BOOKS
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its significant use-but also the role of symbolism in poetry' science,
religion, and philosophy. The book makes abundantly clear that language
and its categories enter constitutively into all knowledge, that linguistic
forms are not passive copies of an antecedently determinate existence, that
a sensationalistic empiricism does not succeed in giving a coherent account
of the phenomena of communication, and that no criteria for meaningful
discourse can be adequate which fail to take into account the cultural
contexts in which language functions. Mr. Urban cannot be justly
charged with overlooking the enormously complex character of language
nor with offering panaceas, in the form of "semantical rules," for iptel–
lectual and social maladjustments.
But
if
he does not throw out any children with the bath, he neverthe–
less does not keep his water very clean.
Hi~
book is indeed not concerned
with the phenomena of language for their own sake, and it yields very
little in the form of critical principles for clarifying scientific and other
types of discourse. Its far-ranging erudition on matters connected with
language is brought together apparently and mainly for the sake of pro–
viding additional support for Mr. Urban's previously formulated phil–
osophy. · His treatise is thus in large measure a "fundamentalist and tradi–
tionalist!' tract against naturalism and positivism, and against current
tendencies which challenge the meaningfulness of traditional philosophic
idealism. Accordingly, Mr. Urban's main critical task is that of showing
that behaviorism and naturalism have neglected the "unique'' character–
istics of language and that they have failed to "reduce" communication
to anything unlike itself; for he maintains that the phenomena of lan–
guage cannot be "explained" in terms of non-linguistic facts and cannot
be
made to fall within the scope of the natural sciences. On the other
hand, Mr. Urban's positive argument consists in specifying certain ideal–
istic or spiritualistic conditions for the meaningful use of language, and
in
interpreting the traits of communication so as to support an essentially
theistic cosmology. Only by extreme courtesy can most of his long and
repetitious book be regarded as a contribution to the understanding of the
(unction of language.
It will
be
sufficient, therefore, to discuss briefly just two issues which
Mr. Urban's argument raises. The first concerns the conditions of what he
calls "intelligible communication"-communication using language to
convey meanings not restricted to momentary occasions. He first argues
that a naturalistic account of these conditions (e.g., in terms of the organic
similarity of the participants and the similarity of their environment) is
1111Satisfactory, in part because there is an unbridgeable hiatus between
men and animals, so that human speech must be regarded as an "emergent"
DOt
"reducible" to pre-human behavior. Moreover, biology cannot supply
my
clues as to the conditions of communication, because origins affect
Yllidity-"what speech was originally made for determines in some sig–
Dificant way what it is capable of doing now.'' Mr. Urban's view is that
(or
intelligible communication there must
be
a mutual acknowledgment
