinking. The fact is that Hitler is
now further away from winning than he was a year ago, and American
aid is beginning to flow in measurable quantities. It is true that the Nazis
have at their
disp~sal
a wholly centralized and efficient economy, but this
advantage is largely cancelled out by the indisputable American superior–
ity in industrial plant and raw materials. There is every reason to believe
that once America is fully drawn into the struggle its offensive power will
astound the world.
If
we should stay out, however, the Nazi plans are
likely to be fulfilled; and it is hard to grasp just how, under conditions of
all-around ruin, any last-minute attempt to refurbish social and property
relations in Britain or Russia can save either country from disaster. The
victorious Nazi soldiers are immune to socialist propaganda; only when
beaten down will they heed the voices of dissent.
Greenberg and Macdonald complain that in the Nazi-occupied coun·
tries "Churchill's propaganda arouses little response... Only a program
which promises a real reorganization of society can inspire the peoples
in the conquered countries to revolt, to take the risks involved in wide·
spread and constant
sabotage.~'
This, mind you, was written just three
months ago, but today, without the benefit of any socialist promises from
