

Should the United States Fear China's Rise?

Whether pundits and policymakers admit it or not, the United States is a great power in relative decline. It is not like the former Soviet Union and soon to fall into the dustbin of history; nor is it akin to ancient Rome with the Goths at the gates. Nevertheless, with policymakers and analysts alike embracing the idea that a new era of great power competition is at hand, they simultaneously acknowledge that the United States' "unipolar era" is over. Relative to rising great powers such as India or (more dramatically) China, the United States is declining.

Shaping American grand strategy to suit this new environment will require a host of diplomatic, economic, and military adjustments that strategists are only slowly coming to recognize. Indeed, the fact that proponents of "restraint" and "offshore balancing" are pitted against advocates of "deep engagement" and "liberal hegemony" in a vibrant debate highlights that the course corrections to manage the U.S. transition away from unipolar dominance remain up in the air.¹ Any number of domestic and international factors will affect the precise nature of the strategy chosen. However, because the changing distribution of power and rise of new great powers largely drive the U.S. grand strategy debate, addressing U.S. strategic needs requires anticipating the likely *future* behavior of other great powers and the role of U.S. policy therein. We therefore need to know: what strategies are rising states *themselves* likely to adopt in response to U.S. decline and, relatedly, how might the different strategic options under discussion for the United States reinforce or reduce problematic aspects of rising state behavior?²

Joshua Shiffrin is an Assistant Professor of International Relations with the Pardee School of Global Affairs at Boston University. His first book, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts*, was recently published by Cornell University Press. He can be reached by email at jris@bu.edu and found on Twitter (@shiffrin).

Copyright © 2019 The Elliott School of International Affairs
The Washington Quarterly • 41:4 pp. 65–83
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2018.1557491>

Given its rapid economic and military development, China is central to this discussion. Of course, China's rise has not occurred in a vacuum. For most of the last three decades, the United States attempted to "engage" China in a bid to shape its preferences so that it became—in former Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick's famous words—a "responsible stakeholder."³ In light of China's recent assertiveness in its near abroad and growing military portfolio, however, this policy is generally seen as a failure.⁴ Instead, analysts across the political and scholarly spectrum increasingly see a rising China as part of a long line of rising states that, with newfound wealth and power, tend to challenge both existing great powers and the international order those powers created. Even if hegemonic war between a rising China and declining United States is avoided—so this logic goes—the United States needs to mobilize its remaining resources to deal with a potentially dangerous PRC apt to throw its growing weight around the international arena.

This article refines and challenges this emerging policy consensus by placing China's rise and U.S. decline in the context of other power shifts.⁵ Not only is it wrong to assume that rising states such as China tend to invariably challenge

The key is to manipulate security threats rising states face in their own geopolitical environment.

existing great powers but, relative to what China *might* be doing, China's recent assertiveness is far from a clear-cut challenge to the United States. In fact, rising great powers across time and space often (1) support declining great powers to a greater or lesser degree in a bid to obtain their assistance against other threats, and/or (2) limit the scope of their strategic challenge until declining states have fallen far down the great power ranks. Along the way, declining states can affect whether and to what degree rising states pursue a coop-

erative or competitive course. The key to doing so is not—as policymakers sometimes suggest—simply engaging or deterring rising states directly, but rather manipulating security threats and opportunities rising states face in their own geopolitical environment.

Applied to the rise of China and resulting U.S. strategy debate, this framework implies that concerns with a predatory rising China are overblown. Though currently problematic, China is far from issuing an outright challenge to the United States and is likely to continue avoiding such a course for some time. As importantly, current and future developments in China's strategic environment may help push the PRC toward greater cooperation with the United States. To catalyze and capitalize on such possibilities, however, U.S. strategists themselves need to recognize that an overly assertive response to China's rise—one that

foregrounds U.S. threats, asserts U.S. power in and around East Asia, and forecloses the possibility of U.S.-China cooperation—is counterproductive. Under certain conditions, a less activist American foreign policy may do more than most pundits expect to encourage Chinese cooperation.

The remainder of this piece proceeds in four sections. First, I briefly crystallize the notion that a power shift is ongoing and link this to debates over American grand strategy. Second, drawing on recent work on how rising states manage power shifts, I discuss the strategies rising great powers may adopt toward declining states and the drivers of these behaviors. I then apply this framework to the rise of China, before discussing the resulting implications for U.S. strategy.

China's Rise and the American Response

Although starting from a low base, China's rise has indeed been meteoric. A quarter century ago, the U.S. economy was 800 percent that of the People's Republic; now, it is barely 170 percent and falling. Whereas Chinese per capita GDP was barely \$1,000 annually at the start of the 1990s, it is now nearly \$7,500 per year and significantly higher still in China's coastal provinces—ahead of actors such as Russia and nearly half that in some U.S. states. In relative terms, household income is now 1/7th that of the United States, whereas in 1993 it was barely 1/34th.⁶ Nor is it just crude measures of economic strength that reflect the trajectory as, judging from its efforts to patent its technologies, it is becoming a more innovative economy as well: where, for example, China filed in 2005 for barely 500 “triadic” patents—those registered in different countries to preserve the copyright—compared to 17,000 in the United States, the PRC last year filed nearly 2,800 patents against the United States' 15,000.⁷

Chinese military strength, meanwhile, is also expanding rapidly. With a growing surface and subsurface force and experience in expeditionary missions, its navy is now capable of conducting some out-of-area operations. China's air force is fielding new generations of advanced fighters and attack aircrafts, and increasingly deploying them to assert Chinese claims over the South and East China seas. Similarly, China's land forces are focusing on conducting high-intensity combat operations using smaller and more dispersed units. And, where China was previously highly dependent on foreign suppliers for its high-end military kit, a surge in domestic investment has helped reduce (though not eliminate) its reliance on foreign sources. To top it off, political reforms have strengthened ties between political and military strategists, decreasing the likelihood that Chinese grand and military strategy will run at cross purposes.⁸ In short, although China is not yet a full peer economic and military competitor to the United States, it is well on its way. Even if it stopped growing tomorrow, China would present the

United States a challenger on par with, and on some metrics ahead of, the Soviet Union during the Cold War.⁹

To be clear, the United States retains strengths of its own, benefitting from a large and diverse economy, educated population, vibrant military-industrial base, and inherent geographic security. Still, China's rise means that the U.S. uni-

China's rise means that the U.S. unipolar era is over.

polar era—the preeminent feature of post-Cold War world politics—is over. For the first time in a quarter century, the United States is seriously concerned with another state's ability to offer sustained opposition to American interests using a wide range of policy tools and with the potential to rally other

actors to its cause. Not only is this *the* seminal strategic development of the last several decades, but policymakers accustomed to asserting U.S. power in world politics with comparatively little thought of the consequences have had to update their playbook.

Facing a China taking on the trappings of a great power, American policymakers have reached two interrelated conclusions. First, a growing consensus concludes that a rising China is likely to be a threatening China out to challenge both a relatively declining United States and the ostensible “liberal order” backed by the United States since World War II. This has not always been the conclusion drawn from China's rise, as mentioned earlier with the “responsible stakeholder” integration strategy. In fact, even into the 2010s, President Barack Obama emphasized that the United States welcomed “the rise of a China that is peaceful, stable, prosperous, and a responsible player in global affairs.”¹⁰ As China's rise continues, however, and as the PRC asserts itself abroad, the U.S. position is changing. Analysts across an array of policy and academic perspectives now argue that Chinese strategy will become increasingly expansive and bellicose as the distribution of power shifts in China's favor.¹¹ A former Obama administration official, for example, warns that “China is emerging with confidence and ambition, setting its sights on global leadership, undergirded by greater economic, military, and ideological power.”¹² A former member of the George W. Bush administration cautions that the “intensifying competition between the United States and China is thus driven not only by the traditional dynamics of power politics—that is, by the narrowing gap between a preponderant hegemon and a fast-rising challenger—but also by a wide and deep divergence in values.”¹³ Mainstream think tank reports, meanwhile, allege that China's rise “pose[s] challenges” to the United States, that China is focused on “establishing regional military hegemony in the Asia-Pacific” in ways inimical to the United States, and that the PRC holds “ambitions to undermine U.S. primacy.”¹⁴

Not to be outdone, the Trump administration has also embraced this narrative. As the 2017 *National Security Strategy* puts it, China is now considered a

“revisionist” power that “seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region,” with the 2018 *National Defense Strategy* elaborating that China “seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”¹⁵ For their part, senior officials have picked up on this thread, arguing—in Vice President Mike Pence’s words—that China “wants nothing less than to push the United States of America from the Western Pacific and attempt to prevent us from coming to the aid of our allies.”¹⁶ In short, a rising China is assumed to be a predatory, highly revisionist power intent on challenging American economic and security interests and threatening the U.S. position as a great power itself.

Building off this dawning consensus, U.S. policy is now focused on containing China’s rise.¹⁷ Of course, as other analysts note, U.S. strategy vis-à-vis China was never devoid of competitive elements: even while engaging the PRC in the 1990s and early 2000s, for instance, the United States cobbled together a nascent counterbalancing coalition and redeployed military assets toward East Asia in a bid to hedge against a hostile PRC.¹⁸ At present, however, engagement is out and hard-balancing is in. The U.S. Department of Defense itself declared in its most recent *National Defense Strategy* that “long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia” constitute the “principal priorities” for the U.S. military.¹⁹ Political leaders have reinforced this trend, advocating policies designed to actively confront China.²⁰

Nor is this just rhetoric. The U.S. Navy, for instance, is moving forces into East Asia—including its newest and most technologically-advanced assets—in a bid to deter and contain the PRC. If current plans hold, 60 percent of the fleet will be homeported in the Pacific by 2020, with upwards of 20 percent of the force stationed or forward deployed on any given day.²¹ So-called “freedom of navigation operations” (FONOPS) by U.S. warships designed to contest Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea are a regular occurrence. Furthermore, the effort to organize a counterbalancing coalition has moved into public view as the United States has looked to strengthen ties with states such as Vietnam and Thailand and promote defense cooperation between the United States, Japan, India, South Korea, Australia, and others. Put simply, the United States is taking the lead in trying to suppress China’s continued growth, forestall Chinese revisionism, and by extension, preserve its own position at the top of the great power ranks.

Power Shifts: Theoretically and Historically

Why, however, should the United States assume that a rising China will be a predatory state? To be sure, great powers confronted with their relative decline have regularly worried that other, relatively rising states are apt to adopt increasingly predatory strategies that push decliners down or from the great power ranks.²²

Thucydides, for instance, famously attributed the Peloponnesian War to the rise of Athens “and the fear which this caused in Sparta,” just as Wilhelmine Germany’s leaders saw Russia’s rise before 1914 as “an ever increasing nightmare.”²³ In practice, however, rising state strategy can differ profoundly across time and space.

While some rising states indeed try to push decliners into the dustbin of history—think of American efforts to exploit the Soviet decline in the late Cold War²⁴—others are apt to limit the scope of their competition for lengthy periods of time. And still more dramatically, some rising states attempt to cooperate with and support declining states, seeking to prevent their continued slide. U.S. efforts to back Great Britain in the first half of the twentieth century is one prominent example of this type of policy, but lesser known cases are also striking. Wilhelmine Germany, for instance, tethered its cart to Austria-Hungary’s increasingly decrepit horse in the years before World War I; likewise, the Soviet Union—as archival documents show—tried to reach a quid pro quo with a rapidly declining Great Britain after World War II, going so far as to offer the United Kingdom a security alliance over one year before the United States did the same.²⁵ Rising states, in

Rising states pursue one of four typical strategies toward declining states.

short, sometimes go for the jugular with declining states, but this is far from always the case.

Rising states can be thought of as pursuing one of four typical strategies toward relatively declining states.²⁶ First, rising states may end up pursuing what I term *relegation* strategies: efforts designed to push declining states down or from the great power ranks using any and all means at a rising state’s expense. This strategy—designed to catalyze a rapid and funda-

mental shift in the distribution of power at a decliner’s expense—parallels what many U.S. analysts seem to fear from China today, and what policymakers in declining states across time and space regularly worry about vis-à-vis their relatively rising peers.

Conversely, rising states may also pursue *strengthening* strategies—that is, efforts to support a decliner and to keep it as a member of the great powers even at significant cost and risk to rising states themselves. The canonical case is that of American policy toward Britain after 1947: having been ambivalent about committing itself to Britain’s defense before and immediately after World War II, or assisting in Britain’s postwar economic recovery, the United States quickly moved after 1947 to offer Britain an alliance via NATO while extending economic aid via the Marshall Plan.²⁷ Moreover, between these two extremes are two middle-of-road options: *weakening* and *bolstering* strategies. The former involves ad hoc and cautious gambits to whittle away at a declining state’s strength over time while trying to avoid an overt competition with the decliner that the

riser may not win (and may lose badly); the latter involves similarly ad hoc and low-cost efforts to keep a decliner a great power.

What causes rising states to adopt one strategy or another? Although many analyses suggest that some combination of economic interdependence, common ideologies, and international institutions may help encourage rising states to embrace declining states and avoid a predatory policy, these arguments are increasingly suspect.²⁸ U.S. concerns with Chinese behavior, for one, have grown despite unprecedented levels of economic interdependence and institutional cohabitation.²⁹ Likewise, that the United States preyed upon the waning USSR in the late Cold War—at a time when the Soviet Union was embracing liberal reforms and “Western values”—suggests that sharing a common ideology may not be a panacea; that the USSR under as devoted a Communist as Joseph Stalin tried to support the postwar United Kingdom is further evidence that a common ideology is secondary to other factors.³⁰

Instead, rising states tend to prey upon or support declining states depending on their own need for partners against other great power threats, and a declining state's ability to militarily threaten a riser along the way.³¹ All things being equal, the more a rising state sees other great power threats besides the decliner on the horizon, and the more a declining state is poised to help a rising state against those challengers, the more likely a rising state is to pursue a supportive strategy. Backing a decliner in this fashion is not altruism, but a strategic move to keep a potential partner around that may help a rising state overcome major threats at lower cost and risk to itself than if the riser were forced to go it alone.

Counterintuitively, the weaker a declining state is militarily under these conditions, the greater a rising state's incentive to strongly back the decliner. After all, even if a rising state wants to back a decliner, a declining state that can defend itself is also a state that may entrap the riser in foreign conflicts or itself decide to threaten the rising state; it's reasonable at such times for a rising state to proceed cautiously. Instead, the militarily weaker such a decliner becomes, the more likely it is that rising states will offer more extensive support to the decliner which can be a partner against other challengers. Here, if a rising state fails to intensely back a militarily dissolute decliner, a riser may reasonably worry that the decliner will fall victim to—or be courted by—rivals eager to deny the riser a potential ally.

Case in point, there was a reason the United States significantly expanded the scope of its economic and military assistance to Britain in 1947-1948: facing the unexpected collapse of British military strength as British leaders prioritized butter over guns in the postwar period, and seeking Britain's assistance against the USSR in the nascent Cold War, U.S. leaders concluded that failing to up the scope of U.S. assistance might lead Britain “to the conclusion that it has no other course open to it than to seek a breathing spell by coming to terms with

the Soviet Union.” Such an arrangement, in turn, “would greatly strengthen the Soviet Union, would weaken the United Kingdom, and would tend to isolate the United States.”³² In short order, prior U.S. reticence to protect the United Kingdom and help Britain reconstruct its economy gave way to full-throated U.S. efforts to make Britain great again.³³

An analogous dynamic played out in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries between a surging Germany and declining Austria-Hungary. Despite having aligned with Austria soon after the Wars of German Unification in a bid to help check Russia and France—calculating, as George Kennan later described, that it was a “basic requirement of Germany’s security” that “Austria retain its status as one of the Great Powers of Europe”—Wilhelmine Germany was initially reluctant to partner too closely with the Hapsburg Empire. To this end, German leaders kept Austro-German military relations distant and limited the scope of Austro-German diplomatic ties into the late 1800s amid the various European diplomatic crises of that era. Instead, it took the progressive collapse of Austrian military strength after the turn of the century to catalyze growing German support for its Austrian ally. Indeed, on the eve of World War I, Germany regularly backed Austria in its disputes with Russia (and Russia’s allies) throughout Southeastern Europe and was prepared to render wartime military assistance for fear of leaving Austria vulnerable to others’ machinations.³⁴

When, however, a declining state is unwilling to assist a rising state against other challengers—or if the riser lacks other challengers—then predation is likely. In such circumstances, predation helps the riser eliminate a potential roadblock to its continued emergence. Still, this does not mean all is lost. Instead, declining states can limit the degree of predation—disincentivizing relegation—by sustaining a military that can punish a rising state’s ambitions and ensure any intensive predation carries meaningful costs. In such situations, relatively rising states are apt to hang back even if the overall distribution of power is weighted in their favor, and limit their challenge to decliners, calculating that they may enjoy more propitious opportunities to push decliners from the great power ranks in the future.

Tellingly, for instance, U.S. policymakers in the late Cold War—a time when the United States was undergoing a massive rise relative to the Soviet Union and converging on becoming the world’s unipolar power³⁵—were highly reluctant to attempt to drive the USSR out of the great powers for fear of provoking a Soviet military response. This behavior was all the more striking given that the USSR was significantly weaker than the United States overall (and had been throughout the Cold War) and was downsizing the Soviet military by the late 1980s.³⁶ Nevertheless, the United States only pursued a relegation strategy vis-à-vis the Soviets after the East European Revolutions of 1989 eviscerated Soviet

military strength in Europe, creating a window of opportunity to quickly push the Soviets out of Central and Eastern Europe.³⁷

Placing China's Rise in Perspective

This framework helps us better understand China's current strategy vis-à-vis the United States and the conditions under which it may change (for better or for worse). First, despite concerns that China has embarked upon a revisionist effort to challenge the United States, Chinese behavior is far more limited and circumscribed than often appreciated. On balance, it seems akin to a weakening strategy designed to slowly undermine U.S. advantages and *perhaps* create *future* conditions for the PRC to significantly gain at the U.S. expense. Indeed, when pointing to signs that a rising China is turning into an aggressive China, analysts often argue that China has (1) asserted territorial claims against its neighbors; (2) rapidly improved its military capabilities in ways that scare other countries; (3) expanded its influence in parts of the world (e.g., Africa) where it has not normally been present; and/or (4) pushed international organizations and fora (e.g., the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank) as rivals to the United States' own.³⁸ Given China's mounting ability to back and sustain these initiatives with meaningful capabilities, these are all important developments that merit attention.

Chinese behavior is far more limited and circumscribed than often appreciated.

Nevertheless, considered in light of what a true relegation strategy would entail and the steps China *might* but has *not* taken, the comparatively limited nature of Chinese predation becomes clear. For one, China has not increased the rate of its military spending over the last decade even as its economy has grown; in fact, Chinese military expenditures remain below the rates witnessed in both the late Cold War period and in the early 2000s.³⁹ Likewise, Chinese land reclamation and military deployments in the East and South China Seas have only involved territories previously claimed by the Chinese government; China has not expanded its maritime claims so much as taken a unilateral approach toward resolving existing disputes.⁴⁰ It has also done little to strengthen its nuclear arsenal even though this force remains vulnerable to American disruption.⁴¹ Above all, it has made no moves to try to evict the United States from East Asia by either declaring a sphere of influence in the region⁴² or undercutting the U.S. alliance network.⁴³ In fact, facing suggestions by the Trump administration that the United States might retrench, Chinese leaders have signaled they want the United States to remain active in the area.⁴⁴ Ultimately, and as other analysts

note, Chinese efforts contain some competitive elements, but these are also notably constrained in their scope and degree.⁴⁵

This strategy makes sense. On one level, China's rise has moved it near the top of the East Asian pecking order. A quarter century ago, China lagged behind states such as Russia and Japan economically and militarily, but now its economy outstrips all states involved in the region except for the United States.⁴⁶ The military balance tells a similar story: China is far from a military hegemon, but given Japan's limited investment in its military, Russia's focus on Europe (and friendly relationship with China), the still-nascent emergence of India as a regional player, and the relative weakness of other countries around China's periphery, the United States is the principal external security impediment to China's continued rise.⁴⁷ Under these conditions—absent another great power competitor—China faces incentives to try to shift the distribution of power further against the United States.

China faces strong incentives to avoid provoking the U.S. too much or too soon.

By the same measure, however, China's relative rise from a position of marked inferiority vis-à-vis the United States means it also faces strong incentives to avoid provoking the United States too much or too soon.⁴⁸ Not only might overly aggressive Chinese activities court a war with the United States that the PRC might well lose, but—even short of war

—it might prompt further U.S. efforts to stymie China's continued growth. Given these conditions, Chinese leaders have good reason to embark on a slow and cautious predatory campaign—a weakening strategy—that tries to shift the distribution of power against the United States while operating below a threshold that might catalyze a hostile response.

In short, limited predation—not an overt and outright push to overtake and challenge the United States—is the name of China's current and highly rational game. As significantly, it appears Chinese leaders are aware of the structural logic of the situation. Despite ongoing debate over the extent to which China has departed from its long-standing “hide strength, bide time” strategy first formulated by Deng Xiaoping in favor a more assertive course seeking to increase Chinese influence in world affairs, Chinese leaders and China watchers have been at pains to point out that Chinese strategy still seeks to avoid provoking conflict with the United States.⁴⁹ As one analyst notes, China's decision to carve out a more prominent role for itself in world politics has been coupled with an effort to reassure and engage the United States so as to avoid unneeded competition while facilitating stability.⁵⁰ Chinese leaders echo these themes, with one senior official noting in 2014 that Chinese policy focused on “properly address[ing] conflicts and differences through dialogue and cooperation instead of confrontational

approaches.”⁵¹ Xi Jinping himself has underlined these currents, arguing even before taking office that U.S.-Chinese relations should be premised on “preventing conflict and confrontation,” and more recently vowing that “China will promote coordination and cooperation with other major countries.”⁵² Ultimately, as one scholar observes, there is “hardly evidence that [... China has] begun to focus on hegemonic competition.”⁵³ Put another way, China’s leaders appear aware of the risks of taking an overly confrontational stance toward a still-potent United States and have scoped Chinese ambitions accordingly.

As importantly, the above framework also highlights the conditions under which Chinese strategy may change in the future. Two different circumstances stand out. First, if China continues to rise economically and militarily, it may eventually reach the point where it so far outstrips potential challengers that even sustained U.S. opposition would no longer be able to suppress Chinese ambitions. A Chinese relegation campaign—focused on ensuring the United States could never again challenge China—is then likely to emerge. This campaign might involve Chinese efforts to overturn the U.S. alliance system in East Asia (or beyond), bankrupt the U.S. economy, and reshape regional and/or global diplomatic conditions to best suit Chinese interests. Such a policy would entail the type of extreme Chinese revisionism that analysts fear may be in the offing.

Still, it is important to recognize that China would not be able to embark on this strategy until well into the future. If nothing else, the United States retains real military strengths that should continue to give China pause. American military spending, for one, continues to outpace China’s by a wide margin.⁵⁴ Likewise, the U.S. military is adept at fielding cutting-edge military forces while China is still catching up technologically.⁵⁵ By the same token, U.S. forces can draw upon over 70 years of experience in deploying advanced military forces far from American shores at a time when China is still revising its doctrine to accommodate modern military conditions.⁵⁶ Moreover, even if China eventually succeeds in overtaking the United States as the preeminent military power, it is worth noting that military preeminence is not required to make other states run scared: if the U.S. military feels pressure from China at a time when China lags behind the United States, there is no reason to suspect the United States could not apply similar pressure vis-à-vis China if it were (at some point) in the PRC’s shoes.

Second, it is also possible that future changes in the distribution of power might push Chinese strategy in a different direction. Today, Asia is largely a bipolar environment divided between the United States and China. Russia is not a major player in the area, Japan is a half-formed great power owing to its decision to remain militarily denuded, and India—though rising—is not yet in the same league as the United States or China. Still, as the U.S. National Intelligence Council itself suggests, this may change in the future if and when Japan

remilitarizes, India rises, Russia recovers ground, and/or other states come to play a major role in the area.⁵⁷

In such circumstances, China might face good reasons to avoid predation entirely and adopt some kind of supportive strategy: doing so would help the PRC “bid” for U.S. cooperation in managing other actors that might threaten Chinese security. Indeed, the fact that the United States is comparatively distant from China and thus relatively less threatening than other prospective great power challengers means that the United States might be an especially attractive partner, giving China reasons to keep the United States around as a great power partner. To borrow from Henry Kissinger, the rise of other states besides China might therefore help restore “fluidity” to international security, creating new constraints and opportunities that may push China into reevaluating the attractiveness of a predatory course.⁵⁸

Implications for U.S. Strategy

In short, despite concerns a rising China is apt to be a highly predatory, revisionist state likely to challenge the United States for dominance in East Asia and beyond, there are good reasons to believe this concern is overstated. If current trends hold,

If and when other great powers rise, China may face reasons to support the United States.

China may have reasons to try to prey upon the United States, but the real risk of antagonizing the United States during a period when the United States will retain significant capabilities to make China pay dearly for aggrandizement means Chinese predation should remain limited in scope. Moreover, if and when still other great powers rise—a possibility that cannot be excluded out of hand—China may then face reasons to support the United

States and seek U.S. backing against other challengers. In either case, the United States is playing a strong hand.

More precisely, the different scenarios point to distinct options for the United States as U.S. policymakers grapple with the strategic changes needed to adjust to China’s rise. In the first scenario—China as cautious predator—U.S. policymakers face an obvious incentive to try to deter additional Chinese predation by acquiring military capabilities to contain Chinese aggrandizement. *Prima facie*, this might seem to call for an assertive U.S. strategy to actively contain China. In reality, however, retaining the ability to impose military costs on China need not mean an expansive and open-ended arms buildup or coalition-building exercise. Instead, retaining the ability to impose costs on China could just as well mean

retaining the ability to “surge” forces into Asia in the event of a crisis, moving offshore and imposing costs on the PRC from afar (e.g., by a blockade), or even positioning tripwire forces around a security perimeter while preparing to mobilize should China cross that hypothetical line. In fact, the seemingly greater lethality of modern military technologies compared to previous periods may allow the United States to retain potent military forces to dissuade Chinese aggrandizement with reasonably limited investment of blood and treasure. Meanwhile, such cost-imposing military options carry a further benefit in that they may help the United States husband its resources for what may be a long-term effort. Although U.S. policymakers understandably wish to pursue an assertive, forward-leaning strategy that would maximize U.S. control over events while hemming in China, U.S. ends may be attainable through other means. More limited forms of engagement may satisfy American goals.

Conversely, the second scenario—China as self-interested supporter of the United States—would argue strongly for something akin to restraint or offshore balancing. In this circumstance, the United States could maximize the likelihood and scope of Chinese cooperation by taking steps that (1) signal the United States might well work with the PRC against China’s other competitors and (2) that the United States is itself not a military threat. Hence, U.S. strategies that reduce the U.S. role and presence in East Asia would seem to have much to commend them. Retracting U.S. security commitments and reducing any lingering U.S. military challenge to China would increase the likelihood that Chinese leaders would conclude the United States is relatively less threatening to China than other great powers. Fearing the United States might be enticed by another actor, China may then bid for U.S. cooperation. In short, the U.S. mission in this second scenario is choosing a path that reinforces the incentives a rising China would have to support the United States—offshore balancing and/or restraint may accomplish this.

Ultimately, China’s rise is among the most important geopolitical developments in modern world politics. While the shift in the distribution of power portends significant global changes, the implications for the United States loom just as large. For the first time in a quarter century, the United States is operating in an environment where another great power’s concerns matter—American relative power is waning. Facing an adverse power shift, U.S. policymakers and analysts alike are voicing understandable concerns that a rising China will prove an inherent and increasingly assertive challenger as its relative strength grows. Viewed in theoretical and historical context, however, there are actually good reasons for cautious optimism that a rising China will not prove an all-out predator eager to push the United States from the great power ranks. In the final analysis, not only should the United States retain the military capacity to keep Chinese aggrandizement in check for the foreseeable future, but there may well be future

shifts in the distribution of power that the United States can exploit to encourage Chinese support and cooperation. Although U.S. policymakers must be prepared to adjust the United States' own strategy to reinforce and exploit these developments, cool calculation rather than undue worry is the solution. China's rise is problematic, but history and theory both indicate the United States is in a manageable—and potentially advantageous—position.

Notes

1. Barry R. Posen, *Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy* (Cornell University Press, 2014); John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, "The Case for Offshore Balancing," *Foreign Affairs* 95, no. 4 (August 2016); Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, "Don't Come Home, America: The Case against Retrenchment," *International Security* 37, no. 3 (Winter 2012–2013): 7–51; Stephen Brooks and William Wohlforth, *America Abroad: The United States' Global Role in the 21st Century* (Oxford University Press, 2016).
2. On the general need to better understand rising state behavior, see Jeffrey W. Legro, "What China Will Want: The Future Intentions of a Rising Power," *Perspectives on Politics* 5, no. 3 (September 2007): 515–534; Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Future of U.S.-China Relations: Is Conflict Inevitable?," *International Security* 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 7–45.
3. See Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York, September 21, 2005, <https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm>.
4. For U.S. engagement, see Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner, "The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations," *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 2 (April 2018): 60–70; Wang Jisi et al., "Did America Get China Wrong?," *Foreign Affairs* 97, no. 4 (August 2018), <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2018-06-14/did-america-get-china-wrong>; Peter Mattis, "From Engagement to Rivalry: Tools to Compete with China," *Texas National Security Review* 1, no. 4 (August 2018); Aaron L. Friedberg, "Competing with China," *Survival* 60, no. 3 (May 2018): 7–64; and Harry Harding, "Has U.S. China Policy Failed?" *The Washington Quarterly* 38, no. 3 (October 2015): 95–112.
5. For elaboration on many of the core concepts, see Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants: How Great Powers Exploit Power Shifts* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018); see also Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shiffrin, "The Rise of China, Balance of Power Theory, and U.S. National Security: Reasons for Optimism?" *Journal of Strategic Studies* (forthcoming).
6. Author calculations from World Bank, World Development Indicators, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>, accessed October 2018. All figures developed in real terms. For Chinese province-level GDP, see the province-level GDP provided by Salvatore Babones, "China Quietly Releases 2017 Provincial GDP Figures." China's highest-earning provinces had per capita incomes in the \$17,000–\$20,000 range (measured in 2017 USD). For comparison, Russian per capita GDP was approximately \$11,000 in 2017, while the poorest U.S. states had per capita GDPs under \$40,000 (in 2009 USD); Russian data from World Bank, World Development Indicators, and U.S. per capita GDP by state from Statista, "Per Capita Real Gross Domestic

- Product of the United States in 2017, by state (in chained 2009 U.S. Dollars),” <https://www.statista.com/statistics/248063/per-capita-us-real-gross-domestic-product-gdp-by-state/>, accessed November 2018.
7. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, “Triadic Patent Families,” 2018, <https://data.oecd.org/triadic-patent-families.htm>, last accessed October 21, 2018. On the importance of triadic patents as a measure of economic vitality, see Michael Beckley, “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure,” *International Security* 36, no. 3 (Winter 2011–2012): 69–70.
 8. For details, see Shiffrinson, “Rise of China, Balance of Power Theory, and U.S. National Security.”
 9. Interestingly, although downplaying the scope of China’s potential threat to the United States, this is also apparent in Michael Beckley’s recent net assessment of Chinese strength vis-à-vis the United States: where China (in Beckley’s calculations) lags far behind the United States in many measures of state strength, its position still outstrips the historical performance of the Soviet Union. Given that the USSR made a game effort of challenging the United States during the Cold War, China’s potential should be evident: if the Cold War era was a bipolar era, then China today is certainly already a peer competitor. See Michael Beckley, *Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).
 10. “Remarks by President Obama and President Xi of the People’s Republic of China in Joint Press Conference,” The White House, September 25, 2015, <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/remarks-president-obama-and-president-xi-peoples-republic-china-joint>; for assessment of the Obama administration’s strategy, see Jeffrey A. Bader, *Obama and China’s Rise: An Insider’s Account of America’s Asia Strategy* (Brookings Institution Press, 2012).
 11. For a good summary, see Randall Schweller, “Opposite but Compatible Nationalisms: A Neoclassical Realist Approach to the Future of US–China Relations,” *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 11, no. 1 (March 2018): 32–37. For a useful popular account, see Max Fisher and Audrey Carlsen, “How China Is Challenging American Dominance in Asia,” *New York Times*, March 9, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/03/09/world/asia/china-us-asia-rivalry.html>.
 12. Ely Ratner, “Rising to the China Challenge,” Testimony before the House Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Congress, 2nd. Sess., 115th Cong., February 15, 2018, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/report_pdf/Strategic%20Competition%20with%20China%20HASC%202015%2018.pdf.
 13. Aaron L. Friedberg, “Competing with China,” *Survival* 60, no. 3 (June 2018): 8–9.
 14. Anthony Cordesman, “China and the U.S.,” *CSIS Commentary*, October 3, 2018, <https://www.csis.org/analysis/choosing-between-four-cs-conflict-and-containment-versus-competition-and-cooperation>; David Dollar, Ryan Hass, Robert Kagan, Kenneth Lieberthal, Cheng Li, Mira Rapp-Hooper, Jonathan Stromseth, Bruce Jones and Tarun Chabra, “Avoiding War: Containment, Competition, and Cooperation in U.S.-China Relations,” *Brookings Report*, November 2017, 1 and 4–6, <https://www.brookings.edu/research/avoiding-war-containment-competition-and-cooperation-in-u-s-china-relations/>; and Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley Tellis, *Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), 17, https://cfrd8-files.cfr.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015/04/China_CSR72.pdf.

15. NSS 2017, 27; Department of Defense, *Summary of the National Defense Strategy of the United States of America 2018* (Washington: Department of Defense), 2, <https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.
16. "Remarks by Vice President Pence," October 4, 2018.
17. For a good discussion, see Dollar et al., "Avoiding War," 5.
18. Nina Silove, "The Pivot before the Pivot: U.S. Strategy to Preserve the Power Balance in Asia," *International Security* 40, no. 4 (Spring, 2016): 45–88; Robert Ross, "The Problem with the Pivot," *Foreign Affairs* 91, no. 6 (December 2012); Thomas Christensen, "Fostering Stability or Creating a Monster? The Rise of China and U.S. Policy toward East Asia," *International Security* 31, no. 1 (Summer 2006): 81–126.
19. Interestingly, the notion that great power politics are back with a vengeance is one of the few issues uniting critics of the Trump administration with the administration itself, forming a kind of new bipartisan consensus. Indeed, if anything, many critics of the Trump administration lambast current U.S. leaders for not competing well enough. See Thomas Wright, "The Return of Great-Power Rivalry Was Inevitable," *The Atlantic*, September 12, 2018, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/liberal-international-order-free-world-trump-authoritarianism/569881/>; Ankit Panda, "The Trump Administration Says It's in for Great Power Competition with China. What Does That Mean?" *The Diplomat*, February 7, 2018, <https://thediplomat.com/2018/02/the-trump-administration-says-its-in-for-great-power-competition-with-china-what-does-that-mean/>; Stephen M. Walt, "Planning for the Post-Trump Wreckage," *Foreign Policy*, August 30, 2018, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/08/30/planning-for-the-post-trump-wreckage/>.
20. "Remarks by Vice President Pence," October 4, 2018; see also discussion in Rudd, "How to Avoid an Avoidable War." In fact, elements of this policy have long had a home in official U.S. strategy pronouncements; see Emma Ashford and Joshua Shiffrin, "Trump's National Security Strategy: A Critic's Dream," *Texas National Security Review* 1, no. 2 (Spring 2018).
21. Ronald O'Rourke, *China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities – Background and Issues for Congress*, Congressional Research Service Report RL33153, August 1, 2018, 79, <https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf>. As of 2014, the Navy plans called for 67 ships stationed or forward deployed in the Pacific on any given day; see Robert Hein, *Right-Sizing the United States Navy*, Brookings Report, March 6, 2015, <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2015/03/06/right-sizing-the-united-states-navy/>. As of 2018, Congress is calling for the Navy to have no fewer than 355 major combatants. In practice, the share of forward deployed units may be higher still given rising U.S. concerns with a rising China and difficulties in actually obtaining a 355-ship Navy.
22. See also Dale Copeland, *The Origins of Major War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 4.
23. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner and ed. M. I. Finley (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1972), book 1, paragraph 23; Quoted in William C. Wohlforth, "The Perception of Power: Russia in the Pre-1914 Balance," *World Politics* 39, no. 3 (April 1987): 362.
24. Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, chap. 5. For related work, see Mary Sarotte, 1989 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
25. For Soviet policy toward Britain, see Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, 83–93.

26. Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, 21–23. For a streamlined typology, see Shiffrin, “Rise of China, Balance of Power Theory, and U.S. National Security.”
27. For a recent treatment arguing Anglo-American bonhomie had solidified much earlier—at the turn of the twentieth century—see Kori Schake, *Safe Passage: The Transition from British to American Hegemony* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017). Schake is right that Anglo-American relations had significantly improved in the decades before World War Two; nevertheless, the United States was hardly a reliable partner of Britain at the start of the postwar era—a qualitative strengthening of U.S.-British relations only emerged in the early Cold War years.
28. These arguments are discussed in Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, 7–8.
29. On economic and institutional interdependence, see Dale Copeland, *Economic Interdependence and War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 436–444; G. John Ikenberry, “Why the Liberal World Order Will Survive,” *Ethics and International Affairs* 32, no. 1 (Spring 2018): 17–29; G. John Ikenberry, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West: Can the Liberal System Survive?,” *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 1 (January 2008): 23–37.
30. On changes in the Soviet Union during this period, see Mark Haas, “The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in Soviet Power, Policies, or Domestic Politics?,” *International Organization* 61, no. 1 (2007): 145–179.
31. I develop this argument in detail in Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, 23–37.
32. Memorandum of the Chairman of the Special Committee to Study Assistance to Greece and Turkey to the Under Secretary of State, undated, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Volume 5: The Middle East and North Africa* (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1971), 47–52.
33. Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, 78–83. For other analyses of Anglo-American relations at the time with slightly different periodization, see Robert Hathaway, *Ambiguous Partnership: Britain and America, 1944-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981); Terry Anderson, *The United States, Great Britain, and the Cold War, 1944-1947* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1981).
34. Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, 166–176.
35. See Shiffrin, *Rising Titans, Falling Giants*, chap. 5; also Hal Brands, *Making the Unipolar Moment: U.S. Foreign Policy and the Rise of the Post-Cold War Order* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016).
36. For illustration, see George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, *A World Transformed* (New York: Knopf, 1998), 146–160, 184–202; Robert Hutchings, *American Diplomacy and the End of the Cold War* (Washington: Wilson Center Press, 1997), 101–106.
37. For this evolution, see Philip Zelikow and Condoleezza Rice, *Germany Unified and Europe Transformed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 159–160.
38. For the logic of pushing alternate institutions as a form of rival order construction, see Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, “After Unipolarity: China’s Visions of International Order in an Era of U.S. Decline,” *International Security* 36, no. 1 (July 2011): 41–72.
39. Military expenditures have remained at 1.9 percent of Chinese gross domestic product (GDP) since 2009; see Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2018,” <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex> (last accessed May 13, 2018). For comparison, the late Cold War and immediate post-Cold War years saw Chinese spending average 2.5 percent of GDP, while the early 2000s saw military expenditures of around 2.0–2.1 percent of GDP.

40. For Chinese claims and approaches, see Ryan D. Martinson, *Echelon Defense: The Role of Seapower in Chinese Maritime Dispute Strategy* (Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2018), Chinese Maritime Studies Report No. 15, 6–11; Joel Wuthnow, “Beyond Imposing Costs: Recalibrating U.S. Strategy in the South China Sea,” *Asia Policy* 24 (July 2017): 4.
41. Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel, “Assuring Assured Retaliation: China’s Nuclear Posture and U.S.-China Strategic Stability,” *International Security* 40, no. 2 (Fall 2015): 7–50.
42. For concerns along these lines, see Peter Layton, “As China’s Sphere of Influence Expands, Australia Has a Choice,” *War on the Rocks*, June 6, 2017, <https://warontherocks.com/2017/06/as-chinas-sphere-of-influence-expands-australia-has-a-choice/>; Lyle Goldstein, “China Could Announce a ‘Total Exclusion Zone’ at Any Time,” *The National Interest*, October 25, 2018, <https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-could-announce-%E2%80%98total-exclusion-zone%E2%80%99-any-time-34297>.
43. As Adam Liff notes, China fears being contained by the United States and its allies but has yet to advance “concrete, viable alternatives” for regional security structures; Adam Liff, “China and the U.S. Alliance System,” *The China Quarterly* 233 (March 2018): 154. That said, Chinese efforts to conduct joint military exercises with ASEAN nations may reflect preliminary steps in this direction; over time, stronger military-to-military ties may give the PRC some limited influence over other states’—some of which are being courted by the United States as de facto allies—defense policies. See Lim Min Zhang, “China, ASEAN Kick off Inaugural Maritime Field Training Exercise in Zhanjiang, Guangdong,” *Straits Times*, October 22, 2018, <https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/east-asia/china-asean-kick-off-inaugural-maritime-field-training-exercise-in-zhanjiang>.
44. “China State Media Warns Trump Against Isolationism, Calls for Status Quo,” Reuters, November 10, 2016, <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-election-china-media-idUSKBN1350P6>.
45. Avery Goldstein, *Rising to the Challenge: China’s Grand Strategy and International Security* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005); Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?,” *International Security* 37, no. 4 (April 2013): 7–48; Evan S. Medeiros, *China’s International Behavior: Activism, Opportunism, and Diversification* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2009); David Shambaugh, “U.S.-China Rivalry in Southeast Asia: Power Shift or Competitive Coexistence?” *International Security* 42, no. 4 (Spring 2018): 85–127. See also Liu Feng, “China’s Security Strategy Towards East Asia,” *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 9, no. 2 (Spring 2016): 151–179; Bjorn Jerden, “The Assertive China Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and Why So Many Still Bought into It,” *Chinese Journal of International Politics*, 7, no. 1 (Winter 2014): 47–88.
46. In 1992, China’s GDP was \$1.0 trillion against \$1.1 trillion for Russia and \$4.9 trillion for Japan. As of 2017, the respective figures were \$10.2, \$1.7, and \$6.2 trillion. Figures from World Bank, World Bank, World Development Indicators, <http://databank.worldbank.org/data/reports.aspx?source=world-development-indicators>, accessed October 2018.
47. For others’ military capabilities and potential to constrain China, see Eugene Gholz, “No Man’s Sea” (draft article manuscript, January 2017); Michael Beckley, “The Emerging Military Balance in East Asia: How China’s Neighbors Can Check Chinese Naval Expansion,” *International Security* 42, no. 2 (Fall 2017): 78–119.
48. For discussion of Chinese concerns along these lines, see Goldstein, *Rising*; Barry Buzan, “The Logic and Contradictions of ‘Peaceful Rise/Development’ as China’s Grand Strategy,” *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7, no. 4 (2014): 381–420; Qi Haixia,

- "Disputing Chinese Views on Power," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 10, no. 2 (2017): 211–239.
49. For an overview, see Joseph Y.S. Cheng, "Xi Jinping's 'New Model of Major Power Relationships' for Sino-American Relations," *Journal of Comparative Asian Development* 15, no. 2 (2016): 226–254; Dingding Chen and Jianwei Wang, "Lying Low No More? China's New Thinking on the *Tao Guang Yang Hui* Strategy," *China: An International Journal* 9, no. 2 (September 2011): 195–216.
 50. Yan Xuetong, "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7, no. 2 (2014): 171–174; see also Mikael Weissmann, "Chinese Foreign Policy in a Global Perspective: A Responsible Reformer 'Striving for Achievement,'" *Journal of China and International Relations* 3, no. 1 (2015); David M. Lampton, "A New Type of Major-Power Relationship," *Asia Policy* 16, July 2013; Chih-Yu Shih and Chiung-chiu Huang, "China's Quest for Grand Strategy: Power, National Interest, or Relational Security," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 8, no. 1 (2015): 1–26.
 51. Yang Jiechi, "Innovations in China's Diplomatic Theory and Practice Under New Circumstances," *Quishi Journal* 6, no. 1 (January 2014), http://english.qstheory.cn/magazine/201401/201401/t20140121_315115.htm.
 52. For Xi's early remarks, see Qin Yaqing, "Continuity Through Change: Background Knowledge and China's International Strategy," *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 7, no. 3 (2014): 306; for his recent comments, see Xi Jinping, "Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era," remarks delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017.
 53. Qin, "Continuity Through Change," 306.
 54. Chinese military spending was approximately 38 percent the United States' in 2017; author calculations from SIPRI, "SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2018."
 55. For discussion of U.S. advantages, see U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCESR), *Annual Report 2017* (Washington: GPO, 2017), 507–596; Eric Heginbotham et al., *The U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017* (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2015), xxx, 21–22. As these studies underscore, China has cut into the U.S. lead in many arenas, but the United States still retains significant areas of comparative advantage.
 56. For discussion, see M. Taylor Fravel, *Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, forthcoming).
 57. The clearest statement remains National Intelligence Council, *Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds* (Washington: National Intelligence Council, 2012), iv, 15–19. Along similar lines, see Barry Posen, "From Unipolarity to Multipolarity: Transition in Sight?" in *International Relations Theory and the Consequences of Unipolarity*, ed. G. John Ikenberry, Michael Mastanduno, and William Wohlforth (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
 58. National Security Archive, "Interview with Dr. Henry Kissinger," February 7, 1999, <https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/coldwar/interviews/episode-16/kissinger1.html>.