116
PARTISAN REVIEW
activity is basic in the formation of our notions of physical things.
The development of the self takes place
pari pasu
with the de–
velopment of mind, out of the activities of animals within a social
context. What defines the self is its reflexivity, the fact that it can
be
both subject and object at the same time. And this is possible
through the fact that the animal's neurological equipment permits
him
to inhibit overt action and enables him to enact, incipiently, in his
own organism, the responses of others to
his
own gestures. We have
a self when our organism is able to take the role of the other. But
the role thus taken is not that of a single individual, but that
of
an
organized group- in Mead's term, "a generalized other."
It would be hardly possible to exaggerate the importance of
Mead's psychology for social theory. Consider its emphasis on the
social origin of the self. The implications of Mead's theory lead di–
rectly to a conception of the social group as an interactive enterprise,
within which the animal develops into an individual self through the
intricate ·relations of opposition no less than of cooperation with the
group. We have here then the much needed resolution of the an–
tithesis of individual and society. "Individual" and "society" are
polar terms. The individual is not prior to society, nor is society
prior to the interacting individuals who constitute it. An individual
outside of society can be no more·than a chunk of palpitating proto–
plasm, without mind, self, or personality. But the values of a society
have to be enjoyed by those who are implicated in their creation,
if
they are to
be
called values at all. Neither the fascist subservience
of the individual to society" nor the presumptions to leadership of
a self-elected bureaucracy,
will
find comfort in this theory. Mead's
theory will not allow us to conceive the individual atomistically.
Neither does it appeal to the mystic confusions of organicism. And
while it does riot obfuscate the individual's relations of dependence on
society, it does not negate his real value. More still, Mead's theory
has a profound implication for the science of value and for ethics.
One of the most urgent needs of our day is to replace the current
subjectivistic" theories with a theory which does justice to the essen–
tially social and objective nature of value. Another
is
to contruct an
ethical theory which abandons the traditional conceptions of moral
responsibility. Until now, as we know, ethics has placed responsibility
for
his
actions solely on the individual. We are coming gradually
to recognize, however, the importance of the social determinants of the
individual's conduct. But our ethical judgments still refer to the
individual in isolation, and neglect the social context which de–
termines the action and furnishes the individual with the instruments
by _means of which he accomplishes it.
I do not claim that Mead has been the only thinker to offer
an adequate solution of the antithesis between individual and society.
A similar theory has been proposed by R. M. Maciver, and there
must undoubtedly be others. Nor do I mean to claim that Mead
was
