

Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool:
Case Studies on the Former
Yugoslavia and Present Day Russia

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Abstract

This paper explores the question of whether sanctions are effective in achieving their policy goals, especially when taking into account the humanitarian cost. Sanctions are a commonly used foreign policy tool, but their use can be controversial because of the question of unintended humanitarian impact. As the use of sanctions has evolved, policy makers have designed a system for targeted sanctions that aim to reduce the humanitarian cost, but the efficacy of these sanctions is still under discussion. The two cases chosen to examine this question are the case United Nations sanctions on the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s and the case of the current United States and European Union sanctions on Russia.

I conducted qualitative research inclusive of the stories of people across generations and across socio-economic backgrounds in order to uncover a narrative of the negative humanitarian effect and political success of each case. In the Yugoslav case, it was evident that the humanitarian effects were devastating. The economy collapsed and the entire society turned to the black market for survival. Milosevic's regime was able to guide public opinion towards anti-west sentiment and use the sanctions as propaganda, giving himself more power; the opposite of the goal of sanctions. In the Russian case, evidence points to a similar scenario. Putin is able to use sanctions as evidence of the inhumanity of the West and suppress internal dissent that is generally pro-western. In both cases sanctions did not change public support of the political leaders targeted. In Yugoslavia, it took six years after the sanctions were lifted for citizens to turn against Milosevic. In Russia, citizens have not changed their opinions on Russian presence in Crimea or advocated for halting Russian aggression. In response to these results, I propose the recommendation to implement only multilateral targeted sanctions, with an emphasis on the use of less invasive measures.

Introduction

This paper explores the question of whether sanctions are effective in achieving their policy goals, especially when taking into account the humanitarian cost. As the use of sanctions has increased over the last century, it has become critical that an effective style of sanction implementation be determined. Sanctions are an important foreign policy tool because of their use as a method for international intervention that is less costly than war. The reason that sanctions have become a highly debated topic in the international community stems from the inherent humanitarian cost imposed on citizens and limited efficacy. Even as the use of sanctions has evolved to exhibit a strategically targeted approach with a reduction in damaging humanitarian cost, the questions of unintended humanitarian cost and political efficacy remain under discussion.

Through qualitative research of the cases of multilateral comprehensive sanctions enacted on Yugoslavia in the early 1990s during the civil war, and United States and European Union targeted sanctions implemented on Russia in 2014 following the conflict in Crimea, this paper explores the cultural narrative of the humanitarian cost and unintended consequences on the citizens compared to the true political outcomes. The examination of these two cases will determine the effectiveness of the two sanctions episodes and allow for the proposal of a recommendation on future use of sanctions.

Historical Overview

Sanctions

Sanctions, in the broadest form, have been a tool of foreign policy for as long as civilization has existed. The commonly cited first case of sanctions is the trade embargo that ancient Athens placed on Megara in 432 BCE.¹ In their early iterations sanctions were blunt. They were designed to isolate a nation through prohibition of trade and communications. As globalization has increased and international trade contacts have increased, sanctions have become a more attractive tool, and use has continuously increased.² This original style of comprehensive boycott was advocated for by Woodrow Wilson while promoting the League of Nations.³ The Covenant of the League of Nations Article 16 allows for the imposition of an economic boycott in the case of a member resorting to war, depriving them of foreign credits and access to foreign markets and supplies. However, this Article did not mandate that all members partake.⁴

In the first half of the 20th century, sanctions were used to disrupt military ventures.⁵ This style was seen, for example, in the multilateral comprehensive sanctions used by the League of Nations during the Italo-Abyssinian crisis in 1935. In this case, multilateral comprehensive sanctions were implemented against Italy to persuade Mussolini to end Italian aggression in

¹ Uri Friedman, "Smart Sanctions: A Short History" *Foreign Policy*, (April 23, 2012).

² Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman, "History Lessons: Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 2 (2003): 196.

³ Uri Friedman, "Smart Sanctions: A Short History" *Foreign Policy*, (April 23, 2012).

⁴ Bailey, K. H. "Sanctions." *The Australian Quarterly* 7, no. 28 (1935): 30-38.

⁵ Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman, "History Lessons: Sanctions: Neither War nor Peace," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 17, no. 2 (2003): 187.

Ethiopia.⁶ These comprehensive sanctions included the ban on arms trade to Italy and Ethiopia, a freeze of all loans and other financial assistance to Italy, and a general ban of imports and exports to Italy. The sanctions notably did not include the inclusion of coal, oil, iron, and steel to the exports. Another weakness of the sanctions was the ambiguous policies of Britain and France, who could not fully commit to the implementation. This severely limited the multilateral attribute. The sanctions had essentially no impact on the Abyssinian war and are attributed with the disintegration of the League of Nations and the formation of alliances that lead to World War II.⁷

With the creation of the Charter of the United Nations in 1945, the international community systemized a framework for the implementation of multilateral sanctions. Chapter VII Article 39 of the UN Charter gives the UN Security Council the responsibility to determine “any threat to peace, breach of peace, or aggression... and decide what measures shall be taken... to restore international peace and security.”⁸ The types of threats to peace that activate the use of sanctions vary from case to case. The most common threat cited is acts of aggression, in which sanctions aim to cease hostilities or bring forth a peace agreement. Sanctions in response to this type of threat account for 42% of UN sanctions episodes. The second most common threat is the abuse of human rights, which is present in 21% of all UN sanctions episodes. Other threats that are frequently cited as rationale for the imposition of sanctions include the support of democracy, counter-terrorism, and non-proliferation.⁹

⁶ Uri Friedman, “Smart Sanctions: A Short History” *Foreign Policy*, (April 23, 2012).

⁷ Cristiano Andrea Ristuccia, *1935 Sanctions Against Italy: Would Coal and Crude Oil Have Made a Difference?* (Oxford, Linacre College)

⁸ Charter of the United Nations Chapter VII Article 39 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>

⁹ Thomas Biersteker, et al., *Effectiveness of UN targeted Sanctions*, (Targeted Sanction Consortium, 2013)

All measures taken by the UNSC in response to the threat to peace must be in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, which give the Security Council the right to enact sanctions, and with the failure of sanctions the authorization to use force. Chapter VI Article 41 states,

“The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.”¹⁰

In this article, the Security council is given the right to implemented economic sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, and aviation bans. Chapter V Article 25 of the UN Charter mandates that all members of the UN must accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council.¹¹ This allows for all decisions to implement sanctions by the UNSC to be legally binding for all 193 members of the United Nations. This is a key difference from the framework for implementing sanctions used in the League of Nations.

The UN Security Council, as outlined in the UN Charter Chapter V Articles 23 and 27, is made up of fifteen members, five of which are permanent members. Each of the five permanent members - the Republic of China, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, and the United States - maintain the right to veto. For a resolution be passed in the Security Council, it must have nine affirmative votes and no vetoes from permanent members.¹² If it is not possible to pass

¹⁰ Charter of the United Nations Chapter VII Article 41 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>

¹¹ Charter of the United Nations Chapter V Article 25 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html>

¹² Charter of the United Nations Chapter V Article 25 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-v/index.html>

sanctions in the Security Council, countries can enact sanctions through regional organizations such as the European Union or enact their own policy unilaterally.

In the mid 1990s, comprehensive sanctions began to gain a bad reputation internationally. The international community became increasingly concerned that comprehensive economic sanctions were causing a great deal of harm without being politically successful. It is commonly cited that 500,000 Iraqi children died as a result of UN comprehensive sanctions implemented on Iraq as a result of the First Gulf War. This emotionally compelling statistic, along with the fact that Saddam Hussein was not removed from power as intended, exemplify the inefficacy of comprehensive sanctions. The transition to targeted sanctions was also facilitated by the idea of individual international responsibility and legal accountability that allowed the United Nations to make the policy shift towards sanctioning individuals or heads of state rather than states as a whole. This shift in UN policy legitimized and institutionalized the targeted sanction model.¹³

In a report by the Targeted Sanction Consortium, all types of United Nations Targeted Sanctions were compiled. They are listed as follows in order from most to least targeted.

¹³ Francesco Giumelli, "Understanding United Nations targeted sanctions: an empirical analysis," *International Affairs* 9, no.6 (2015): 352-353

TYPE OF SANCTIONS

Individual sanctions
Travel ban
Asset freeze
Asset freeze and transfer
Diplomatic sanctions
Revision of visa policy
Limiting of travel of diplomatic personnel
Closing of embassies / offices of official representation
Limiting number of diplomatic personnel
Sectoral sanctions
Arms imports embargo
Aviation ban
Arms export ban
Proliferation-sensitive material
Shipping
Oil service equipment
Commodity sanctions
Diamonds
Oil import ban
Timber
Luxury goods
Charcoal
Other
Financial sector sanctions
Investment ban
Diaspora tax
Central Bank asset freeze
Financial services (insurance)
Sovereign wealth funds

(Targeted Sanctions Institute, Nov 2013)

The most frequent type of sanctions used by the UNSC is the arms imports embargo, which is used in 87.1% of UN sanctions episodes. The second most frequently used type of targeted sanctions is individual sanctions, such as travel bans, which have been used in 62.9 % of UN sanctions episodes, and asset freezes, used in 51.6 % of UN sanctions episodes. Other less frequently used targeted sanctions include diplomatic sanctions, such as revision of visa policy, limiting diplomatic travel, and closing embassies, commodity sanctions, such as an oil import ban, or financial sector sanctions, such as an investment ban.¹⁴

¹⁴ Thomas Biersteker, et al., *Effectiveness of UN targeted Sanctions*, (Targeted Sanction Consortium, 2013)

Cases

The Case of Yugoslavia

After the death of Marshall Josip Broz Tito in 1980, Yugoslavia struggled to find another charismatic leader to take his place leading to a weakened federal government and increased disagreements between republics. Simultaneously, the country hit a period of economic stagnation, exacerbated by the 1982 Latin American debt crisis. Amidst growing nationalism and a degeneration of the political system, Ante Markovic became prime minister in January 1989. He announced comprehensive economic reform and democratic parliamentary reform. Markovic faced difficulties competing for power with regional authorities and the unwillingness of international financial institutions to back his reforms before his party eventually collapsed.¹⁵

In each of the six republics within Yugoslavia - Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, and Macedonia - ethnic nationalism grew and aggravated the poor inter-republic relations through the late 1980s. Milsosevic, who first became President of the Serbian Communist Party in 1986, became the Serbian President in 1989 rising to power on a Serbian nationalist platform.¹⁶

In December 1990 Slovenia held a referendum for independence and Croatia in the following May. In both countries there was an overwhelming majority voting to leave the republic. In June 25th, 1991 both Croatian and Slovenian republics declared sovereignty and

¹⁵ Milica Delevic, "Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia," *The International Journal of Peace Studies* 3, no. 1 (1998).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

independence.¹⁷ In Slovenia, a short military conflict started as a result, but ended with Slovenian victory only ten days later. In Croatia, there was a much larger ethnic Serb population, supported politically and financially by Serbia and so the resulting conflict became much more serious, lasting through 1995.¹⁸

The conflict over the independence in Bosnia was even more severe than in Croatia. Bosnia's population was divided between three different ethnic backgrounds; 43% of the population was Bosnian Muslim, 33% was Bosnian Serb, and 17% was Bosnian Croat. In March 1992, there was a referendum in Bosnia where over sixty percent of Bosnian citizens voted in favor of independence. This referendum was boycotted by Bosnian Serbs who then revolted with the support of the Yugoslav People's Army and Serbia declaring the territories under their control a Serb republic. The Bosnian Croats quickly did the same; rejecting the Bosnian government and declaring their territory a Croat republic. The conflict became a three-sided war that cost 100,000 their lives, displaced two million, and bore witness to genocide and crimes against humanity.¹⁹

During the Slovenian and Croatian conflicts, the international community, especially the European Economic Community (EEC), had been involved in vain, attempting to organize peaceful solutions. With escalating violence in Croatia and increasing tensions in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EEC decided to implement economic pressure.²⁰ In November of 1991, the EEC placed unilateral general economic sanctions on Yugoslavia and urged the United Nations to declare a global oil embargo, hoping to use economic pressure to end the war and encourage the opening of

¹⁷ Catherine Baker, *The Yugoslav Wars of the 1990s* (MacMillen Higher Education, 2015)50-51.

¹⁸ "The Conflicts," United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, United Nations International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals, Accessed March 20, 2020.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Milica Delevic, "Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia," *The International Journal of Peace Studies* 3, no. 1 (1998).

negotiations. Canada quickly followed and the United States voiced support without agreeing to put in place its own sanctions.²¹

The first United Nations resolution responding to the Yugoslav crisis as a threat to international peace and security came shortly after the fruitless September 17th cease-fire in Igalo. On September 25th, 1991, the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 713, in which a “general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Yugoslavia” was implemented.²² This was the first implementation of obligatory retaliatory measures placed on Yugoslavia in response to the conflict. All UN member states were required, through the UN Charter, to act in accordance with this resolution. This measure did not stop the war nor change the behavior of state leadership and so the international community was forced to take further action.

On May 30th 1992, in United Nations Security Council Resolution 757, a more stringent embargo was placed on all commodities in addition to financial sanctions restricting economic resources and remittances, an aviation ban, and diplomatic sanctions. States were no longer able to export or import any goods (except approved medical supplies and foodstuffs). Also included in this resolution was the diminishing of diplomatic staff in Yugoslavia, the prevention of financial transfers to people or organizations in Yugoslavia, the prevention of Yugoslav participation in sporting events, the prevention of air travel to and from Yugoslavia, and the suspension of educational, scientific, and cultural exchanges with Yugoslavia.²³

The arms and commodities embargos were formally lifted by United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1021 and 1022 on November 22nd, 1995, after the conclusion of the Dayton

²¹ William D. Montalbano, “Yugoslavia Hit by Trade Sanctions: Civil war: European Community, imposing toughest economic measures in response to fighting, urges U.N. to declare global oil embargo. U.S. is undecided on boycott,” *Los Angeles Times*, November 9, 1991.

²² United Nations Security Council Resolution 713 (S/1991/713) <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/713>

²³ United Nations Security Council Resolution 757 (S/1992/757) <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/757>

Peace Agreements on November 21st, 1995.^{24 25} The Dayton Peace Agreements required that Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) recognize each other's sovereignty, respect the cease-fire, and cooperate with the investigation and prosecution of war crimes and other violations of humanitarian law, among other agreements.²⁶ This concluded the so called first round of sanctions that was in response to the Bosnian and Croatian wars.

After the Dayton Peace Agreements, the United States unilaterally maintained an "outer wall" of sanctions against FRY Serbia-Montenegro. This outer wall included the withholding of diplomatic relations and economic assistance from the US government or other international financial institutions. These sanctions were set to remain until the FRY cooperated fully with the war crimes tribunal, and reversed its anti-democratic practices.²⁷

The second round of sanctions began in 1998 after fighting broke out in Kosovo. The conflict between Serbs and Kosovo Albanians bears much more cultural and ethno-political weight. Serbia's claims to Kosovo lie in that it was the core of medieval Serbia from the 12th to 15th centuries. Albanian nationalist claims lie in the ancient Albanian state Illyria that covered the territory of Kosovo. Both sides claim continuous settlement and favor incompatible solutions. Kosovo had changed hands multiple times from the interwar period until 1945 when it became an autonomous province within Serbia. This was strengthened under Tito's 1974 Constitution, which

²⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1021 (S/1995/1021) <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1021>

²⁵ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1022 (S/1995/1021) <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1022>

²⁶ The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina Signed 14 December 1995 <https://www.osce.org/bih/126173?download=true>

²⁷ Julie Kim, *Economic Sanctions and the Former Yugoslavia: Current Status and Policy Considerations Through 1996*.

gave Kosovo federal status and the right to its own constitution.²⁸ In 1989, Milosevic and the Serbian parliament ended Kosovo's special autonomy provided for by the 1974 Constitution.²⁹

In the early 1990s, after Serbia's decision to end Kosovo's special autonomy, Kosovo Albanians' dissatisfaction with Milosevic's government grew as his stance on Kosovo became increasingly oppressive. In 1992, an "Albanian 'shadow state'" was developed in Kosovo with its own shadow parliament, government and president.³⁰ In May 1992, Ibrahim Rugova was elected as president of this parallel "shadow state" in an election not recognized by Serbia. Rugova led with the principle of non-violence and attempted to find a political solution for disagreements.³¹ Though there was frequent minor violence, the situation in Kosovo stayed relatively stable through the conflicts with Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina up until 1995 when the united Kosovo Albanian leadership split as they began to question the effectiveness of Rugova's non-violent tactics.³² The Kosovo Liberation Army gained power, responding to Serbian leadership with violence and terrorism.³³ The conflict then escalated into a fourth military confrontation after Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia.

On March 31, 1998 in response to atrocities carried out by both Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, a second round of Sanctions began once again with an arms embargo implemented by

²⁸ Stefan Troebst, "The Kosovo Conflict, 1998," *The Conflict Development in the Southern Balkans I; Security Policy Information*, no.17, June 1999.

²⁹ Christopher J. Borgen, "Kosovo's Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition," *American Society of International Law Insights* 12, no. 2 (2008).

³⁰ Stefan Troebst, "The Kosovo Conflict, 1998," *The Conflict Development in the Southern Balkans I; Security Policy Information*, no.17, June 1999.

³¹ M.V. Naidu, "NATO's War On Yugoslavia: Issues, Actors and Prospects." *Peace Research* 31, no. 2 (1999): 2.

³² Stefan Troebst, "The Kosovo Conflict, 1998," *The Conflict Development in the Southern Balkans I; Security Policy Information*, no.17, June 1999.

³³ M.V. Naidu, "NATO's War On Yugoslavia: Issues, Actors and Prospects." *Peace Research* 31, no. 2 (1999): 2.

the United Nations with UN Security Council Resolution 1160.³⁴ This was followed by a cease-fire negotiated by American diplomat, Richard Holbrooke in October 1998.³⁵

On April 23, 1999, the EU went a step further and implemented targeted sanctions banning exports of oil to Yugoslavia with the exception of an “Energy for Democracy” program which delivered fuel to opposition-run Serbian cities. Other sanctions the EU enacted included a freeze on assets held by the Serbian government, and individuals and companies associated with President Milosevic, a ban on visas to Milosevic and Yugoslav officials, and an arms embargo.³⁶ On May 1st, 1999, the US. again introduced a ban on trade with Serbia, including oil products.³⁷

The military escalation, ethnic cleansing, and the rise of civilian casualties necessitated the reaching of a peace agreement. In February 1999, the Rambouillet Conference began with the intention of reaching a peaceful settlement. Before the beginning of the negotiations, a peace plan was presented with non-negotiable principles including a ceasefire, an interim agreement on governance, protection of rights of members of all nationalities free and fair elections in Kosovo under supervision of the OSCE and self-governance through legislative executive and judiciary bodies with fair representation, judicial protection of human rights, the establishment of a joint commission to supervise implementation, amnesty and release of political prisoners, and no prosecution for conflict related crimes, other than crimes against humanity, and war crimes. The conference was chaired by French and British foreign ministers with the main negotiators being from the US, the EU, and Russia along with the FRY/Serbia delegation and the Kosovo delegation.

³⁴ United Nations Security Council Resolution 1160 (S/1998/1160) <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1160>

³⁵ M.V. Naidu, "NATO's War On Yugoslavia: Issues, Actors and Prospects." *Peace Research* 31, no. 2 (1999): 2.

³⁶ Agence France Presse, “List of International Sanctions Against Serbia,” Global Policy Forum, October 9, 2000.

³⁷ Ibid.

After extensive back and forth, the Serb delegation rejected the plan while the Kosovo delegation signed the agreement witnessed by the US and the EU but refused by Russia.³⁸

On March 22, negotiators travelled to Belgrade in a final attempt to persuade Milosevic to cease aggression and accept the Rambouillet accords. In response to Serbia's final refusal, the United States turned to NATO to take measures "to avert a humanitarian catastrophe" and developed a NATO campaign directed at ending attacks by the Serb Army and Police Forces.³⁹ March 24th, 1999, NATO began bombing Yugoslavia.⁴⁰ In June 1999, NATO ceased its bombing campaign and the UN introduced Resolution 1244 to set a framework for finding a political solution for the governance of Kosovo. The UN was present in the administration of Kosovo for the next nine years.⁴¹

The Case of Russia

Russia's claims over Crimea are influenced by geo-strategy and geo-politics, but they originate from pre-existing historical claims. Russia's claims to Crimea date back to the late 18th century when Russians conquered the territory in a war with the Ottoman Empire. Through the 19th and 20th centuries, there was mass Russification of the Crimean population through expulsion of Tartars and Turks and resettlement of ethnic Russians. In 1921, Crimea was an Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic unit of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (SFSR) and in 1922 was

³⁸ Marc Weller, "The Rambouillet Conference on Kosovo." *International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-)*75, no. 2 (1999): 213.

³⁹ Ibid. 213

⁴⁰ M.V. Naidu, "NATO's War On Yugoslavia: Issues, Actors and Prospects." *Peace Research* 31, no. 2 (1999): 3.

⁴¹ Christopher J. Borgen, "Kosovo's Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination, Secession and Recognition," *American Society of International Law Insights* 12, no. 2 (2008).

incorporated in to the Soviet Union. In 1954, Crimea was stripped of its autonomous status and transferred to the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. With the dissolution of the USSR in 1991, Crimea remained a part of Ukraine. In 1992, Crimea declared independence. This was annulled by Ukrainian authorities, but in return the Crimean autonomous status was strengthened.⁴²

The Southeastern part of Ukraine including the Donbass region, also has a considerable historical relationship with Russia. During Russian imperial control, it was called “Novorossia”, and has still been referred to as such by Russian mass media and politicians even though the region has legally been a part of Ukraine since 1921. The region contains a smaller population of ethnic Russians than Crimea, but is very strongly economically and culturally connected to Russia.⁴³

It is likely that Russia has held plans for reabsorption of Crimea for decades. In 2008 Russia began distributing passports on Crimea in mass, and declared a general policy of military intervention to protect Russian citizens living abroad.⁴⁴ With the fall of the Soviet Union, many ethnic-Russians were left outside of Russian territory. Russia claimed that by backing autonomy movements in eastern Ukraine, they were fulfilling their responsibility as a member of the international community to protect individuals they believed to be repressed by state leadership.⁴⁵

In 2012, Ukraine was among eight former soviet states to sign the Commonwealth of Independent States Free-trade Agreement with the EU. In 2013, Russia made sure to assert their opposition to Ukraine’s signature of this agreement by imposing restrictions on Ukrainian exports. This caused Ukraine’s president at the time Victor Yanukovich to not sign the agreement with the EU, which included a political association agreement and a “deep and comprehensive free-trade

⁴² Anton Bebler, “Crimea and the Ukrainian-Russian Conflict,” in *“Frozen Conflicts” in Europe*, ed. Anton Bebler (Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2015), 191-194

⁴³ Ibid. 200

⁴⁴ Ibid. 194

⁴⁵ Hall Garder, “The Russian annexation of Crimea: regional and global ramifications,” *European Politics & Society* 17, no. 4 (2016): 490-505.

agreement” (DCFTA). In 2014, both of the agreements were signed, the political one by the acting prime minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, and the DCFTA by newly elected president Petro Poroshenko.⁴⁶ This newly solidified tie between Ukraine and the West and heightened tensions with Russia.

On February 28th, 2014, after a series of clashes of pro-Ukrainian and pro-Russian protestors, regular Russian forces and local “self-defense” militias seized the Perekop Isthmus and blocked land/sea connections and media access between Crimea and mainland Ukraine. By March, Russia had sent tens of thousands of troops to occupy Crimea, many of which were so-called “green men” bearing no insignia on their combat uniforms with the intention of concealing their identity. While under Russian occupation, a referendum was held on the question of rejoining Russia or remaining part of Ukraine. The official result as reported by the Crimean authorities was that 81.4% of registered voters participated and 96.8% of them voted to separate from Ukraine and reunite with Russia, but the results of the referendum were not verified by the OSCE nor accepted by Ukrainian officials or the international community. On March 17th, 2014, Crimea declared independence and rejoined the Russian Federation.⁴⁷

In April 2014, Russia strategically utilized the discontent of ethnic Russians supporting extremists, providing weapons, money, and even sending troops to create a proxy conflict in the Ukrainian Donbas region. Since then, over 13,000 have died and two million have been displaced due to the fighting.⁴⁸

One of the most internationally noted incidents happened in July, Malaysian Air flight MH17 was shot down over the Donetsk region in Ukraine, causing the death of 298 passengers and

⁴⁶ Andrew Gardner, “The EU-Ukraine association agreement: a potted history” *Politico European Voice* (2014)

⁴⁷ Anton Bebler, “Crimea and the Ukrainian-Russian Conflict,” in ‘*Frozen Conflicts*’ in Europe, ed. Anton Bebler (Toronto: Barbara Budrich Publishers, 2015), 198.

⁴⁸ Steven Pifer, “Five years after Crimea’s illegal annexation, the issue is no closer to resolution,” *Brookings* (March 18, 2019).

crew. At the time there was strong suspicion of Russian involvement, though Russia denied it, which prompted international outrage. In 2019, three Russians and a Ukrainian were charged with the murder of the 298 passengers.⁴⁹

In response to Russia's annexation of Crimea, the United States imposed unilateral targeted sanctions in coordination with the European Union. The European Union began implement sanctions in March of 2014, which have been extended until September 15th, 2020 so far. The first sanctions implemented were restrictive measures, including travel bans and asset freezes, against twenty-one officials and entities who were involved in the threatening of the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine.⁵⁰ This list of officials was expanded over the next few months, with fighting in Donbas and the downing of a Malaysian Air airliner. Sanctions were expanded to include people and entities involved in the energy and defense sectors, and reinforced with other types of sanctions such as diplomatic sanctions, import and export bans, and restrictions on investment.⁵¹

The United States implemented similar sanctions designed to reverse and deter Russian aggression in Ukraine while preventing new Russian aggression against other countries. These sanctions were developed to target specific people, minimize collateral damage to the Russian people while imposing long-term pressure on Russia's economy.⁵² The US sanctions enacted on April 3, 2014 specifically targeted current or former Ukrainian government officials responsible for human rights abuses in Ukraine after anti-government protests in November 2013, any official of the Russian Federation responsible for ordering acts of corruption in Ukraine or the Russian

⁴⁹ "MH17: Four charged with shooting down plane over Ukraine," BBC News, (2019).

⁵⁰ Foreign Affairs Council, 17 March 2014, *European Council / Council of the European Union*, May 3, 2018.

⁵¹ EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine, *European Council / Council of the European Union*, March 13, 2020.

⁵² Cory Welt, Kristin Archick and Rebecca M. Nelson, "U.S. Sanctions on Russia," *Congressional Research Service* (November 28, 2018).

Federation or people that have financially supported these actions, and any person that acted to undermine the peace, security, stability, sovereignty, or territorial integrity of Ukraine. The types of sanctions included blocking the assets of these individuals held on US territory and exclusion from the territorial United States.⁵³

The second set of sanctions enacted by the United States on December 18, 2014 were directed at the energy and defense sectors in Russia. These sanctions targeted specific companies and individual entities that are “producers, transferors, or brokers” of defense articles and special crude oil products. The types of sanctions implemented included licensing limitations on export items, arms and dual-use export prohibition, property transaction prohibition, executive procurement prohibition, import/export bank assistance and banking transaction limitations, and visa revocation and exclusion from the US territory.⁵⁴ Since 2014 various sanctions for other concerns have been implemented, but the original sanctions against Russia have not yet been removed.⁵⁵

Within the United Nations context, the Security Council was unable to pass resolutions in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity as Russia could use its veto power. However, Russia could not prevent the passage of a General Assembly resolution affirming Ukraine’s territorial integrity and invalidating the Crimean referendum.⁵⁶ Though the General Assembly resolution passed, no sanctions were implemented as this remains a power exclusively given to the Security Council.

⁵³ US PUBLIC LAW 113–95, SUPPORT FOR THE SOVEREIGNTY, INTEGRITY, DEMOCRACY, AND ECONOMIC STABILITY OF UKRAINE ACT OF 2014, April. 3, 2014

<https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ95/PLAW-113publ95.pdf>

⁵⁴ UNITED STATES PUBLIC LAW 113–272, UKRAINE FREEDOM SUPPORT ACT OF 2014, DEC. 18, 2014

<https://www.congress.gov/113/plaws/publ272/PLAW-113publ272.pdf>

⁵⁵ Cory Welt, Kristin Archick and Rebecca M. Nelson, “U.S. Sanctions on Russia,” *Congressional Research Service* (November 28, 2018).

⁵⁶ Steven Pifer, “Five years after Crimea’s illegal annexation, the issue is no closer to resolution,” *Brookings* (March 18, 2019).

Despite international efforts, Crimea and Eastern Ukraine are still in crisis today and thus sanctions are still in place.

Field Work

Statement of Research Question

This paper explores the question: were the comprehensive sanctions against Yugoslavia and the targeted sanctions against Russia successful in achieving their policy goals? A second concomitant question is: what is the best implementation style to maximize the efficacy of sanctions? It also seeks to explore the narrative of the humanitarian cost and unintended consequences on the citizens of countries under sanctions compared to the true political outcomes. Understanding that the style of implementation has evolved with time to attempt to minimize humanitarian cost, this paper examines two cases: the first is the case of the multilateral sanctions placed on Yugoslavia in the early 1990s as a result of the civil war, and the second is the case of the United States and European Union sanctions placed on Russia in 2014 following the conflict in Crimea. This research will be used to inform a policy recommendation on how sanctions should be implemented in order to minimize humanitarian cost and maximize effectiveness as a political tool.

The case of United Nations sanctions implemented on the Former Yugoslavia is an example of comprehensive sanctions; an embargo that affected the population indiscriminately, not designed to minimize humanitarian cost. These sanctions were multilateral, implemented under the international legal authority of the United Nations Security Council given by the Charter of the

United Nations Chapter VII Article 41.⁵⁷ UN sanctions are legally binding for all member states under Chapter V Article 25 of the Charter.⁵⁸ This legal framework makes the comprehensive embargo on Yugoslavia legally justified and a legally binding responsibility that must be maintained by all member states ensuring that essentially the entire world turned against Yugoslavia.

In contrast, the second case, the case of the United States and European Union sanctions placed on Russia 2014, sanctions that are still in place today, is an example of a more advanced and carefully crafted style of sanctions that is targeted to affect only certain people and sectors. These sanctions were crafted with the intention of signaling disapproval and inspiring policy change while reducing the effect on the average citizen. Sanctions were implemented on Russia by the United States and the European Union as well as other states, but there was no legally binding mandate. Both the United States and the European Union have within their legal framework the authorization to implement sanctions. The United States International Emergency Economic Powers Act, US Code Title 50 Chapter 35, gives the president the authority to be the sole decision-maker in imposing sanctions in response to an “unusual and extraordinary threat ... to national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States”.⁵⁹ In the European Union, the Treaty of Lisbon

⁵⁷ “The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.” Charter of the United Nations Chapter 7 Article 41 <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art41.shtml>

⁵⁸ “The Members of the United Nations agree to accept and carry out the decisions of the Security Council in accordance with the present Charter.”

Charter of the United Nations Chapter 5 Article 25 <https://legal.un.org/repertory/art25.shtml>

⁵⁹ “Any authority granted to the President by section 1702 of this title may be exercised to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”

United States Code Annotated. Title 50. War and National Defense Chapter 35. International Emergency Economic Powers §1701

<https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Documents/ieepa.pdf>

added Title IV Article 188 K to the Treaty on the European Union to allow for the implementation of restrictive measures (sanctions) and to make the responsibility to follow implementation measures legally binding for all member states.⁶⁰ Though the European Union sanctions are binding for all member states, they are not legally binding for non-member states. Several countries that hope to become EU member states have enacted similar sanctions to show their willingness and ability to harmonize foreign policy, but they are not legally mandated to do so. As these sanctions were made unilaterally by international actors and not implemented by the United Nations, there is no international legal obligation to implement them. These unilateral implementations of sanctions turned the constraint on Russia into a Russia-versus-the-West situation, which drastically impacted the Russian response.

These cases, though the details differ, show the international response of states supporting marginalized ethnic groups, and using it as justification to make territorial claims. In the Yugoslav case, Milosevic's support of ethnic Serbs, despite moral commentary from the international community, was legal in that the territory was still a part of the Republic. In the Russian case, Putin's support of ethnic Russians was within internationally recognized territory of Ukraine and therefore did not comply with the international norm of inviolability of borders.

In both cases, the territorial claims are based on the historical combinations of states in multi-ethnic republics. Each case grapples with the concept of self-determination. In the Yugoslav case, conflict arose as the states decided to separate from the republic. In the Russian case, conflict

⁶⁰ “Where a decision, adopted in accordance with Chapter 2 of Title V of the Treaty on European Union, provides for the interruption or reduction, in part or completely, of economic and financial relations with one or more third countries, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a joint proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and the Commission, shall adopt the necessary measures. It shall inform the European Parliament thereof.” Title IV Restrictive Measures Article 188 K.

Treaty of Lisbon, *Eur-Lex: Access to European Union Law*, Accessed March 23, 2020.

<https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT>

arose over the possibility of territory rejoining the successor of the former republic. Another similarity between the two cases is that one of the major concerns was the treatment of those of different ethnic backgrounds. In the Yugoslav case, the international community intervened because of their concern for international order and peace and the concept that would later be coined as the Responsibility to Protect.⁶¹ In the Russian case, Russia claimed that it was following the principle of responsibility to protect by supporting ethnic-Russians in Crimea who were not being protected by the Ukrainian government.

The importance in the comparison of these cases is derived from their ability to showcase the evolution of sanctions policy. The examination of these two cases will address how the implementation styles of sanctions has developed over time and whether the implementation style has an effect on the level of humanitarian cost as well as success of the political goals that inspired the sanctions in the first place.

Another important difference between the two cases is that the Yugoslav case is closed. The sanctions were removed many years ago after their completion, while in the Russian case, the sanctions are current. The case is open, and sanctions are ongoing. This provides an opportunity to retrieve different information from each case. In the Yugoslav, case as sanctions have been completed for a sufficient number of years, it is possible to evaluate both the immediate and long

⁶¹ The concept of the responsibility to protect largely was a response to the tragedies in the Balkans, which the international community failed to prevent, and the discussion over the legality of the NATO military intervention in Kosovo. The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty issued a report in 2001 titled “The Responsibility to Protect” in which it delineated that sovereignty, in addition to being a protection from outside interference, bears the responsibility of protecting a populations welfare, and that when a state fails to maintain this protection the responsibility falls to the international community. In 2005, member states committed to the principle of the responsibility to protect in the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document paragraphs 138 and 139.

Responsibility to Protect, *United Nations Office on Genocide Prevention*, Accessed March 21, 2020.
<https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/about-responsibility-to-protect.shtml>

term political, economic, and social effects. This allows for more comprehensive research and the ability to make conclusions.

In the Russian case, it is only possible to evaluate the effect of sanctions thus far. The last six years of sanctions can provide details on the immediate impact, but the long term effect is impossible to determine. What the comparison can show from these two cases is the success, or lack thereof, of the 20th century use of sanctions versus the trajectory of the success of contemporary sanctions use.

These two cases will be compared in order to judge the true results of the changing style of implementation of sanctions, and whether the current style of implementation is sufficient for future cases. After performing this research, a policy recommendation based on the information collected will be developed on how sanctions should be implemented in order to minimize humanitarian cost and maximize effectiveness as a political tool.

Methodology

The process of performing fieldwork for this project was not intended to culminate in statistical data and quantitative analysis. Instead, the goal was to reveal cultural and political narratives that explained the hardships families faced, political opinions and trends, and personal experiences. I wanted to piece together a story of the immediate and long term results of sanctions, getting a feeling for the true impact on the country. I performed my research through the Snowball Sampling Method.

The Snowball Sampling Method, or chain-referral sampling, is a method of convenience sampling in which one subject gives the name of another, who then gives the name of a third, until

the sample grows “like a rolling snowball”.⁶² This method is successful when the researcher anticipates difficulties in creating a representative sample of the research population. The Snowball Method is most commonly used in qualitative research, especially when trying to access a hidden or hard to reach population. This method is less commonly used in quantitative research as it can be difficult to reach a representative sample.⁶³

As I was carrying out qualitative research, the Snowball Sampling Method was the most practical method of gather subjects, due to time and resource limitations. As one of the weaknesses of the Snowball Method is gathering a representative sample, and the story of the true impact would be best explained through an account of anecdotes given by a range of subjects across generations, socio-economic backgrounds, and political dispositions, I actively worked to reach subjects covering each of these backgrounds, the youth and the elderly, from private business owners to politicians.

With the case of Yugoslavia, people were very willing to speak about their experience living through sanctions. Though some subjects found it emotional, especially at first, once getting into it they seemed to find it almost therapeutic to be able to tell their story and explain their family’s difficulties to someone so willing to listen. The sanctions were long enough ago that subjects were able to give a full description of their experience from the beginning of sanctions to the end. Many were even able to explain the long term effects that they witness to this day. Subjects seemed to feel comfortable sharing their opinions and their stories. Nobody seemed to worry about sharing their political opinion and expressing unhappiness with those who had been in charge.

In contrast, when completing interviews for the case of Russia, it was obvious that people were not fully comfortable sharing their opinion. Subjects often double checked that their name

⁶² Nissim Cohen and Tamar Arieli, “Field Research in Conflict Environments: Methodological Challenges and Snowball Sampling.” *Journal of Peace Research* 48, no. 4 (July 2011): 423–35.

⁶³ Ibid.

wouldn't be used and wanted to make sure that they couldn't be identified from their answers. Many potential subjects declined an interview because they did not feel comfortable speaking about politics over the phone or over email and there was no opportunity to meet in person. I could promise total anonymity on my part, but concerns of security and surveillance was prohibitive for many because the regime being targeted under sanctions still maintains power and the sanctions are ongoing. The majority of subjects with whom I completed interviews on the case of Russia were people who currently live in the United States, which drastically shifted the bias of answers I received.

Going into each interview, I used a set list of questions as a guideline. This set list of questions was developed in order to give a similar structure to each interview and allow me to compare answers across interviews. I formulated a short list of topics that were central to my research and developed questions to direct the conversation towards those topics. These questions were designed to be accessible for anybody that I spoke to regardless of their socio-economic background, political leaning, or education level. By having the same conversations with each subject I hoped to be able to compare answers across generations, education levels, and socio-economic backgrounds. By comparing answers, I hoped to get a comprehensive understanding of the opinions of the same issues from every point of view to best understand the overall cultural narrative and where there might be contradictions within it. For my interviews on the Yugoslav case the questions were:

1. Where were you in your life when sanctions were introduced? How old were you?
Were you in school? Did you have a family? What was your job?
2. What is your understanding of why sanctions were introduced?
3. Were you personally affected by the implementation of sanctions? How was your community affected?

4. Did you see any change in the behavior of the government as a result of the sanctions?
5. Did your experiences during sanctions have an effect on your view of the West or on your own government?
6. In retrospect, were the sanctions successful? Why?

My list of questions for interviews on the Russian case was designed to be similar, but had to reflect the difference in the situation. In the Russian case, I could only ask about short term effects as the sanctions have not been completed. My questions for interviews on the Russian case were:

1. What is your understanding of why sanctions are currently in place in Russia? Do you consider this common knowledge?
2. Were you affected personally by the implementation of sanctions? Was anybody in your community or family?
3. Have you seen any response from the government? Have they changed their policies?
4. Have the sanctions changed your opinion on the West?

These questions were used merely to give direction and guide to give structure to the interview. As interviews progressed additional questions would become relevant. For example:

1. What was the lasting legacy of the effect of sanctions in Yugoslavia?
2. Which aspect of the effects of sanctions was the most difficult for you personally?
3. During the time when sanctions were being implemented did you speak about politics frequently with your family or friends? Did you speak about Milosevic and/or sanctions specifically?

4. Does the topic of sanctions appear in conversation frequently?
5. Do you think that the sanctions played a role in why Milosevic left office?
6. Is there an alternate narrative that is spread about the reasons for sanctions?
7. How much of your understanding is based on memories from the time and how much is from things you have experienced and heard since then?

In each interview, the goal was to allow the subject to drive the conversation and to encourage them to discuss what meant the most to them. The reasoning behind this was that this style would allow subjects to speak their mind and not feel that I, as the interviewer, was trying to elicit a certain response. As subjects continued, I would direct the conversation by asking a follow-up question on something of interest or asking for clarification or more details on a point, but not push them too hard on any certain statement. I was careful to try to make subjects feel as though everything they said mattered. There was no way I could predict what a subject might say and I wanted to provide opportunities for subjects to share details that I wouldn't have thought to ask. I had planned on recording each interview so that I would have a more reliable record of what we discussed, but I decided that it was more important for the subject to feel comfortable and not feel the pressure and sterility of a recorded conversation. Instead, I recorded notes on each conversation by hand.

Limitations

It is important to recognize the limitations of this field work. There are several factors that limited the reach of this research, namely time, resources, and experience. Each of these factors limited the ability to collect data from a large pool of subjects. Data collected still conveys valid information, this should be seen as a starting point for future research.

This research, from planning to interviews, was carried out over the course of two semesters, with the majority of the field work being carried out over a week spent in Belgrade, Serbia and two days in Podgorica, Montenegro. In order for the snowball method to be properly employed much more time would be needed in each location. Additionally, to reach a representative sample it would have been beneficial to have time to go to smaller towns outside of the capital and speak with those outside of the urban area.

Another limitation that impacted each aspect of this research was the limited resources in terms of funding, manpower, and logistics. To do comprehensive research more funding would have been required in order to spend more time in the field in Serbia and Montenegro and be able to complete field work in Russia. A larger team of researchers would have been beneficial as well. With more people conducting interviews and more people to translate, a much wider population could have been reached. The majority of the people I spoke with were well educated and well-traveled. I was able to speak with businessmen, artists, academics, diplomats, and politicians, but few working-class people. With more resources and time to spend in Serbia and Montenegro, and the ability to speak the language, I would have been able to access a more diverse population.

Another important consideration is that I, as the primary investigator, have no prior experience completing research on this level nor performing field research. I have completed research to the best of my abilities. I secured Institutional Review Board approval and coaching as well as seeking advice from various professors and researchers, but field work can only be learned from experience.

Though this project was not intended to serve as a quantitative analysis, the resulting narrative developed from interview content would have benefited by access to a more diverse interview population that would've been possible with more time, resources, and experience. Without these denoted limitations, a more thorough representation of the various opinions within

the country would have been possible. Even so, the data remains substantial and compelling as results reflect the shared understanding among citizens of the effects of sanctions. This research should serve as groundwork for future work on this subject.

Results

Findings from the Yugoslav Case

The first type of effect that data was collected on was the direct impact of the sanctions on citizens of Yugoslavia. Among the populations interviewed, there were many commonalities.⁶⁴ For the most part, the sanctions affected people in similar ways no matter who they were. In the short term, everyone faced difficulties with tangible effects such as the food and gasoline shortage, the economic crisis, and the development of the black market. Equally as harmful were the intangible effects such as the destructive psychological effects of isolation. Not a single subject expressed that they had escaped the situation unscathed. Everyone felt the effects of sanctions, the only variation between subjects was to what degree they were felt.

It became clear through the course of the interviews that many of the short term effects had developed into long term effects that lasted long past the time when sanctions were removed. Many of these long term effects are seen even today in 2020. Though many of the short term tangible effects were quickly remedied with the removal of sanctions, some developed into more structural tangible long term effects. For example, the recovery of political and economic structures was

⁶⁴ Populations: those that were children at the time, those that were adults with careers at the time, those who held public office, those who owned or worked for private businesses

severely impeded even after the resolution of the economic crisis and hyperinflation. In addition, a new phenomenon of brain drain developed. Some of the intangible effects actually worsened with time. During a crisis everyone bears the emotional effects, but when life begins to return to normal and the mentality caused by the crisis remains the same then that is proof of a larger lasting psychological effect.

The second type of effect that data was collected on is the real effect versus desired effect of the sanctions in terms of political developments. It was clear that subjects did not believe the sanctions served their desired purpose. Many explained that at the time, it was not common that people understood why exactly sanctions were enacted, and even if they did, they didn't understand why *they* were being punished. Subjects also explained that there was very little constraint on Milosevic imposed by the sanctions. If anything, they might have made him stronger, and intensified the existing anti-west mindset.

Short Term: Tangible Effects

Food Shortage

One of the most difficult to bear effects of the sanctions was the shortage of commodities such as food and medicine. The years in which the sanctions were in place are now called “the years eaten by grasshoppers”. The shelves of stores were barren. Even if a family had money, there was nothing to buy so families learned to make what they couldn't buy. Subjects who were children at the time recounted stories of learning to make bread and chocolates with their parents. Many told of a recipe for “embargo cake”, a simple pastry made of minimal ingredients. One subject even said, “I made embargo cake for my kids just a few weeks ago. People still make it today!”

If a family had a garden then at least they could eat, but it was impossible to grow things like medicine, or diapers for the babies. Those that were children at the time explained that they had to bring lunch to school - not because the food at school didn't taste good, but because school lunch didn't exist. One subject reminisced about how they couldn't afford Coca-Cola brand coke. Instead they had a powder they could use to create coke from water. They would hang out together, put on music, and dance as they shook the bottles of water to mix the powder to create "coke".

Gasoline Shortage

In addition to the shortage of commodities such as food and medicine, there was an extreme shortage of gasoline. This had an immense effect on daily life. It impacted personal and professional life, restricting the movement of families, the abilities of companies to do business, and even the opportunity for people to commute to work.

Several business owners explained that if they had an upcoming business trip they would fill the trunk of their car with extra bottles of gasoline because it was impossible to know if they were going to be able to stop along the way and buy more. Unable to find and afford gasoline to fill their cars, people opted to take public transportation. This oversaturated the public transportation system, which created drastic delays. One subject recounted his difficulties saying, "how can you expect me to work or study" when it's so difficult to even get to class.

Access to gasoline was so severely restricted that children who were growing up during sanctions didn't know what gas stations were until sanctions were lifted. They had only experienced their parents buying gasoline from people in parking lots selling it out of the trunks of their cars. Foreigners who were travelling through were allowed to buy gasoline and so they would buy what they could then stop in a parking lot and sell it immediately. Similarly, those who could get to Romania would buy gasoline there and smuggle it back into Serbia. People would calculate the

miles it would take versus how much cheaper the gas would be as one got closer to Romania and use that to decide how far to drive to get gas. The scarcity of gasoline was one of the aspects of sanctions that most directly hit the general population.

Economic Crisis

Another aspect of the time that increased the severity of the situation was the economic crisis. Most people recognized that the hyperinflation the society was witnessing wasn't caused by the imposition of sanctions, but they did believe that the sanctions exacerbated the situation.⁶⁵ As one subject put it "The entire country was in crisis: the sanctions were just the cherry on top."

People of different socio-economic backgrounds experienced the economic crisis differently, but nobody was able to fully escape the hardship. For example, one subject explained that her father had held a high military position and had a generous military pension, so their family was better off than many. Even with his large pension payment their family could only buy five kilograms of oranges. One might be inclined to think that using a pension to buy five kilograms of oranges is an impractical use of money, but because inflation was so high, people spent their money as soon as possible before it lost its value. Society was forced to return to the use of barter.

Money would lose its value so fast that by the end of the day an entire paycheck couldn't pay for a meal. One subject told of how he had just gotten his first big job as an architect and was given an advance on his salary. He went to buy a celebratory meal, but by the time he could get to

⁶⁵ At the peak of the hyperinflation in Yugoslavia in January 1994, the official monthly inflation rate was 313,000,000% - four orders of magnitude higher than the hyperinflation in Weimar Germany. The price level rose by a factor of 3.6 X 10²². The hyperinflation suffered by Yugoslavia was the second highest, after Hungarian hyperinflation of 1945-46, and second longest in history, after Russian hyperinflation in the 1920s.

Pavle Petrovic, Zeljko Bogetic, and Zorica Bujesevic. "The Yugoslav Hyperinflation of 1992-1994: Causes, Dynamics, and Money Supply Process," *Journal of Comparative Economics* 27, (1999) 335-353.

<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0147596799915779?via%3Dihub>

the restaurant for dinner, it had already devalued so much that he couldn't afford it. People would pay with checks because they knew by the time the check cleared the amount of money it had been worth would mean nothing. In stores the prices for items would always be handwritten, often written on a chalkboard instead of on a tag so that prices could be changed according to the hourly decreasing value of the dinar. The inflation was so high that government computers couldn't perform calculations properly. One subject provided the statistics that the inflation increased 100% a day. Another subject, who was a child at the time of sanctions, illustrated the meaninglessness of cash through a story of how his father would give him cash to play with because it's worth as a toy was more than any real monetary value.

The lack of economic infrastructure made it extremely difficult for industry to progress and businesses to survive let alone to grow. Many businesses were already struggling because they had lost manpower due to the draft and the crisis only worsened the situation. There was no reliable banking system which made running a business difficult. There was no trade; nobody was willing to invest. Demand for goods was low because people didn't have discretionary income. As one business owner explained it, "the company was going in slow motion" through 1997. His company was forced to diversify and to find a niche, which essentially meant starting from scratch. It wasn't until the early 2000s when he was able to begin exporting again that he was able to build his company into the successful major exporter that it is now. As a business owner he was lucky. Those with businesses were better able to provide for their families than those without. Even better off were those who were paid in foreign currencies, such as German marks, and those who had family members living abroad who could send them foreign currency.

Establishment of the Black Market

Because the daily needs of citizens weren't being met, they developed a system for survival. One subject spoke with pride saying, "A country like Serbia is skilled at improvisation. We created an entirely new infrastructure to survive." The black market enveloped the entire country and drew in its neighbors. Though it was prohibited under international law through the United Nations sanctions regime, neighboring countries Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria decided to breach the sanctions regime. Hungary and Macedonia profited from smuggling, while Romania and Bulgaria profited from selling gas. Everyday items were in short supply, so everyone turned to the black market, but products were often more expensive and their quality couldn't be trusted. For example, gasoline was often watered down, which then ruined cars' engines. There was no infrastructure in place to regulate quality nor regulate extra costs. The statistic one subject gave was that items became eight times more expensive. It was risky, there was no insurance, but you had to take risks in order to survive. All of a sudden, the entire economy had become smuggling.

Each business owner interviewed explained that because of the war the business had already been affected, but with sanctions business became practically impossible. The black market became the only way to do business. One company had just bought a printer from Germany as the sanctions were starting, but couldn't get it shipped to Serbia once the embargo was in place. He and his colleagues worked secretly to use a Red Cross van to get the printer to the border, then at the border transferred it into another unmarked van to bring it into the country. Of course there were cameras at the border, but if you paid off the border monitors then you wouldn't have to worry. It was fully accepted that you would have to pay a bribe for services. There was even a standard rate of three percent that was expected when paying a bribe. There were unmarked white vans that mirrored aid trucks and agreements with border patrol for importing goods. Companies developed in Macedonia that were dedicated only to smuggling, and many of them were even state sponsored. At first it was all improvisation but a strong infrastructure was developed out of the necessity for survival.

The entire society faced a degradation of morals from outright desperation. Subjects described the feeling of not being able to trust even their neighbors. One subject recounted how his father had engineered a system in their family car so that if you didn't make an adjustment before driving the car would only be able to use a half of a gallon of gas. This way when the car was stolen and then inevitably abandoned when it stopped working, the family could search the small radius and find it again. The same person told of watching his cigarette dealer get shot in the leg in what could only be explained as a territory war.

Short Term: Intangible Effects

Psychological Effect

A less visible but no less impactful result of the sanctions was the feeling of humiliation and isolation from the rest of the world. Besides the obvious daily humiliations of not being able to afford food or medication, having to wait in line for hours just for flour, and having to rely on illegal methods to acquire even cigarettes, the psychological effects of isolation had a destructive effect. Many people explained the feeling like there were walls surrounding them. To teenagers it meant that the pop stars and singers never came on tour to their country. To adults it meant being restricted from travelling as they once had, not being able to properly take care of their kids, or not being able to provide for themselves regardless of whether they had a job or not. To everyone it meant having to live feeling like they were constantly seen as the "bad guy" without having done anything wrong.

Long Term: Tangible Effects

Lack of Economic and Political infrastructure

Many people never fully recovered from the economic crisis. To this day, there is little industry in the country. That which does exist is at 10% at what it used to be. The middle class, which had been the most populous class during communism, was hit the hardest. Those who were poor frequently turned to the black market, and could become rich through criminal activity. The rich were able to survive on savings and other sources of income. Those who didn't have the financial cushion to rely on nor the desperation to turn to the black market, the middle class, were hit hard. By the end of sanctions, the middle class had effectively disappeared.

In a society where the economy was controlled by the black market, criminals, and those in power who overlooked illegal activity became extremely rich. Those that became rich then took advantage of the privatization of the society and bought property and companies at extremely low prices. To this day, the same criminals still own these properties and dictate much of the state's politics.

Another lasting effect of the criminalized society, is that the black market that once transported necessities, now transports drugs and other illegal goods remaining as an advanced organized crime network throughout all the former Yugoslav states. As a result, the economic infrastructure and political institutions remain weak, and the legal economy has never fully recovered, even 20 years later.

Though the government is now technically democratic, there is a strong democratic deficiency. For example, there are now non-governmental organizations but they are supported by the government, which contradicts the inherent principle of independence that NGOs have by definition. Milosevic's legacy and policy are still present in the current government and the general political mindset. People, especially those who are uneducated and uninformed, tend to see all politicians as thieves. They don't believe that matters who will be in power, whoever it is will be

the same. “During the time of Milosevic there was hope but no democracy. Now there is democracy but no hope.” described one subject.

Brain drain

Today, young people often leave the country for work or education. Without young people, there is no driving force of the country. One subject gave the statistics that every year 400,000 people leave Serbia. Four hundred thousand of the brightest and most educated people, but the country can't produce 400,000 highly educated people per year to replace them. The subject who was explaining this, described that it was a different situation when he left Serbia as sanctions were starting. He chose to leave because of the war, but he always knew he would come back. Now, he says, those who are leaving won't be coming back.

Long Term: Intangible Effects

Psychological Effect

The cultural, political, and economic isolation created a mindset that many believe still hasn't been shaken today. People learned that it was impossible to plan for the future because everything was uncertain, that it was meaningless to have a job because the pay wasn't worth anything anyway. Young people lacked hope because their world lacked predictability. Though there is no longer an extreme economic crisis, similar sentiments still linger in the unwillingness to plan for the future and pervasive pessimism. Another telling example of the lasting psychological effects is in the way that so many people have immense nostalgia for the pre-war Yugoslavia and have romanticized the ideas of the past.

A different type of psychological effect that Yugoslavia faced was the societal degradation of morals. When an entire country is treated as a country of criminals, it becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy. Faced with challenges to their survival, the entire country faced a degradation of morals and descent into corruption from outright desperation. Though different on many levels, the country still faces difficulties with corruption

Political Effects

Public Knowledge

Across all backgrounds and all ages, there was a general agreement that nobody fully understood why sanctions were being put in place at the time. It was common that even if one wasn't a supporter of Milosevic, it wasn't easy to connect the dots that he was the reason the sanctions were in place. Some, especially the well-educated, realized that it was because of the actions of Milosevic, but even they didn't know exactly what it was that had inspired the sanctions. Many government employees and officials didn't fully comprehend what was going on. They were kept from Milosevic's dealings and isolated by the rest of the world. Everyone believed that sanctions were going to be a short term inconvenience. What confused the general public the most was that if the sanctions were a result of the government's wrongdoings, why was the civilian population being targeted.

Some believe now that the real reason for the sanctions was not to bring down an oppressive regime, but to lower the economic, political, and military power of Serbia to make it less of a player in geopolitics. With limited understanding, conspiracy theories such as these became easy to believe. People described themselves as feeling "shocked" and "betrayed" that they were to be

penalized for others wrongdoings and that the ones causing their misery were those they had considered allies.

Younger generations who weren't alive at the time, or who were too young to understand what was going on know little about the sanctions. Older generations lament that already people have begun to forget. Most of what the younger generations know is from stories their parents and grandparents have told them. The memories that have remained the strongest through generations are those of the NATO bombings.

Lack of Constraint on Milosevic

Most people believed that the sanctions placed little to no constraint on Milosevic and his policies. One subject explained that the support of Milosevic was deeper than could be targeted by sanctions. He came at a turning point in the history of Yugoslavia. People were looking for a savior and he pledged to make the country great once again and bring it back to its former glory. The Yugoslav politicians were skilled; it wasn't simple for sanctions to change an entire system. The sanctions turned the West into Milosevic's scapegoat. He blamed them for the destruction of the economy and infrastructure. It's agreed upon across disciplines, by economists, professors, and politicians, that the sanctions actually strengthened Milosevic. As one subject put it "general sanctions are a gift from heaven for a corrupt regime". Sanctions gave Milosevic's system justification.

The Milosevic regime used the sanctions to justify their policies saying that it was the West that wanted Yugoslavians to suffer, not the Yugoslav government. Even those who didn't support or trust Milosevic grew further apart from the West because of the sanctions. One subject explained it by saying "If one was anti-west it didn't mean they were pro-Milosevic, it just meant that they believed the West would steal more from them than the existing government already was. Few

people doubt that the sanctions were justified, but they don't believe that they were carried out correctly. Ordinary people were hurt, especially those that were not politically connected. Those who had connections to the government survived much more easily. People began to care less about politics, "it became less about politics and more about survival". In many ways, the crisis helped Milosevic. Dictators strive for crisis because it makes citizens passive to the crimes of their leaders. A combination of internally and externally created crises allowed Milosevic to lead for many years.

Milosevic won the dispute locally through the Media. Only one subject recounted a memory of seeing American propaganda on a Bosnian TV station. It was just the same long paragraph of poorly translated writing shown over and over. It didn't catch people's attention, it wasn't written well, and it didn't express a simple message. If the western message had been conveyed more effectively it's possible some people may have viewed things differently. One subject says that most people he knows still don't see Milosevic as guilty. He believes that those who gave him over to The Hague did it only because it was the politically strategic thing to do if they ever hoped to receive international funds.

View of the West

An important aspect that exemplifies the counter productivity of sanctions was that it turned people against the West. Instead of becoming angry at their government as those implementing the sanctions had hoped, the sanctions made people angry at the West for causing them so much pain. Anti-West sentiment existed before the sanctions, but it was different. During World War Two, the West and Yugoslavia were on the same side and therefore were sympathetic to each other. Though Yugoslavia had been socialist, it wasn't fully communist in the way that Russia was. People were free to travel and Yugoslavia was open to Western cultural influence. When sanctions were implemented, the anti-west sentiments changed and became cemented into society.

Success

Most subjects believed it is impossible to know for sure whether the sanctions fulfilled their political goals. Too many complex factors were at play so it is difficult to say exactly what ended the conflict and removed Milosevic from power. Out of all subjects interviewed, only one overtly said that he believed sanctions aided in bringing down Milosevic. A few admitted that they believed the sanctions softened him and made him willing to negotiate suggesting that sanctions played a role in bringing about the Dayton Accords. The one subject who believed sanctions caused the downfall of Milosevic was also the only one that believed the sanctions were justified. He said that whether it was sanctions or not, something difficult had to be done. He believed they were the only thing that could have stopped the regime.⁶⁶ Others believed that the bombing is what actually broke Milosevic and the Serbian political will, and that sanctions did nothing.

In addition to the unintended political consequences, there were unintended economic consequences for the countries that were implementing sanctions. One subject proudly explained “we gave back to the West” what they had dealt. He explained that they had “Marlboro” cigarettes, but not the Marlboros that the rest of the world had. These were cigarettes made out of materials found within Yugoslavia, made with Yugoslavian tobacco. One pack cost the equivalent of one dollar instead of seven dollars. He estimated that this cost the United States an estimated four billion dollars.

⁶⁶ *It is worth mentioning that the subject who felt this way was one of the subjects that fled the country during the time of sanctions and was able to find work in another country.*

Findings from the Russian Case

It was clear that people from different socio-economic and education levels in Russia felt sanctions differently. The population interviewed was mostly of high socio-economic status and high education levels, but many were able to share the opinions of relatives and friends who had different experiences. The short term tangible economic impact was felt the most unevenly, with those at a lower socio-economic status feeling more economic pressure. Similarly, the short term intangible effect of making the population more susceptible to propaganda was less impactful on those with higher education levels. Due to the fact that the sanctions regime being implemented on Russia is still active, subjects were not asked about long term effects.

Information collected on the success, thus far, of the desired political effects of sanctions, showed that few subjects believed sanctions were able to constrain Putin in any way. Instead, sanctions allowed Putin to consolidate power as sanctions offered legitimization of his actions, developed anti-west rhetoric, and failed to inspire civil discontent.

Short term: Tangible Effects

Economic impact

Any economic hardship that may be attributed to the sanctions has been felt unevenly. A few subjects explained that their families are relatively affluent and therefore hadn't faced many challenges, but others explained that the country is facing economic troubles that especially affect start-ups, middle income businesses, and social services. Much of the economy is oil based, so it is difficult to say whether the impact is directly from sanctions, or the collapse of the global oil

market, or a combination of the two, but there is no doubt that the economy is struggling. Even those who come from affluent families feel the difficulties of the loss of value of the ruble.

At the beginning of the implementation of sanctions there was a prevalent media campaign that Russia is strong enough to sustain any difficulties that the West imposes, and that the sanctions can't hurt Russians. In 2008, there was a stabilization fund made up of leftover oil funds from the 20th century that to a certain extent was able to protect the Russian economy from the international recession. The idea promoted by Russian officials was that a similar system would be used to protect the Russian economy from sanctions, explained one subject.

In retaliation for sanctions Putin has reduced access to European products especially cheese. The government says they are restricting access to European goods stimulate Russian production, but it hasn't been truly successful. This exemplifies the resourcefulness of the government and their ability to reorient finances both within Russia and to other markets such as South America and China.

Short term: Intangible Effects

Psychological Effect

Though all subjects interviewed knew that the sanctions were, in theory, a response to the annexation of Crimea, they believed that it wasn't common knowledge through the country as a whole. The alternative explanation that is believed by many Russians across socio-economic and educational backgrounds is that Russia is being punished for following its independent foreign policy. People see it as finally Russia is pursuing its own interests instead of being subordinate to the West and its demands, but the West is doing as much as possible to prevent that from happening.

One subject, a self-described Americanophile, explained that he believed the United States will put sanctions on Russia regardless of what Russia has actually done. For example, he recalled when the United States boycotted the Sochi Olympics because of Russia's oppression of the LGBTQ+ community, but when Russia welcomed minorities the United States changed their argument towards the "unjust" arrest of three women from the band Pussy Riot.⁶⁷ He believes the US really doesn't care about what they say they do but instead are just attempting to secure economic advantage. Though among well-educated and well informed people there is a good, albeit general, understanding of why sanctions are imposed. Even so, these conspiracy theories that the West only cares about preventing Russian success are not uncommon. They are especially common amongst those without access to international news sources, such as the elderly, those who don't speak English, and those outside of metropolitan areas.

Political Results

Constraint of Putin

Each subject agreed that sanctions haven't been successful in changing the behavior of Putin. His foreign policy has always been the same: "Expand when possible, and never make concessions," as one subject described it. If anything, Putin's rhetoric has become more radicalized because of the isolation. Much of the population believes that Crimea rightfully belongs to Russia and that "Russia did the right thing" by annexing it. This sentiment was echoed by several subjects

⁶⁷ In 2012, three female artists of the rock-punk band Pussy Riot were arrested for hooliganism and sentenced to two years in prison for hooliganism after performing a song critical of President Putin. The court ruled that the women had intended to insult the Russian Orthodox Church and undermine public order. The international community condemned the "disproportionate" response as counter to Russia's international obligations to respect freedom of expression.

Laura Smith Spark, "Russian Court Imprisons Pussy Riot Band Members on Hooliganism Charges," *CNN World*, August 18, 2012.

saying, “Of course, it's an unpleasant reality that sanctions are imposed and will continue, but The Crimea is ours, so let it be.”

Sanctions haven't been successful in getting Russia to pull out of Ukraine, but Russia has not made any more significant progress into other countries' territories. People do believe that the sanctions have successfully indicated the disapproval of the West, but they have fallen short on having an effect on Putin's policies. Referring back to the restriction on European products, one subject explained that the sanctions had little effect on Putin saying, he may have implemented restrictions for the public, but “He's eating all the European cheese he wants.”

Political Discontent

There may be a great deal of political discontent in Russia, but subjects unanimously indicated that discontent cannot be attributed to sanctions. One subject expressed, “We are tired of Putin, but not because of his foreign policy.” For young people especially, frustrations stem from Putin's continuous breaking of democratic practices, especially in what is technically a democratic constitutional system. They are more concerned with their constitutional rights than with Russia's foreign relations. Older generations that lived through the fall of the Soviet Union may or may not like Putin, but regardless, they believe that Putin holding power is better than the chaos they associate with political change. The fall of the Soviet Union caused such violent uprisings and chaos that they would rather keep Putin in power than risk another political overhaul.

One subject expressed that the economic impact of sanctions could be fueling political discontent, but what was more important was economic pressure on oligarchs who have political relevance. The country is run essentially as a dictatorship; elections, though they exist, aren't conducted fairly so public opinion has little influence. One subject explicitly said, “The only way sanctions would be effective through changing public opinion would be if it starts a full violent

rebellion,” which she sees as extremely unethical. Another subject said she did believe that public opinion could have power, but only when people are so frustrated that they overcome their fear of the government and go out into the street to protest. She believes that the government fears protests and that 500,000 people protesting in the street could incite change.

View of the West

Unintended political results of the sanctions include increased tensions between the West and Russia. As one subject described it, “the Cold War rhetoric has been brought back,” the us-versus-them mentality has become pervasive again. Another subject explained how her parents talked about sanctions as if they were entirely logical. They said, “Of course they [the West] have put sanctions on us. It’s geopolitics. They will do anything to take us down.”

Sanctions have become another vessel for Putin to spread anti-west propaganda. He can easily blame anything that goes wrong on sanctions. He has already accused everyone who disagrees with him as being an agent for the United States government. The phrase “State Department’s Bitch” has become a popular insult online. This isn’t unique to the time in which Russia was under Western sanctions. Putin used to say that those who publicly opposed him were paid off by Hillary Clinton. Now that Clinton isn’t as relevant on the international political stage, the accusation has changed to being paid off by the US State Department. Sanctions have been an opportunity to further this narrative with undeniable evidence that the West was not a partner but a hostile competitor.

The Russian media spreads Putin’s message easily. Many people do not read international media, due to language barriers or lack of interest, etc. This creates a strong belief in the idea that the West is the root of all evil and their sanctions are how they hope to take down Russia. It’s common across generations and education levels that people believe that sanctions are put in place

not for political reasons like the West claims, but instead for economic reasons. People see sanctions as a way for the West to ensure economic advantage and stop Russia from attaining economic hegemony.

Success

Only one subject, one who is currently living in the United States, believed that the sanctions were reasonable. All other subjects believed the sanctions weren't fair. Some thought sanctions were unfair because they were designed only to promote western interests and avoided sanctioning industries that proved useful to the West. Others thought sanctions were unfair because they affected people who weren't involved in the government. One subject expressed his frustrations saying that the United States picks and chooses when it wants to obey international law and it is hypocritical to punish Russia for doing what it thinks it needs to do to defend Russian interests. Despite the various explanations for why, the consensus was that subjects felt that sanctions were not the correct policy to enact in response to the Russian annexation of Crimea.

There was enough anti-west sentiment before that sanctions haven't caused drastic changes, but they are perpetuating hostility against the west and western values. One subject explained that Russia faces a deeply entrenched inferiority complex, and the way they address it is to embrace Russian exceptionalism and discredit Western values. Many subjects noted the existence of a return to the Cold War era mindset of us versus them, expressing concern with increased tensions. With the increase in anti-west sentiment, the political groups opposing Putin have been suffering. They traditionally promote more pro-western ideology arguing for more openness and cooperation with Europe and the United States. Now, these parties are suffering and Putin's government is even more entrenched.

Conclusions

Several conclusions on the effects of sanctions can be drawn from these two cases. In the case of the sanctions on Yugoslavia, the humanitarian effects of the international sanctions are indisputable. Sanctions were comprehensive and directly affected everybody regardless of socio-economic status or political alignment. In the case of the sanctions on Russia, the humanitarian effects have been minimized, but not eliminated through the use of targeted sanctions. In both Russia and Yugoslavia, short term tangible economic effects were felt as well as short term intangible psychological effects. In the Yugoslav case, these short term effects developed into lasting long term tangible and intangible effects, some of which are still felt today. Though the Russian case has yet to fully unfold and therefore long term effects cannot yet be determined, it is possible to predict that some of the short term effects that have been seen thus far will contribute to lasting effects.

The level of impact from tangible short term economic impact differed in each case. The effect in Yugoslavia was so severe, there were significant shortages of everything one might need from food, to gasoline, to medical supplies. Businesses struggled to stay open as they couldn't access materials for production and as people had no discretionary income to spend. The middle class, which had been the most populous during communism, disappeared. In order to survive, businesses and families were forced to turn to the black market, which caused a societal erosion of morals and an economy that was completely reliant on the black market. This shift to a non-regulated market eliminated the revenues that had been collected from taxes for use on social services. The economic system collapsed to an irreparable point.

Due to the targeted nature of the sanctions on Russia, the economic effect could not compare to the severity of the Yugoslav case. In addition to being targeted rather than comprehensive, the

targeted sanctions on Russia are not implemented by the UNSC, allowing for the opportunity to reorganize the market, whereas the sanctions on Yugoslavia were implemented globally. The economic impact in Russia was felt in difficulties for those starting businesses, or restrictions on specific sectors, but the majority of the population felt little economic pressure. The only aspect that affected everyone was the changing value of the Russian ruble.

In both cases the psychological effect borne by the population was a feeling that the world was against them. In the Yugoslav case, it was true, the entire world was sanctioning them. The combination of isolation and population wide punishment bred disillusionment and hopelessness in addition to any political response. The idea that “Of course they [the West] have put sanctions on us...They will do anything to take us down.” was heard in both cases. In both Russia and Yugoslavia this feeling was encouraged by state run propaganda.

In Russia, the psychological effect was mostly politically driven. The population did not have to grapple with the emotional burden of not being able to care for their family or the moral battle of the criminalization of society as Yugoslavs did. Instead, in Russia, the response has been an overwhelming return to the Cold War us-versus-them mindset. In Russia, many people support the annexation of Crimea, they see it as Russia making its own political decisions instead of remaining subordinate to the West. To many, these economic sanctions are just an example of how the West will do anything to prevent Russia’s prosperity. This type of response was distinctly opposite to the response that was envisioned when the sanctions were imposed.

In Yugoslavia, many of the short term effects, both tangible and intangible, developed into long term effects some of which can still be seen today. The economic crisis left behind a decline in industry and a collapse of the economic infrastructure. The black market remained and quickly switched to selling illegal goods such as drugs and weapons. In response to the low level of economic opportunity in Serbia, the country now is witnessing a brain drain. Four hundred thousand

of the most educated people leave Serbia every year in search of economic opportunity deeply depleting the country's youth population and work force. The brain drain is also evidence of underlying long term psychological effect of sanctions in the societal disillusionment and pessimism.

In Russia it is subjects weren't asked to explain lasting effects as the sanctions are still being implemented. Even so, if the Russian case were to follow a similar evolution as the Yugoslav case, it can be predicted that some of the short term effects will turn into long term effects. For example, in terms of economic impact, it is likely that the Russian government's initiative to reorient finances to within Russia and to other markets such as South America and China could become the new orientation of Russian markets for the foreseeable future. Similarly, the anti-West mindset, though not a new concept, could be maintained with more vigor as a result.

The strongest similarities of each case are seen in the true political response and how it differed from the desired political response. In both cases, the sanctions actually gave more power to those that they were trying to weaken. In addition to weakening opposition parties that traditionally leaned more towards the West, the isolation allowed state rhetoric to become more radicalized. Sanctions became justification for the leaders' actions. In Yugoslavia, people were preoccupied worrying about surviving from day to day and weren't thinking about politics. If someone did happen to be paying attention to politics, they likely saw the difficult situation as giving justification to Milosevic's actions. In Russia, people saw the sanctions as the West trying to gain economic advantage and punishing Russians for pursuing their own path, which justified Putin's annexation of Crimea. In both Yugoslav and Russian cases, sanctions allowed the government to successfully spread propaganda. Sanctions have become a vessel for Putin to spread anti-west propaganda. He can easily blame anything that goes wrong in Russia on Western

sanctions. The same was true for Milosevic. Milosevic won local support throughout the conflict through his control of the media.

Another important similarity when considering the outcomes of the political motivations of the sanctions is that few citizens believed that sanctions changed their leaders' actions at all. Only one subject in the Yugoslav case believed that sanctions were successful in bringing down Milosevic. In the Russian case, nobody believed that Putin had made any policy changes as a result. The only impact the sanctions may have had was stopping him from instigating more aggression and making more territorial grabs. Russia may not have removed itself from Crimea, but it has made no further advancements on the Ukrainian front nor in any of the other countries that fear Russian intrusion.

These cases make it clear that the real impact of sanctions on a society is not straightforward. Even in the case of strategically targeted sanctions on Russia, the humanitarian impact, though much less serious than under comprehensive sanctions, was still felt by the public. It is evident that the intended political constraint is unlikely to be achieved. The unintended economic, psychological, and political consequences bear much more influence on the targeted populations than does the intended political effect. These cases suggest that it is unlikely that any of the intended political consequences are achieved in a typical sanctions episode. Instead those who are targeted may gain power and find it easier to promote their ideas. This is especially true when sanctions are enacted on countries with weak democratic institutions where, if there is civil discontent, it bears little effect on the functioning of the government.

Policy Recommendations

There are many possible takeaways from the results of the field research. One key takeaway is that economic sanctions, especially comprehensive economic sanctions place an unnecessary burden on the economy without ensuring success in causing political change. Without careful regulation they can lead to the criminalization of an entire society and the erosion of morals. The sanctions infrastructure as it stands has not proven to be successful in causing governments to change their policies. In light of this, there are several options for reform to consider. The first and most drastic option would be to recommend no future use of economic sanctions. Instead, policymakers should focus on non-invasive methods such as diplomatic sanctions. The second policy option is to leave the infrastructure for economic sanction implementation as it stands without change and instead focus on the creation of programs to eliminate economic strain on civilians and third countries. The third option is to mandate that all economic sanctions must be targeted and only implemented after the failure of less invasive measures such as diplomatic sanctions.

Option One: No Future Use

The first policy option to consider is no future use of economic sanctions. According to a study done by the Targeted Sanctions Consortium, out of the three most common uses of sanctions, the most effective are constraint, effective in 28% of UN targeted sanctions episodes with mixed efficacy in 22%, and signaling, effective in 27% of sanctions episodes with mixed efficacy in 44%.

Coercion, the third determined objective of sanctions, was effective only 10% of the time with mixed efficacy in 27%.⁶⁸

The most successful aspects of sanctions are the ability to signal consequences for violating international norms, to stigmatize and isolate a target who is violating norms, and to constrain targets access to resources. These aspects can be achieved through other less invasive methods than economic sanctions. Less invasive options include diplomatic sanctions such as revocation of visas, closing of embassies, or limiting diplomatic personnel, individual travel bans, and in cases of armed conflict, arms embargoes.

A positive of this option is that it limits the effect on anyone but government officials. The cost of comprehensive economic sanctions is borne by civilians. This has proven not to be effective in eliciting change in political opinion and inspiring political revolt. Instead, citizens who faced difficulties were more likely to be vulnerable to propaganda produced by their government. It is unlikely that citizens will be harmed as a direct result of diplomatic sanctions as there would be no economic constriction or shortage of goods. In combination with the decreased humanitarian effect, any long term psychological effects on citizens and their society would be minimized as well. The pessimism and hopelessness attributed to the dehumanizing effects of a society under economic sanctions would be avoided.

No future use of economic sanctions is the only option that ensures the losses of other countries will be zero. As the third country effect is most notable under economic sanctions, there would be no loss of revenue from cancelled exports nor price increases from new imports. This option would also be the easiest to implement in an exclusively multilateral framework. Requesting implementation of diplomatic sanctions is a much less demanding request than the

⁶⁸ Thomas Biersteker, et al., *Effectiveness of UN targeted Sanctions*, (Targeted Sanction Consortium, 2013)

implementation of economic sanctions. Therefore, more countries would be willing to join together in implementing sanctions, making it more likely for the United Nations Security Council to pass a resolution enacting legally binding sanctions. This would greatly increase their efficacy.

It is important to recognize that other methods of signaling, including diplomatic sanctions, run the risk of not being drastic enough to incite policy change. Though, as the field work has shown, neither comprehensive sanctions nor targeted sanctions were decidedly successful in causing policy change either. More so, the focus should be on the ability to constrain a government's actions, which further research could prove that diplomatic sanctions would prove successful in as well. This option does not eliminate the possibility of malignant actors using sanctions to their benefit, but because diplomatic sanctions will not affect the general public, it diminishes the possibility for governments to have concrete evidence to convince their citizens that the world is acting against them.

It is equally important to recognize that asking for no future use of economic sanctions is a big undertaking. Economic sanctions are a primary option when a government takes actions that do not follow international norms. Out of all episodes of United Nations endorsed sanctions, economic sanctions such as commodity sanctions have been used in 27.4%, financial sector sanctions have been used in 12.9%, and asset freezes have been used in 51.6%.⁶⁹ It is unlikely that policymakers will accept the removal of these tool from their box. It would prove useless to recommend an option that would be unlikely to get implemented. It would be especially hard to implement this option if it does not become the norm across the international community. It is impossible to get rid of a tool if adversaries do not agree to do the same.

⁶⁹ Thomas Biersteker, et al., *Effectiveness of UN targeted Sanctions*, (Targeted Sanction Consortium, 2013)

Another restriction of this option is the fact that diplomatic sanctions may take a long time to show any effects. Even economic sanctions require a certain length of implementation before tangible results are seen. Diplomatic sanctions, as they are less invasive and less severe, will require an even longer duration before results are seen. Problems could arise as results are delayed if the situation the sanctions are addressing is particularly instable and frequently fluctuating.

Less invasive sanctions such as arms embargoes are frequently imposed, used in 87% of UN sanctions episodes, but are among the least effective when they are applied alone. However, when combined with commodity sanctions, such as the sanctions on the diamond trade implemented on Liberia in 2003-2006, they become very effective. In the case of Liberia, sanctions were implemented to constrain and signal parties that were threatening a peace agreement. The sanctions implemented were an arms embargo, a travel ban, a ban on the export on diamonds and timber, and asset freezes. These sanctions were seen as playing an important role in reinforcing peacebuilding efforts to stabilize the situation in Liberia and constraining the actions of Charles Taylor, the former leader.⁷⁰ It can be assumed that without the use of the ban on diamond exports these sanctions would not have been as successful.

The prohibition of using economic sanctions fails to account for a course of action if diplomatic methods fail. Economic sanctions often play the role of the intermediate option after the failure of diplomatic sanctions and before the use of military force. A major concern with this option is that it would not provide a reasonable response for severe cases such as in the event of grave violation of human rights. If the use of stringent sanctions is forbidden, then the only option after the failure of other diplomatic methods is the use of military force. The authorization of use of military force should not be taken lightly.

⁷⁰ Thomas Biersteker, et al., *Effectiveness of UN targeted Sanctions*, (Targeted Sanction Consortium, 2013)

Option Two: Protection and Aid Programs

A second policy option to consider is to not change anything about the direct implementation of sanctions, but to instead focus on the development of programs to protect and provide aid for citizens and non-targeted countries. This option focuses on civilian protection but allows the political infrastructure of sanction implementation to remain in place. This option would also allow for increased multilateralism as implementing countries could work together to create successful programming.

Already included in the UN Charter is Article 50, which provides a means by which third party states who have been unintentionally hurt by sanctions can approach the Security Council for aid. This option recommends greater use of this article and further research into its use and how the existing framework to decrease losses by third countries can be improved.⁷¹

This option would protect from effects tangential to the economic effect. For example, in the Yugoslav case, people were forced to participate in the black market in order to access to simple items needed for daily life or for business. This created a strong illegal network that shifted from supplying staples to supplying drugs and weapons after sanctions were lifted. If there had been a reliable way for people to access staples the criminalization of society and erosion of morals could have been eliminated. A second tangential effect that could be limited with the development of aid programs is the psychological harm. In the Yugoslav case, as seen in other cases such as Russia and Iran, the isolation from the world and the constant feeling of being considered criminals and

⁷¹ Charter of the United Nations Chapter VII Article 50 <https://www.un.org/en/sections/un-charter/chapter-vii/index.html>

enemies left a lasting impact on the society leaving behind a pervasive pessimism that remains today.

Another benefit of providing aid would be the ability to prevent governments from being able to successfully spread propaganda. If citizens see that they are being helped while specific politicians are being punished, it is less likely that politicians will be able to create an excuse for why they are being sanctioned. In the Russian case, for example, the Russian media promotes the idea that this is just geo-politics - that the United States, and other Western countries, are targeting the Russian economy in order stop Russia from being a competitor.

The focus on civilian protection may appear contradictory when looked at in the framework of comprehensive sanctions. Comprehensive economic sanctions inherently include civilian harm. By design comprehensive economic sanctions put economic pressure on civilians to inspire dissatisfaction with their government and incite political change. As Milica Delvic, Director of Governance and Political Affairs at the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, explains, “With respect to the ordinary people, whose lives were to be the most affected by sanctions, it was expected that both isolation and worsening living conditions would lead to dissatisfaction, which in turn would, through electoral behavior, result in compliance with the international community’s demands.”⁷² Providing civilian protection and aid would attempt to eliminate this aspect, which would in theory have decreased political success.

The reason this is being suggested is because there is no evidence to suggest that the economic hardship placed on civilians had any success in causing political enlightenment and inciting protest. Conversely, in the Yugoslav case, a struggling society became more willing to accept anti-west propaganda. They saw it as a justification of Milosevic’s actions not proof that he

⁷² Milica Delvic, “Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool: The Case of Yugoslavia,” *The International Journal of Peace Studies* 3, no. 1 (1998), https://www.gmu.edu/programs/icar/ijps/vol3_1/Delvic.htm

was in the wrong. Similarly, in the Russian case, citizens see sanctions as justification that Putin must pursue Russia's foreign policy goals because the West will always try to use their political supremacy to enforce their interests. In light of this, targeted sanctions should be used over comprehensive sanctions, following the recent trends and aid programs should then be used to protect citizens who were tangentially affected by targeted sanctions.

An important concern with this option is that it would be more costly as it accrues cost both from the spillover effect from economic sanctions as well as the cost of providing aid. It is possible that a system of import replacement could be developed, but it would be more difficult to rearrange exports.

The strongest obstacle to the success of this option would be the likelihood of the targeted state's government to deny access to aid providers. It does not matter how strong the development or aid programs are if they aren't allowed into the country to complete their work. This happened during the US unilateral targeted sanctions placed on Venezuela. During the political conflict over presidency between Juan Guaido and Nicolas Maduro in 2019, the United States attempted to deliver food and medicine to aid citizens through Colombia. This was supported by Guaido, but President Maduro, who still held power and was backed by the Venezuelan army, blockaded the border with Colombia preventing aid from reaching Venezuelan citizens.⁷³ In cases such as this, where the government does not give their consent, aid programs cannot function and fail to provide anything to those who need it.

A second example of this was the difficulties in the implementation of the European Union's 1999 "Energy for Democracy" plan. This relief plan was created in response to a proposal by Serb opposition forces and agreed to supply heating fuel to Serbian towns run by democratic forces in

⁷³ Laurel Wamsley, "Humanitarian Aid Arrives For Venezuela – But Maduro Blocks it," *npr*, (February 8, 2019)

time to protect them from the coming winter weather. The plan was to deliver 350 tons of heating fuel to Nis and Pirot from the Macedonian city, Skopje.⁷⁴ When the fourteen trucks of heating oil arrived at the border of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, they were stopped and informed they would go through a rigorous customs clearance process before proceeding. The drivers and their lorries were stuck at the border for nine days while they waited for the completion of the abnormal customs inspections. These unusual customs requirements were attempts made by the Yugoslav government to restrict the access of relief to their country.⁷⁵

Another scenario that occurred in the case of the Former Yugoslavia that similarly shows the difficulties in implementing aid programs was the EU's policy to aid non-governmental businesses. In April of 2000, the EU organized a "white" list of companies so that they could better target the asset freeze being implemented. This "white" list delineated the companies in Yugoslavia that were not owned or operated by Yugoslav government officials. These companies were then spared from the asset freeze.⁷⁶ Several subjects in this study owned a business on this "white" list. The true effect of this white list was more harmful than it was intended to be. Once a business was listed as "safe" for the West, it became blacklisted by the Serbian government. They were then barred from doing business in Yugoslavia. Even though companies on the "white" list were spared from the asset freeze, they still were unable to do business in Europe. The only way their company, and others facing the same situation, could continue to do business was by finding a local partner on the EU's "black" list who would then act as an intermediary with the government. In this way, the EU's attempts to protect independent businesses actually hurt them, and made the companies they had attempted to sanction even stronger.

⁷⁴ "MEMO/99/60 Energy for Democracy – First Delivery" Press Corner, European Commission, Accessed March 27, 2020. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/MEMO_99_60

⁷⁵ "Energy for Democracy: Chronicle of Events," Reliefweb, OCHA Services, December 3, 1999.

⁷⁶ Anthonius W. de Vries, "EU Sanctions against Yugoslavia, 1998-2000," in *Smart Sanctions: Targeting Economic Statecraft*, ed. David Cortright and George Lopez (Rowman & Littlefield 2002) 97-99.

Another concern in the implementation of aid programs is that malignant leaders may actually be able to profit off of the aid program. One case that exemplifies this problem is the 1996 UN Oil for Food program, which was designed to aid Iraqi citizens during the UN sanctions on Iraq. In this case, the UN administered comprehensive economic sanctions after the First Gulf War. The program was designed to allow Iraq to sell a restricted amount of oil and use the profits for buying food and essential products. The program faced failures in implementation on the UN side, with accusations of mismanagement and corruption. In addition, Saddam Hussein exploited the program by developing an advanced system to earn and pocket extra funds, which he then used to purchase military items.⁷⁷

This option, though it is morally strong, faces many problems in its application. There have been many instances when policies following this format have been implemented, that have failed to provide any actual aid, for example in the case of US sanctions on Venezuela. Even more problematic, is when attempted aid situations actually give the sanctioned entities more power as in the case of the EU “white” list in Yugoslavia and the Oil for Food program in Iraq.

Option Three: Multilateral/Targeted Only

The final policy option is to mandate that all sanctions be multilateral and targeted with the support of the UN Security Council. The importance of the multilateral aspect is seen in the Russian case. In this case, it was impossible for sanctions to be implemented by the United Nations Security Council because, as one of the five permanent members, Russia has veto power. Though it was impossible to gain UNSC endorsement, the sanctions aren’t unilateral. Instead, they were

⁷⁷ Sharon Otterman, “IRAQ: Oil for Food Scandal,” *Council on Foreign Relations*, (October 28, 2005). <https://www.cfr.org/background/iraq-oil-food-scandal>

implemented by the US and the European Union as well as EU aligned countries, but this still can't compare to global support. In the UN Charter Chapter V Article 25, it is provided for that all members of the UN must implement the decisions of the Security Council. If sanctions aren't imposed within the UN framework than this universal implementation is impossible to attain. When Russia was unable to continue trading with the US or Europe, both as a result of sanctions and as a retaliation to sanctions, they reoriented business within Russia or found new partners in China or South America. This in turn affects the economies of the implementing countries. In order to minimize this, it needs to be harder for a country under sanctions to find a new market, meaning that the more countries involved in the sanctions the better. While the five permanent members of the UN Security Council maintain veto power, it is difficult for the Security Council to be effective. Even if there is no reform to ameliorate this problem, policymakers should work outside the United Nations to facilitate cooperation on sanctions policies.

Mandating the use of targeted sanctions would effectively minimize the painful effect of sanctions on undeserving citizens. In the Russian case, we saw that even though sanctions were targeted there was still an economic impact on citizens. The economic pressure in this case was limited and only affected certain sectors. In comparison, this economic impact was much less extreme than it was in the Yugoslav case. In Yugoslavia, everybody was affected, regardless of their socio-economic status. This illustrates that the use of targeted economic sanctions over comprehensive economic sanctions can make an immense difference in the civilian suffering.

One thing that doesn't change significantly enough with the change to targeted sanctions is its influence on the acceptance of propaganda. In both Yugoslav and Russian cases, the government spread propaganda that the World/West was against them and that citizens should rally support behind the government to counter this attack on their lives and their societies. In this way, the

sanctions actually gave power to those that they were trying to weaken. Even though targeted sanctions had a less direct effect on citizens, it still became a rallying call for many Russians.

Understanding that even targeted sanctions can cause an undesired political effect, there should be a system created that counters governmental propaganda. In the Russian case subjects explained that people who were especially susceptible were those who only had access to Russian news sources due to language barrier. Similarly, in the Yugoslav case, the only news that many people read was that from within Yugoslavia. American news was limited to a single paragraph that was poorly translated and spread from a single NATO run station. Creation of a system of spreading international news in the language of the location being sanctioned would be an important step to counter this.

Recommendation

Considering the data retrieved from the field work, and information from other cases of the use of sanctions, the best course of action is to advocate for limited use of multilateral targeted sanctions. There are four criteria that I recommend for implementation. First, multilateral targeted sanctions should be endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. If support of the UNSC is impossible, then sanctions should be created with the support of other states and regional institutions. Second, multilateral targeted economic sanctions should be implemented only after the failure of less invasive measures such as diplomatic sanctions or arms embargoes. More stringent economic sanctions should only be used in cases when less invasive methods are not sufficient - when the only other option is military intervention. Third, multilateral targeted sanctions must be implemented with a set time limit to ensure they are not maintained past the limit of their

effectiveness. Fourth, the implementation of multilateral targeted sanctions must include the use of all programming possible to increase success such as the use of media campaigns to promote ideas counter to those that sanctions are targeting.

It has been said that targeted sanctions are less politically effective because of their minimized economic effect, but from comparison with the Yugoslav case, it can be seen that causing greater economic damage cannot be equated with a greater ability to bring political change. The importance of mandating the use of targeted economic sanctions stems from the evidence that comprehensive economic sanctions cause irreparable economic and psychological damage to those uninvolved in decision making. Targeted sanctions can also create economic pressure on civilians, but at a significantly reduced level, causing minimal damage, as seen in the Russian case.

Targeted economic sanctions still may not be effective in causing policy change. Instead, they should be used with the expectation of signaling disapproval and constraining further malicious action. For example, Economic sanctions are seen as an important tool in the implementation of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.⁷⁸ In the 2009 report of the Secretary General on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the three pillars of R2P described have become the guide to practice on R2P. The first pillar reflects the responsibility of the state to protect its population from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The second pillar reflects the responsibility of the international community to assist and encourage states to fulfill their responsibilities denoted in the first pillar. The third pillar reflects the responsibility of the international community to take ‘timely and decisive action’ through diplomatic, humanitarian, or other peaceful means denoted in Chapter VI and VIII of the UN charter to protect populations

⁷⁸James Pattison, "Economic Sanctions." In *The Alternatives to War: From Sanctions to Nonviolence*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018. Oxford Scholarship Online, 2018.

from the previous listed crimes, and on a case by case basis, after the failure of peaceful actions, more forceful means as denoted in chapter VII of the UN Charter.⁷⁹ This third pillar explicitly makes reference to Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which gives the UN Security Council the power to enact sanctions. The third pillar also notes that these actions are only to be taken in the event that more peaceful options fail. This reinforces the concept denoted in this policy recommendation which requires the use of diplomatic sanctions, and arms embargoes, before the use of more stringent economic sanctions.

Targeted sanctions must be enacted only with multilateral support. Sanctions should be endorsed by a UN Security Council resolution in order to be legally binding and therefore have maximized efficiency. Only when it is impossible to enact sanctions through the UN Security Council, for example, if a permanent member will use their veto power as in the case of Russia, should multilateral sanctions not endorsed by the Security Council be considered. In this case, policy coordination with other states and regional organizations is imperative. This however, cannot be considered the equivalent of UNSC endorsed sanctions as the UNSC is the only international legal body able to make legally binding decisions for all UN member states. The purpose of this requirement is to increase the success of political goals by eliminating opportunities for market reorienting and political response. The concept of the futility of unilateral sanctions is well encapsulated by a quote from Richard Haass stated in his congressional testimony on the Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions. He says, “As a rule, unilateral sanctions tend to be little more than statements or expressions of opposition except in those instances in which the tie between the United States and the target is so extensive that the latter cannot adjust to an American cut-off.”⁸⁰

⁷⁹ Alex J. Bellamy, “The Three Pillars of the Responsibility to Protect” *PENSAMIENTO PROPIO* 41, no.20 (2015) 35-55.

⁸⁰ Richard N. Haass, “Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions” *The Brookings Institution* May 27, 1999.

An example of the importance of the multilateral nature of sanctions is the case of US sanctions on Iran. In 1995, President Clinton implemented a unilateral comprehensive trade and investment embargo against Iran in response to their opposition to Middle East peace. The EU had adopted a policy of ‘critical dialogue’ to criticize the Islamic regime’s behavior while maintaining diplomatic and economic relations. After the United States enacted the sanctions, a French oil company took over the \$600 million deal which had previously been made with US oil company Connoco. Over time, as sanctions continued, Iran was able to adjust to the sanctions and replace alternative markets.⁸¹ Any losses that Iran may have faced were eventually either made up for by the increase in oil prices or replaced with transactions with other countries. The only way the long term economic effect would have been significant is if the sanctions had been multilaterally implemented. Other countries often value commercial interaction more than the US, believe that it promotes open political and economic systems. For this reason, it can be difficult to garner international support for sanctions when they are over matters less consequential than human rights abuses.⁸²

The idea that targeted economic sanctions should only be carried out after the failure of stems from the idea that conflicts should be solved with the least amount of intervention necessary in order to minimize unintended humanitarian costs. It should be noted that in some cases the implementation of sanctions can be time sensitive. For example, in the case of the UN intervention in Rwanda, the failure of the UN to prevent the Rwandan genocide is commonly attributed, at least in part, to their inability to take cohesive timely action.⁸³ Therefore, in a situation where time is of

⁸¹ Akbar E. Torbat, *Impact of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions*, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005)

⁸² Richard N. Haass, “Use and Effect of Unilateral Trade Sanctions” *The Brookings Institution* May 27, 1999.

⁸³ Roméo A. Dallaire, and Krystel Carrier. “Rwanda.” in *The United Nations Security Council in the Age of Human Rights*, edited by Jared Genser and Bruno Stagno Ugarte,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014): 275-276.

the essence in preventing the increase of violence, multilateral targeted economic sanctions should be implemented in coordination with targeted individual sanctions, diplomatic sanctions, and arms embargoes instead of waiting for these measures to prove ineffective.

The Iran case is also an example for why a time limit should be enforced on the length of implementation. There is enough data to say that the comprehensive US sanctions of 2015 were successful in the short term. The sanctions successfully disrupted Iran's oil exports and sunk the country into an economic crisis when the sanctions were imposed in 1995, but the long term effects have been minimal. Iran was able to find alternative suppliers for US made goods and to finance oil development projects through non-US firms. The political effect in both the short term and the long term has been minimal. The only areas that have seen some change have been those targeted in addition by the EU's 'critical dialogue' policy.⁸⁴ This shows that the length of implementation had little effect on the success of the sanctions, which was instead more dependent on multilateral implementation.

It is important to set a time limit to ensure that sanctions are not left in implementation past the frame within which they could be effective. A time frame at the end of which implementation would be reevaluated would allow for the potential to disband a sanctions regime before its completion if it has shown no success and no future opportunity for success. It is difficult to set a general time limit that should be followed for all cases as different types of sanctions require a different length of time to begin to see results. Further research should be done to determine the length of time that would be sufficient to achieve the goals of each type of sanctions. A set time limit would allow for reevaluation on efficacy and opportunities for reconciliation. This policy, for

⁸⁴ Akbar E. Torbat, *Impact of the US Trade and Financial Sanctions*, (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2005)

example, has been implemented by the European Union since 2016 with its current sanctions on Russia that get reevaluated every six months.⁸⁵

Present in both Yugoslav and Russian cases, was the tendency of the population to be more susceptible to the spread of governmental propaganda. The effects of sanctions became hard evidence that allowed leaders to radicalize political sentiments and rally support with the justification that the West was attempting to take them down. In the Yugoslav case, a subject explained there was only one station that broadcast NATO statements and it was badly written, and badly translated making it useless. In the Russian case, the efficacy of Russian propaganda was mostly due to language barrier prohibiting access to international news. A system should be developed to counter governmental propaganda by increasing translated news access. This would be an important step to make the political goals of sanctions more easily attainable and to minimize the possibility for the increase in power of the targeted leaders.

From the review of the results from the two case studies performed despite previously outlined shortcomings, the consideration of other cases of sanctions episodes, and the comparison to other less effective measures at our disposal, I believe the best policy option is to endorse multilateral targeted economic sanctions implemented with limited use. These sanctions must be endorsed by the UNSC unless extenuating circumstances prevent it. They should also be only implemented after the failure of or in coordination with less invasive measures such as diplomatic pressure, diplomatic sanctions, or arms embargoes. Additional framework should be included such as a set time limit with opportunities for reevaluation and extension and efforts to increase access to news other than state produced propaganda. These conditions should be met in all sanctions

⁸⁵ EU restrictive measures in response to the crisis in Ukraine, *European Council / Council of the European Union, March 13, 2020.*

episodes in order to most effectively achieve political goals while still minimizing civilian suffering.

Conclusion

The results from the fieldwork completed in this study indicate that targeted sanctions exact less harmful humanitarian effects than comprehensive sanctions, but far from none. In the case of the sanctions on Yugoslavia, the severe humanitarian impact of the international sanctions is indisputable. Sanctions were comprehensive and directly affected everybody regardless of socio-economic status or political alignment. In the case of the sanctions on Russia, the humanitarian effects have been minimized, but not eliminated through the use of targeted sanctions.

In both cases, the unintended economic, psychological, and political consequences bear much more influence than intended effects. Instead those who are targeted may gain power and find it easier to promote their ideas. This is especially true when sanctions are enacted on countries with weak democratic institutions where, if there is civil discontent, it bears little effect on the functioning of the government.

Due to several structural limitations to this study, I recommend more research on this subject and that this research should serve as groundwork for future research. Even so, the data remains substantial and compelling as results reflect the shared narrative among citizens of the former Yugoslavia and of present day Russia on the effects of sanctions.

With careful consideration of the two case studies of this paper and their limitations, as well as understanding of several other cases, I recommend limited use of multilateral targeted sanctions with four points critical to their implementation.

First, sanctions must be implemented multilaterally, ideally by the United Nations Security Council, but when that becomes impossible, cooperation with other states and regional organizations is necessary.

Second, multilateral targeted economic sanctions should only be used after the failure of less invasive measures such as diplomatic sanctions and arms embargoes, unless it is a case of time sensitivity in which less all intended measures should be taken in coordination at the same time.

Third, the multilateral targeted sanctions must be implemented with a set time limit in order to ensure they are not implemented past the time frame for efficacy.

Fourth, and finally, multilateral targeted sanctions should be implemented along with as many supporting initiatives as possible. An example of this kind of initiative would be an initiative to increase foreign language access to Western news in order to combat state produced propaganda. The need for this was proven by the case studies on Russia and Yugoslavia.

This study should be the starting point for further research into ideas mentioned in the policy recommendation, especially the concept of time limit and how it can be used to ensure effective implementation of sanctions.

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