

Why did the Democrats Lose the South?

Bringing New Data to an Old Debate

Ilyana Kuziemko and Ebonya Washington*

September 17, 2016

Abstract

A long-standing debate in political economy is whether voters are driven primarily by economic self-interest or by less pecuniary motives such as ethnocentrism. Using newly available data, we reexamine one of the largest partisan shifts in a modern democracy: Southern whites' exodus from the Democratic Party, concentrated in the 1960s. Combining high-frequency survey data and textual newspaper analysis, we show that defection among racially conservative whites explains all (three-fourths) of the large decline in white Southern Democratic identification between 1958 and 1980 (2000). Racial attitudes also predict whites' partisan shifts earlier in the century. Relative to recent work, we find a much larger role for racial views and essentially no role for income growth or (non-race-related) policy preferences in explaining why Democrats "lost" the South.

JEL codes: D72, H23, J15, N92

*We thank Frank Newport and Jeff Jones for answering our questions about the Gallup data. We are grateful to Alberto Alesina, Daron Acemoglu, Bill Collins, Marvin Danielson, Claudia Goldin, Matt Gentzkow, Alex Mas, Adrian Matray, Suresh Naidu, Jesse Shapiro, Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, Gavin Wright and seminar participants at the University of Chicago, Middlebury, NBER Summer Institute's Political Economy Workshop, the National Tax Association, NYU, Pomona, Princeton, Stanford SITE, University of Toronto, UBC, UCLA and Yale's CSAP Summer conference, particularly discussants Georgia Kernell, Nolan McCarthy and Maya Sen for valuable comments and feedback. Khurram Ali, Jimmy Charité, Joséphine Gantois, Keith Gladstone, Meredith Levine, Chitra Marti, Jenny Shen, Timothy Toh and Tammy Tseng provided truly exceptional research assistance. Kuziemko: kuziemko@princeton.edu; Washington: ebonya.washington@yale.edu.

1 Introduction

Recent events in the US and Europe have rekindled interest in a long-standing political economy question: are voters driven primarily by economic self-interest or by less pecuniary motives such as ethnocentrism? Some scholars see economic dislocations fueling many voters' current rejection of the status quo, whereas others see racism or xenophobia as the chief factor.¹ In this paper, we reexamine one of the largest and most debated partisan shifts in a modern democracy—the exodus of white Southerners from the Democratic party in the second half of the twentieth century. Benefitting from recently released data, we offer new evidence on whether racial attitudes or economic factors best explain this political transformation.

As illustrated in Figure 1, at mid-century white Southerners (defined throughout as residents of the eleven states of the former Confederacy) were 25 percentage points more likely to identify as Democrats than were other whites. This advantage has since flipped in sign, with the most dramatic losses occurring during the 1960s. Despite the massive, concurrent enfranchisement of Southern blacks, who overwhelmingly favored the Democrats from 1964 onward, the resulting shifts in aggregate Southern political outcomes have been stark: to take but one example, in 1960, *all* U.S. senators from the South were Democrats, whereas today all but three (of 22) are Republican.

As with the contemporary debate over the underlying causes of the recent rise of anti-establishment political movements, no clear consensus has emerged as to why the Democrats “lost” white Southerners, despite fifty years of scholarship. On one side are researchers who conclude that the party’s advocacy of 1960s Civil Rights legislation was the prime cause. From the Civil War until the middle of the twentieth century, the Democratic Party was based in the South and associated with white supremacy.² But as early as the 1940s, the growing

¹There is a lively debate among economists over what explains recent events such as the Republican nomination of Donald Trump and the successful “Brexit” campaign. On the importance of economic dislocation driven by trade, David Autor concludes that “whether it’s Trump or Sanders, we should have seen it [rise in anti-establishment feeling] coming. The China [import] shock isn’t the sole factor, but it is something of a missing link.” Similarly, Larry Summers sees the “Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s victory in the Republican presidential primaries [as evidence that] electorates are revolting against the relatively open economic policies that have been the norm in the United States and Britain since World War II.” By contrast, Paul Krugman bluntly concludes: “Economic anxiety is not a very good predictor of who’s a Trump supporter. Racial antagonism is a good indicator of who’s a Trump supporter.” See <http://goo.gl/eulzkV>, <http://goo.gl/bl8Mrd>, and <http://goo.gl/1T4zt6>, respectively, for each quote.

²As just one example, see Fryer and Levitt (2012) on the positive correlation between member-

Northern wing of the party began to take positions in favor of racial equality. Eventually, Democratic presidents would introduce and sign the sweeping Civil Rights (1964) and Voting Rights (1965) Acts—outlawing, respectively, *de jure* segregation in public accommodations and racial barriers to voting, both of which, by the 1960s, existed only in the South. This group of scholars argues that the party’s shift on Civil Rights triggered the permanent defection of many racially conservative white Southerners.

On the other side is a more recent, quantitative scholarship, which emphasizes factors other than Civil Rights. These scholars most often argue that economic development in the South made the redistributive policies of the Democrats increasingly unattractive. From 1940 to 1980, per capita income in the South rose from 60 to 89 percent of the U.S. average, which in principle should predict a movement away from the more redistributive party.³ Beyond economic catch-up, these scholars have argued that demographic change and the polarization of the parties on other domestic issues led Southern whites to change party allegiances. Indeed, the *a priori* case for factors besides Civil Rights is compelling. Southern dealignment, though much accelerated during the 1960s, has taken place during a sixty-year period.⁴ As we detail in Section 4, voters viewed Civil Rights as the most important issue facing the country for a fleeting two to three year period, weakening the case that it could be the underlying cause of this long-run trend.⁵

That scholars have failed to converge toward consensus on this central question of American political economy may seem surprising, but data limitations have severely hampered research on this question. Until recently, consistently worded survey questions on racial attitudes—from both *before* and after the major Civil Rights victories of the 1960s—have not been widely available. For example, the standard dataset on political preferences in the US, the American National Election Survey (ANES), does not include a consistently repeated question on racial views until the 1970s, well after the Civil Rights and Voting Rights Acts. Similarly, the General Social Survey, another commonly used dataset on Americans’ political and social views, begins in 1972.

In this paper, we employ a little used data source that allows us to analyze political identification and racial attitudes back to the 1950s. Beginning in 1958, Gallup asks respondents

ship in the Ku Klux Klan and the Democratic party among whites in the South in the 1920s.

³Numbers are taken from Margo (1995).

⁴We use the term “dealignment” instead of “realignment” in this paper as we focus on Southerners *leaving* the Democratic party—whether to join the Republicans, adopt independent status, or support third-party candidates such as Strom Thurmond or George Wallace.

⁵We detail each of the arguments in this paragraph in the next section.

“Between now and ...[election]....there will be much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates. If your party nominated a well-qualified man for president, would you vote for him if he happened to be a Negro?” Fortunately for our purposes, the wording has remained consistent and the question has been asked repeatedly since that date.⁶ We refer to those who say they would not vote for such a candidate as having “racially conservative views.”

Having identified our measure of racial attitudes, we then define the pre- and post-periods by determining the moment at which the Democratic Party is first seen as actively pursuing a more liberal Civil Rights agenda than the Republican Party. Conventional wisdom holds that Democratic President Johnson famously “lost the South” with his signing of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. However, analyzing contemporaneous media and survey data, we identify instead the Spring of 1963—when Democratic President John F. Kennedy first proposed legislation barring discrimination in public accommodations—as the critical moment when Civil Rights is, for the first time, an issue of great salience to the majority of Americans and an issue clearly associated with the Democratic Party.

Our main analysis takes the form of a triple-difference: how much of the pre- versus post-period decrease in Democratic party identification among Southern versus other whites is explained by the differential decline among those Southerners with conservative racial attitudes? Democratic identification among white Southerners relative to other whites falls 17 percentage points over our preferred sample period of 1958-1980. This decline is entirely explained by the 19 percentage point decline among racially conservative Southern whites. Extending the post-period through 2000, 78% of the 20 percentage-point drop is explained by the differential drop among Southern whites with conservative racial views. These results are robust to controlling flexibly for the many socioeconomic status measures included in the Gallup data and is highly evident in event-time graphical analysis as well.

We complement this main result with a variety of corroborating evidence of the central role of racial views in the decline of the white Southern Democrat. Whereas Gallup only asks the black president question every one to two years, it asks its signature “presidential approval” question roughly once a month during our sample period. We can thus perform a higher-frequency analysis surrounding our key moment of Spring of 1963 by correlating presidential approval for President Kennedy in the South versus the non-South, with the daily count of newspaper articles that include the President’s name along with terms related

⁶Changes are very minor and are discussed in detail in Section 3.

to Civil Rights. The inverse correlation between these two series is visually striking. Even when we flexibly control for media coverage of other events and issues—allowing Southerners to have different reactions to news regarding Cuba, the Soviet Union, Social Security, etc.—the number of articles linking Kennedy to Civil Rights retains its overwhelming explanatory power in predicting divergence in his popularity among Southern versus other whites.

The 1960s not only witnessed watershed moments for Civil Rights, but also other important political and social changes. For example, recent work argues the 1960s marks the end of a period of political consensus between Democrats and Republicans, especially on economic and redistributive issues (McCarty *et al.*, 2006). If white Southerners were always more conservative, then rising polarization may explain why they differentially begin to leave the Democrats in the 1960s. Yet we find that—except for issues related to racial equality—whites in the South were, if anything, slightly to the left of whites elsewhere on domestic policy issues. Moreover, while the 1960s also saw the political organization of women and other minority groups, we find no evidence that white Southerners who have negative views of women, Catholics or Jews differentially leave the Democratic party in 1963—the exodus is specific to those who are *racially* conservative.

While white Southerners indeed enjoy faster income growth than whites elsewhere during our sample period, we find no evidence that it can explain much if any of their defection from the Democratic party. This income growth led to substantial disruption and dislocation—to borrow language from current debates—as whites (and others) in the region rapidly transitioned from agriculture to services and manufacturing.⁷ We show, however, that these trends have little to no power in explaining dealignment.

Finally, we make some progress on quantifying the role of racial attitudes in party identification during earlier decades. While our central data source begins in 1958, the evolution of the Democratic Party on Civil Rights has a longer history. As is evident in Figure 1, a substantial number of Southern whites leave the party in the late 1940s and early 1950s. While our data from this earlier period is decidedly more limited and thus results should be viewed more cautiously, we provide several pieces of evidence that this decline is linked to racially conservative Southerners leaving the party after it takes its first pro-Civil Rights steps under Democratic President Harry Truman in 1948.

While better understanding the basis of individuals’ partisan identity is of interest in its

⁷Between 1950 and 1980, the share of the white labor force identifying as farmers declines from 17.0 to 3.3 percent in the South, twice as large as the decline among whites elsewhere. Authors’ calculations from IPUMS.

own right, shifts in political allegiance can have large policy consequences as well. Today, some policy makers fear that rising populist sentiment will have disruptive effects on economic policy, especially trade agreements. While scholars still disagree on its underlying causes, few discount the vast impacts of Southern dealignment on U.S. domestic policy. As McCarty *et al.* (2006) write, “had the Democratic Party maintained the allegiance of southern voters, the Republicans would have been denied an electoral majority for their low-tax and anti-regulation platform.”

We provide evidence that this allegiance broke down over *racial* issues, not due to Southern economic development, income growth or disagreements over (non-race-related) policy. Indeed, as we show later, even if we take the most generous estimate of how Democratic identification declines with household income, the effect of Civil Rights on racially conservative Southern whites’ party identification is akin to a 600% household income increase over the course of two years. Our work thus supports the view that racial attitudes are a powerful force in U.S. politics and that racial fractionalization might help explain “American exceptionalism” in terms of limited redistribution relative to peer countries (Lipset, 1997; Alesina and Glaeser, 2004; Lee and Roemer, 2006; Luttmer, 2001).⁸

Our findings further shed light on redistributive patterns within the US. First, race-based dealignment helps explain why the poorest part of the country now serves as the base for the Republicans, the party less supportive of redistribution.⁹ Second, our findings provide a potential explanation for why—in stark contrast to the median voter model’s prediction (Meltzer and Richard, 1981)—redistribution in the US has receded since the 1970s, even as income inequality has risen. Our results suggest that a large voting bloc left the more redistributive political party over largely *non-economic* issues, reducing political support for redistributive policies just when theory would predict that they should become more popular.

The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we review the scholarly debate over the causes of Southern dealignment. In Section 3, we introduce the Gallup micro data, and in particular our key question on racial attitudes. In Section 4, we justify our use of the Spring of 1963 as the key moment that separates the “pre-” and “post-periods.” In Section 5, we

⁸While we focus on political outcomes, the question of the relative importance of racial views versus economic factors has arisen in other contexts. For example, Jackson (1985) was influential in arguing that American suburbanization was mostly due to post-war income growth, whereas more recently Boustan (2010) has shown that whites’ reaction to black migration into cities explains at least one third of total “white flight.”

⁹Despite catch-up growth since 1960, the South remains the poorest Census region of the country, even when considering only whites (authors’ calculation using 2013 ACS).

present our main results. In Section 6, we more directly address the remaining arguments of the research arguing for causes besides Civil Rights. In Section 7 we conclude.

2 Debate Over the Role of Race in Southern Dealignment

The literature on the role of race in Southern politics is vast, and our attempts to summarize it here cannot do it proper justice. While an imperfect categorization, we view the literature as divided into two main camps: a side arguing that Civil Rights caused white Southerners to leave the Democratic party versus a side (more recent and somewhat more quantitative) arguing for other explanations. Given our approach to the question, our review below will overweight the more quantitative papers, though certainly our sense is that conventional wisdom favors the older, more qualitative literature.

The canonical reference on the role of race in Southern politics is V.O. Key’s *Southern Politics in State and Nation*. Key memorably wrote, “[w]hatever phase of the southern political process one seeks to understand, sooner or later the trail of inquiry leads to the Negro” (Key Jr, 1949). Drawing on hundreds of interviews with Southern politicians and journalists, the book provides a state-by-state analysis of how race influenced Southern politics, but, given its 1949 publication, it cannot directly speak to the coming 1960s dealignment. Carmines and Stimson (1989) is a more modern update, using historical material (e.g., interviews, party platforms, and speech transcripts) as well as some survey tabulations to conclude that “racially conservative white southerners felt betrayed” when Democratic President Lyndon Johnson, a Southerner, navigated the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (CRA).

The more recent branch of the literature emphasizes the lack of quantitative evidence in support of this traditional view. Shafer and Johnston (2009) are quite emphatic in this regard, calling the historical literature “charming and richly contextualized, but also unsystematic and deeply inbred.” While we do not endorse their critique of the qualitative evidence on Southern politics, we agree that, to date, the argument that Civil Rights triggered Southern dealignment rests on little if any quantitative evidence.

While some papers in the more recent literature emphasize racial attitudes in explaining dealignment, the majority argue that the role of Civil Rights and race has been vastly overstated.¹⁰ We group their arguments into four main categories.

¹⁰Papers emphasizing the importance of racial attitudes include Valentino and Sears (2005), who use the GSS and ANES to show that, in the South relative to elsewhere, whites report more racially conservative views and that racial views have greater predictive power for whites’ party

Economic development in the South. While not the main focus of their seminal work on political polarization, McCarty *et al.* (2006) argue that the conventional wisdom overstates the role of race and Civil Rights in explaining dealignment, writing that “pocketbook voting is an important part of the story of the dramatic switch of partisan allegiances in the South.”¹¹ Shafer and Johnston (2009) go further, arguing that Democratic Civil Rights victories, by introducing a strongly Democratic black voting bloc to the South, in fact *slowed* the natural process of dealignment that would have happened as the region became richer.¹²

Interestingly, economists who have studied Southern economic development often lay out a reverse chain of events, arguing that both major Civil Rights victories and large-scale dealignment in many cases *preceded* major economic catch-up in the region. Wright (2013) contends that desegregation in fact *caused* accelerated economic growth, by allowing businesses to hire from larger pools of workers and serve larger pools of customers.¹³ Besley *et al.* (2010) argue that political competition brought on by the 1965 Voting Rights Act made the region’s politicians propose more pro-growth economic policies. Similarly, both Margo (1995) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2008) argue that Civil Rights was a key factor in sparking Southern economic growth. Moreover, as Margo notes, a key component of the region’s post-1960 growth was economic catch-up *among blacks*, and thus should not help explain why whites left the Democrats.¹⁴

Changing selection into the South. The South experienced net in-migration after 1960. Given the large Democratic advantage in the South during much of the 20th century, identification. McVeigh *et al.* (2014) use county-level data to show that the presence of a Ku Klux Klan chapter in 1960 predicts higher vote shares for anti-Civil Rights candidates in 1964 and 1968.

¹¹For example, they use Congressional District election outcomes data to show that “[b]y the early 1970s, southern districts represented by Republicans were considerably more well-heeled than those represented by Democrats.”

¹²Shafer and Johnston (2009), winner of the annual best book award by the Race, Ethnicity, and Politics section of the American Political Science Association, show via cross tabulations that, relative to the 1950s, in more recent decades it is *economically conservative* Southern whites who identify as Republican (they generally do not compare this trend to that among non-Southern whites). See Kousser (2010) for a wide-ranging critique.

¹³A common view is that mobilization for World War II helped “jump start” economic modernization, especially in the South. However, recent work suggests any such effects were limited or short-lived, both for the US in general (Fishback and Cullen, 2013) and for the South in particular (Jaworski, 2015).

¹⁴In related work, Alston and Ferrie (1993) argue that certain aspects of Southern economic development—in particular, the mechanization of cotton production—should have made whites, especially white elites, *more* open to Democratic policies, by changing labor relations in a way that made a government-provided social safety net more attractive.

in-migrants from the non-South would tend to be more Republican (McCarty *et al.*, 2006, Gimpel and Schuknecht, 2001 and Trende, 2012). Age has also been considered as a dimension of dealignment that weakens the Civil Rights case: Wattenberg (1991) argues that Southern whites who came of age since Jim Crow—and should have less allegiance to segregation—have in fact driven the dealignment.

Issues other than Civil Rights. Over the past fifty years, the Democratic and Republican Parties staked out increasingly disparate positions on issues outside of Civil Rights, including redistribution, free speech and gender equality. Some scholars point to these increasingly liberal stances of the Democratic Party as the cause of dealignment. Abramowitz and Saunders (1998) support this view by demonstrating that in the post-Civil Rights period issues such as support of the social safety net are better predictors than racial views of Southern white partisanship.

The timing of dealignment. Trende (2012) argues that the slow-moving nature of Southern dealignment undermines the claim that Civil Rights was the prime trigger, given that the major pieces of Civil Rights legislation passed in a concentrated period in the mid-1960s. He concludes that “the gradual realignment of the South had been going for nearly forty years by 1964 and continued at a glacial pace after that.” He points to the 1960 election as a key piece of evidence for secular causes: “That [Republican Richard] Nixon could do so well in the South while part of an administration that had finished desegregating Washington, argued that segregation was unconstitutional before the Supreme Court ... implemented [desegregation] with a show of force in Little Rock, and pushed through the Civil Rights Acts of 1957 and 1960 seems astonishing, until you realize that economics, rather than race, was primarily driving the development of Southern politics at the time.”

Although both large and contentious, the literature on the cause of dealignment has a clear gap: Due to the limitations of standard data sets, existing quantitative work is unable to examine racial attitudes before Civil Rights was a key political issue (and often not until several years after that). Even Shafer and Johnston, the authors perhaps most associated with the argument that economic development triggered dealignment, write: “Introducing racial attitudes...will prove more difficult....because there is less substantive consistency in the opinion items asked by the [A]NES in the realm of race policy for the full postwar period.”¹⁵

¹⁵While the deficiencies of ANES racial views questions are well documented, we revisited the ANES ourselves, hoping that past scholars had given up too quickly. Our hopes were dashed. For interested readers, scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/kuziemko/files/online_app_b.pdf provides our own analysis of ANES racial views questions from the 1950s

Due to this limitation, a standard econometric decomposition of the share of dealignment accounted for by those with conservative racial views has not been possible.

As we describe in the following section, we employ a little used data source that provides a consistent measure of racial attitudes dating back to the 1950s. In the next three sections, we describe these data, develop our empirical strategy, and present our main results. Section 6 then addresses in detail the arguments documented above.

3 Data

An ideal research design would employ panel data on white voters to compare the extent to which holding conservative racial views in the pre-period (before the Democratic party clearly establishes itself as the pro-Civil Rights party) predicts leaving the Party in the post-period, in the South versus the rest of the country. As far as we know, such data do not exist. We instead use repeated cross-sectional surveys from Gallup (and later the restricted-access version of the GSS) that each have the following key variables: a consistently worded question of racial views, party identification, state of residence and race.

The Gallup data are only recently available, thanks to the efforts of the non-profit Roper Center (currently housed at Cornell). Roper has posted over 20,000 surveys (as of this writing) from Gallup and other outlets, dating back to 1935. Appendix B describes how to access the data and provides details about survey quality. We hope our paper might increase awareness of Roper’s resources.

As noted in the introduction, beginning in 1958 Gallup repeatedly asks respondents whether they would vote for a qualified man (“person,” in more recent years) who happened to be Negro (“black”). We have made available online the exact wording of this item (as well as the party ID question) separately by survey date, as well as the wording of the question preceding it.¹⁶ Variations from year to year are minor. For ease of exposition, we refer to this survey item as the “black president question.” By contrast, while the ANES has racial views questions from the 1950s (which we use later) and 1960s, no single question spans the key mid-1960s Civil Rights moment.

In addition to consistency, a second advantage of the black president item is that Gallup fielded it frequently: on nine separate surveys between 1958 and 1972. While the question is asked less frequently after 1972, we are fortunate that beginning in 1974 we can include and 1960s.

¹⁶See scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/kuziemko/files/online_app.pdf.

the geo-coded restricted-use version of the GSS. As such, between 1958 and 1980 (2000), the black president item (as well as the other variables we need for the analysis) was collected by either Gallup or GSS on 14 (29) separate occasions.¹⁷

A final strength of the black president item is its specificity: it refers to a single, hypothetical (at least during our key sample period) concept. By contrast, the GSS, for example, often asks whether the government should “help” blacks, which is not only vague but also might be interpreted differently in 1972 than in 2000. Gallup also asks white respondents—much less frequently than they do about a black president—whether they would move if blacks came to reside next door or in their neighborhoods in great numbers.¹⁸ But responses might vary not only by racial views but also by the actual integration of one’s present neighborhood, not to mention housing density (“next door” is a different concept in an apartment building versus a farm). The black president question suffers from no such contextual bias: it should be interpreted similarly for Southerners and non-Southerners, urban and rural, etc. Nonetheless, we show in Appendix Table A.1 that whites’ views toward a black president are highly predictive (in both the South and non-South) of views on other racial matters (e.g., interracial socializing, school integration, affirmative action) in the GSS.

While the Gallup data have allowed us to make an important step forward in answering the question at hand, they have some limitations. During our sample period, Gallup does not often ask respondents’ household income or place of birth, important omissions in our context given the arguments that Southern income growth and in-migration from the North played key roles in dealignment. We can partially address the lack of income data by using education and occupation (both included in Gallup) as proxies. We also turn to other data sources to rule out these alternative hypotheses, most frequently the ANES, a nationally representative repeated cross-sectional survey of the political and social opinions of voting-age Americans conducted in the fall of presidential (as well as most midterm) election years.

Appendix Table A.2 provides summary statistics for our basic Gallup analysis sample (whites ages 21 and above who live in the continental US) from 1958 to 1980 (our standard sample period, though we demonstrate robustness to various endpoints), separately by region and time period.¹⁹ Not surprisingly, we see an increase in education and urbanicity in both

¹⁷The GSS fields this question in 1972, but state identifiers only become available in 1974. See the url in footnote 16 for the exact wording (variation from year to year is minimal).

¹⁸Gallup also poses, again less frequently than the black president question, questions on school integration, but only to parents of school-aged children, greatly reducing sample sizes.

¹⁹To avoid compositional changes, we exclude those under age 21 as well as Alaskans and Hawaiians, as they were not eligible to vote in early years of our sample period.

regions. The table also compares the Gallup demographics to those in the Census. While differing variable definitions make exact precise comparisons difficult for some variables, the levels and trends by region are generally very similar.

Figure 2 depicts the evolution of our key explanatory variable: acceptance of a hypothetical black president.²⁰ At the start of the time series, only about ten percent of white Southerners say they would be willing to vote for a qualified, black candidate nominated by their party, compared to just under forty percent of whites elsewhere. These shares increase at roughly the same rate through about 1970, after which point there is more substantial (though never complete) Southern catch-up.²¹

4 Methodological Approach

4.1 Defining the pre- and post-periods

Before 1958, we do not have any consistently worded, frequently repeated measure of racial attitudes, and thus our main analysis is restricted to 1958 and beyond (Section 6.3 analyzes in detail, but with more imperfect data, earlier episodes of Southern dealignment). To define pre- and post-periods for our main analysis sample, we need to identify the moment during this period when the party’s position on Civil Rights undergoes its most substantial change in the eyes of voters.

Evidence from the ANES: The shift occurs between 1960 and 1964. To pin down the point during our sample period when views on the parties’ positions most significantly shift, we would ideally employ a consistently worded and frequently repeated survey question that asks respondents which party they believe will do more to promote equality between whites and blacks. Unfortunately we were unable to find such a question. We come close, however. Using the ANES, we can compare a 1960 item asking “which party is more likely to stay out of the question of whether white and colored children go to the same schools”

²⁰In this focal sample we have roughly 2,000 (1,200) observations per survey in the Gallup (GSS) data. For completeness, Appendix Figure A.1 graphs the responses to the black president over time for all (including non-white) respondents in the combined GSS and Gallup samples, denoting the data set from which each point is drawn. In years when both GSS and Gallup ask the black president question, responses are nearly identical, suggesting that both surveys are collecting data from very similar (presumably representative) universes.

²¹The Gallup questions noted earlier on whether you would move if blacks moved into your neighborhood also show the same pattern of substantial (but incomplete) Southern convergence. Graphs available from the authors.

with 1964 and 1968 items asking which party is more likely to “see to it that white and Negro children go to the same schools.” Figure 3 shows that in 1960, only 13% of Southern whites see the Democrats as the party pushing for school integration, 22% say Republicans, and the rest see no difference. Non-Southern whites see essentially no difference between the parties on this issue.²²

A dramatic shift occurs sometime between 1960 and 1964. By 1964, 45% of Southern whites now see the Democrats as more aggressively promoting school integration, whereas the share seeing Republicans as more aggressive has fallen to 16%. Non-Southerners’ assessment shifts similarly. The large gap in voters’ perception of the parties on school integration that emerges in 1964 holds steady in 1968.²³

Evidence from Congress: The shift occurs between 1960 and 1964. It is perhaps puzzling *a priori* that voters would have changed their views so dramatically by 1964, given that the majority of Congressional opposition to the 1964 CRA came from Democrats. However, this correlation is entirely driven by Democrats’ over-representation in the South. Within the South (indeed, within state in the South), Democratic legislators were significantly *more* likely to support the 1964 CRA than were their Republican counterparts, as we show in Appendix Table A.3.²⁴ As such, even by 1964, a white Southerner surveying the local political landscape would have seen Democrats as more hostile to racial conservatism than a local politician from the nascent Southern wing of the Republican party, consistent with the views of the ANES respondents. Importantly, the Appendix table also shows that this pattern was new in 1964: while both Republican representatives and pro-Civil Rights votes were extremely scarce in the South before 1964, what within-South variation did exist points to Democrats being *less* likely to vote in support of the (far weaker) 1957 and 1960 CRAs than (the few) Republican representatives in the South at the time.

Evidence from newspapers: The shift occurs in Spring of 1963. The ANES and voting records data cannot tell us at what point between 1960 and 1964 the Democrats are

²²This result from the 1960 ANES echoes patterns from a Gallup question in the Spring of 1960: the plurality of voters (28%) said the Republican Party was “doing the most for Negroes.” But only tabulations (not microdata) are available, so this result includes non-whites as well.

²³ANES also asks which party is doing the most to combat employment and housing discrimination. While we prefer the school integration question because it is worded more consistently, we find an essentially identical pattern as in Figure 3. Graphs available from the authors.

²⁴Indeed, *all* Southern Republicans in Congress (one in the Senate, eleven in the House) voted ‘nay’ (as did Strom Thurmond (D-SC), who switched to the GOP two months later). Among Southern Democrats who voted, 83 (20) out of 91 (21) in the House (Senate) voted ‘nay.’

first viewed by voters as the party of Civil Rights. To further pinpoint that moment, we use higher-frequency data, but these data admittedly provide less direct evidence.

The leader of the Democratic party during most of the 1960 to 1964 period was President John F. Kennedy. Kennedy was not a consistent supporter of Civil Rights throughout his presidency. Just as his Republican predecessor Eisenhower sent federal troops to forcibly integrate Little Rock Central High School, Kennedy intervened to end the violence against both the “freedom riders,” the protesters who organized to integrate interstate bus service in the Spring of 1961, and James Meredith, who integrated the University of Mississippi in the Fall of 1962. But Kennedy also disappointed movement leaders with his inaction, including a January 1962 press conference pledging not to move ahead of public opinion on Civil Rights and his appointment of segregationist federal judges in the South. Thus, it is unlikely that voters would have predicted his June 1963 proposal of sweeping Civil Rights legislation, even a few months before that date.

Unfortunately we do not have high-frequency polling data that directly speaks to the evolution of voters’ perception of Kennedy’s commitment to the issue. Instead we turn to the *New York Times* to track his progression on the issue. Specifically, in Figure 4 we tally daily counts of articles in which (1) “President” and “Kennedy” and “civil rights” appear or (2) “President” and “Kennedy” and *any* of the following terms: “civil rights,” “integrat*”, “segregat*,” where the asterisk is a “wildcard.”²⁵

The two series tell similar stories. Outside of two short-lived spikes—when the administration intervenes on behalf of the freedom riders and later Meredith—the first two years of Kennedy’s administration see few mentions of his name alongside civil rights terms. But then the number of articles begins a steep rise in May 1963, when the nation’s attention turned to Birmingham. Local black activists had organized a shopping boycott of the city’s segregated stores in the weeks leading up to Easter. By early April, Martin Luther King arrived in the city and the movement grew into a series of marches and sit-ins aimed at over-running the local jails to force the city into negotiations to integrate employment and public accommodations. Controversially, King enlisted children in these protest activities. By early May, the Birmingham police responded with beatings, water hoses and dogs, attacks that did not spare children and that were captured live for a television audience. These events

²⁵We searched for words “President” and “Kennedy” to exclude articles that *only* mention Robert Kennedy, though in practice there is little difference. We employ both a more narrow (President Kennedy and “civil rights”) and a broader search (President Kennedy and civil rights *terms*) to address Type I and Type II error concerns.

drew Attorney General Robert Kennedy and other administration officials to Birmingham, a move interpreted by local whites as intervention on behalf of the protesters.²⁶

The number of articles reaches its pinnacle the following month when President Kennedy holds a nationally televised address to announce his plans to introduce sweeping Civil Rights legislation to Congress (“The events in Birmingham and elsewhere have so increased the cries for equality that no city, or State, or legislative body can prudently choose to ignore them”). And while the number of articles drops slightly from that mid-June high it remains elevated above pre-May 1963 levels throughout the remainder of his presidency.

While the *NYT* is useful because of its national prominence and its convenient search interface, its articles may reflect the views of a narrow, elite group of East Coast editors and may not reach, much less reflect the views of, Southern voters. Appendix Figures A.2 presents analogous results from the two Southern papers for which we can do textual analysis, the *Dallas Morning News* and the *New Orleans Times-Picayune*. Again, we see Spring (in particular June) of 1963 as the moment when articles including “civil rights” and “President Kennedy” skyrocket.

Further corroborating evidence. A related concern is that newspapers, regardless of their regional focus, reflect the decisions of editors, not the sentiment of the general public. We thus complement our newspaper analysis with polling data. In the years 1950-1980, Gallup asks over 100 times “What do you think is the most important problem facing this country today?” Unfortunately, as we detail in the figure notes (Appendix Figure A.3), there are non-trivial inconsistencies with the coding from one survey to the next, so we are cautious in interpreting these data points. Nonetheless the figure demonstrates that 1963 marks the beginning of a large (but temporary) swell in the share of Americans calling civil rights the country’s most important issue.

In summary, the ANES data show that views on the parties’ racial policies shift dramatically between 1960 and 1964, consistent with within-region changes in the voting patterns of representatives. Media coverage of Civil Rights (and in particular the Democratic president’s involvement in the issue) during this period was mostly flat until a dramatic and sustained increase beginning in the Spring of 1963, and we thus conclude that this moment was the key turning point when voters would first see the Democrats as the party on the more liberal side of the Civil Rights issue.

An implicit assumption we will make in the regression analysis is that the moment the

²⁶ “The Birmingham Story,” *NYT*, May 26, 1963 provides a contemporaneous summary of events.

post-period begins is plausibly exogenous. While untestable, the historical record supports this assumption. As Schickler (2016) writes: “Kennedy’s personal commitment to civil rights was limited at best...but the dramatic violence in Birmingham, Alabama....forced Kennedy to change his approach” (pp. 230-231). Moreover, King had limited personal contact with Kennedy and certainly did not consult with the administration in planning strategy (indeed, Kennedy would unsuccessfully lobby against the August 1963 March on Washington). We have come across no evidence that Kennedy’s move was long in the making. In fact, just weeks before he introduced Civil Rights legislation, he had considered addressing the violence in Birmingham with a bill that would limit the rights of Southern blacks to protest.²⁷

4.2 Estimating equations

Having defined a pre- and post-period for our 1958 to 1980 sample period, the empirical strategy for our main set of results is straightforward. We first estimate the total amount of decline from the pre- to post-period in Democratic identification among white Southerners relative to other whites via the following regression:

$$D_{ist} = \beta_1 South_s \times After_t + \gamma X_{ist} + \lambda_s + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ist}, \quad (1)$$

where D_{ist} is an indicator for person i identifying as a Democrat (so, Republican, Independent, other all coded as zero), $South_s$ is an indicator for residency in a Southern state, $After_t$ is an indicator for being observed in the post-period, X_{ist} includes controls (which we will vary in robustness checks), and λ_s and μ_t are state and survey date effects, respectively.

We then estimate a companion regression:

$$D_{ist} = \tilde{\beta}_1 South_s \times After_t + \tilde{\beta}_2 South_s \times After_t \times NoBlackPres_i + \tilde{\gamma} \tilde{X}_{ist} + \lambda_s + \mu_t + \epsilon_{ist}. \quad (2)$$

In equation (2), the $South_s \times After_t$ interaction is now interacted with $NoBlackPres_i$, an indicator variable for being unwilling to vote for a black president. The vector $\tilde{X}$ includes *all lower-order terms* of this triple interaction and the remaining notation follows that in (1). The estimate of $\tilde{\beta}_2$ reflects the dealignment coming from those with conservative racial views, and comparing the estimate of β_1 in (1) with that of $\tilde{\beta}_1$ in (2) allows us to measure the share of Southern dealignment accounted for by those with conservative racial views.

For the most part our outcome is Democratic identification, which Gallup asks much more

²⁷See Perlstein (2009), Chapter 11.

frequently (especially in non-election years) than vote choice (e.g., for presidential, Senate or House races). Even beyond availability, party identification has some key advantages over vote choice: it is likely more robust to variation in the quality of local candidates (e.g., a scandal-plagued incumbent running for re-election should affect a voter’s decision in a particular election more than her overall party ID) and voter turnout (e.g., a blow-out or highly negative race might deter individuals from voting in or even following a particular election). Nonetheless, we present results using vote choice whenever the data permit.

5 Results

We first present the main results from estimating equations (1) and (2) and then provide corroborating evidence using other Gallup data.

5.1 Results using the “black president” question

Regression results. Table 1 presents the main results of the paper. To provide a baseline, col. (1) replaces state fixed effects with a *South* dummy and uses only Gallup (as opposed to adding GSS) data from 1958 to 1980. Whereas Democrats enjoy a 23-percentage-point advantage among whites in the South relative to the rest of the country during the pre-period, the negative and significant coefficient on $South \times After$ indicates that the advantage falls by 65% in the post-period. In col. (2), we show that the $South \times After$ coefficient goes to zero once the triple interaction term is added, which is itself highly significant and negative, indicating that essentially all the pre- vs. post-period decline in Democratic identification among white Southerners comes from those with conservative racial views.

The lower-order terms of the triple interaction are of interest in their own right. The positive, significant coefficient on $South \times No\ Black\ Prez$ highlights the strongly conservative racial views that characterize the pre-period Southern Democratic party. Note also that the small and statistically insignificant coefficients on $No\ Black\ Prez$ and $No\ Black\ Prez \times After$ indicate that racial conservatism did not strongly predict Democratic identification among non-Southern whites before 1963, nor did it predict an exodus from the party afterward. Non-Southern whites’ seeming indifference to the Democrats’ mid-1960s Civil Rights legislation is not surprising, given that the practices outlawed by the CRA and VRA did not then exist outside the South (voting rights discrimination had never been widespread outside the South and *de jure* public accommodations discrimination had mostly disappeared

by the 1950s).²⁸ Readers, of course, should not take this “non-result” to mean that race, racial views, or integration policy have not had political repercussions outside of the South. But Civil Rights policies in other parts of the country were far more scattered across time and place and even branches of government, so whites’ reactions in these areas would be unlikely to line up with the introduction of the Civil Rights Bill in 1963.²⁹

In the remainder of Table 1 we explore the robustness of the results in cols. (1) and (2). In cols. (3) and (4) as well as all remaining columns we add state fixed effects. The comparison of *South* $\times$ *After* across specifications is even more striking: in col. (3) the coefficient is larger in magnitude than in col. (1), but the inclusion in col. (4) of *NoBlackPrez* and its interactions actually makes the *South* $\times$ *After* coefficient flip signs (though its magnitude is tiny). The resulting point estimates suggest that the 18.7 percentage-point decline among Southerners with conservative racial views (very) slightly *overpredicts* the 16.5 percentage-point relative decline among white Southerners. In Cols. (5) and (6) we add basic controls: fixed effects for gender, age (in ten-year bins), city-size (twelve categories), educational attainment (six categories), and occupation (thirteen categories); the coefficients of interest barely move. Note that controlling for occupation fixed effects picks up the differentially large Southern decline in the agricultural share of the labor force.

Col. (7) adds interactions of *South* $\times$ *After* with age, a high school completion dummy, a dummy for living in a city greater than 50,000 people, a dummy for high-skill occupation and a dummy for being a farmer or farm laborer (as well as all lower-order terms of these triple interactions). This specification tests whether the strong, negative coefficient on *South* $\times$ *After* $\times$ *NoBlackPrez* is merely picking up differential trends in the South along these other dimensions. For example, we might worry that rural and small-town Southerners (or farmers, or the high-school educated, etc.) differentially turn against the Democrats in the post-period for reasons *independent* of Civil Rights. If these Southerners happen to have more conservative racial views, we would estimate a negative coefficient on *South* $\times$ *NoBlackPrez* $\times$ *After* even absent any true reaction to Civil Rights. In fact, even after allowing all these variables to have different effects in the South, different effects in the post-period, and different effects in the South in the post-period, the coefficient

²⁸See Sugrue (2008) for a historical treatment on racial discrimination outside the South in the 1940s and 1950s and see Collins (2003) on the political economy of anti-discrimination laws in non-Southern states. Despite many states outlawing *de jure* employment discrimination, Boustan (2016) provides empirical evidence of severe occupational segregation in Northern labor markets.

²⁹How these various local Civil Rights laws and court orders affected whites’ party identification outside the South is in fact the subject of a concurrent project.

on $South \times After \times NoBlackPrez$ barely changes (note that adding the additional triple interactions means that the coefficient on $South \times After$ no longer has any natural interpretation).

In the remaining columns, we add the GSS data (as control variables are not consistent across the two datasets, we do not include them). Comparing cols. (8) and (9) to cols. (3) and (4) shows that the results are nearly identical in this larger, pooled dataset. In the final two columns we keep the GSS data and extend the series to 2000. The point estimates suggest that the decline in Democratic identification among those with conservative racial views explains three-fourths of the 19.5 point relative decline in the South over this longer period.³⁰

Graphical results. Figure 5 shows the variation underlying our regression results in an event-time figure. Specifically, for each survey date, we present the coefficient from regressing our Democratic identification indicator variable on *NoBlackPrez*, separately for Southern and non-Southern whites. As we would expect, the figure echoes the regression results (conservative racial views strongly predict Democratic party identification in the South in the pre-period, an association that is wiped out in the post-period) but unlike those results can show the shift is better described as a one-time decline—occurring sometime between the 1961 and 1963 survey dates—and not a secular trend. While the decline between the last pre- and first post-period surveys is dramatic, the shape of the figure is noisy and certainly not a perfect step function as our model (if taken literally) would have predicted. In particular, it appears there may have been some over-reaction in the first post-period survey in August of 1963 (perhaps due to its timing just two months after Kennedy’s televised introduction of Civil Rights legislation) and a bit of a rebound by the next poll in 1965.

But despite some noise, a clear break emerges at some point between August of 1961 and August of 1963.³¹ The event-time analysis indicates that Democratic identification among those Southerners with racially conservative views declines by 17 percentage points in the course of a few years. To give a sense of the enormity of this shift, today, one would need to have household income increase by over \$300,000 (or 600%) to have predicted democratic

³⁰We conclude our analysis period in 2000. After Illinois State Senator Barack Obama’s 2004 Democratic convention speech, heightened talk of his Presidential bid may have transformed the black president item from a hypothetical question to a referendum on a particular individual. To the extent Jesse Jackson’s less successful Democratic primary bids in 1984 and 1988 had a similar effect, they offer another reason we favor the 1958-1980 sample period.

³¹We omit the confidence intervals in the main figure to avoid clutter. However, Appendix Figure A.4 includes error bands.

identification fall by 17 percentage points.³²

Note that, while indeed large, the shifts documented in Table 1 and Figure 5 do *not* indicate that Civil Rights caused the complete extinction of the white Southern Democrat. This fact should not come as a surprise. On the one hand, over time, fewer white Southerners held racially conservative views (and indeed some racially liberal Southern Democratic politicians such as Jimmy Carter successfully engineered winning black-white coalitions in the region). On the other hand, not all racially conservative white Southerners left the party. These voters may have stayed because of inertia (individuals tend to retain a single party ID over adulthood) or because, at least in the short-run, they convinced themselves the party might yet return their way.³³ In the 1966 Senate race, for example, a racially conservative Southern white in Georgia or Mississippi could still vote for two of the most unabashed supporters of segregation (Richard Russell and Jim Eastland, respectively), both of whom retained decades of seniority and powerful committee assignments by officially remaining Democrats. Moreover, as we demonstrate in Section 6.1, Southern whites were somewhat to the left of whites elsewhere on some key domestic policy issues. To the extent not all of them were single-issue voters, some racially conservative voters would remain in the party because it better represented their economic interests.

Note also that our results so far do *not* imply that Southern dealignment from the Democrats led to a simultaneous one-for-one embrace of the Republicans, as moves to Independent and other parties are captured in the null of our Democratic identification dummy (George Wallace’s segregationist, independent presidential campaigns being important examples). In fact, as we demonstrate in Appendix Table A.5 the Southern *increase* in Republican identification, while still significant, is slightly less than half the *decrease* in Democratic Party adherence over our sample period.

Our key conclusion from the analysis so far is that a significant number of racially conservative Southern Democrats left the party just at the moment its national leaders proposed sweeping Civil Rights laws.

Robustness checks. Perhaps the key concern about our approach so far is that while the black president question is worded consistently over time, the *true attitudes* of those who respond “yes” may change because of the increasing social desirability of progressive

³²Those income elasticities are based on GSS data from 1990 to 2012.

³³Political scientists have found partisanship, like religion or ethnicity, to be a stable part of an adult’s identity, at least in the US. The canonical reference is Campbell *et al.* (1966), with a more quantitative treatment by Green *et al.* (2004).

racial views over the sample period.³⁴ For example, suppose that post-period Southerners feel cowed by national public opinion and become less truthful in answering the black president question, adding noise. We might then worry that the large decline in its positive correlation with Democratic identification is *not* because racially conservative Southerners had bolted, but is instead due to attenuation bias in the post-period driving the correlation toward zero. (Of course, given the pattern in Figure 5, the decline in its informational content would have to be highly discontinuous.)

We address this concern in two ways in Appendix Table A.4. First, as shown in Figure 2, from 1958 to about 1970, the South-versus-non-South gap on this question remains relatively stable, suggesting that social desirability bias may work similarly by region during these earlier years (and it seems fair to assume this bias was simply *smaller* during earlier years and thus less concerning). We show that our main result is largely unchanged when we limit our sample to this shorter period, not surprising given the patterns presented in Figure 5.

Second, we use pre-1963 data to *predict* conservative racial views and then substitute this predicted black president response for the actual response. Put differently, we ask, *is Southern dealignment driven by the type of person who would have given racially conservative answers in the pre-period*, regardless of how that person answers the black president question in later, more politically correct years. Our results hold when we use *predicted* racial views (see the Appendix Table for details on the prediction equations).

Appendix Table A.5 performs a few more robustness checks for the main Table 1 results. While we use linear probability models for ease of interpretation, our results hold using probit instead. We vary the group of non-Southern states that serve as our control and in fact find that our results hold regardless of which region of the country we compare to the South. Appendix Table A.6 clusters on survey date instead of state (correcting standard errors via bootstrapping) and shows that inference is unchanged. While Gallup much less often asks respondents “their preferred party for Congress,” Appendix Figure A.5 presents the analogue to Figure 5 using this variable instead of party identification, again finding that support for Democrats declines in 1963 among Southerners with conservative racial views.

³⁴Empirical evidence supports this concern. Kuklinski *et al.* (1997) use a clever between-subject approach whereby the racial views of any one individual cannot be detected but the racial views of large groups can be. They show that these “unobtrusive” measures of racial attitudes show white Southerners to have significantly more conservative racial views than other whites, whereas standard survey questions (subject to social desirability bias) show much smaller differences.

5.2 Higher-frequency results from Gallup

The results of Figure 5 point to a sharp decline in the association of conservative racial attitudes and white Southern identification with the Democratic Party between the summers of 1961 and 1963, the last pre-period and first post-period surveys that include the black president question, respectively. Gallup does not ask the black president question at a sufficiently high frequency that we can pin the key shift to the Spring of 1963, the moment when, we earlier argued, voters first firmly connect the Democrats to Civil Rights. We now turn to alternative Gallup questions and a modified empirical strategy to more finely pinpoint the transition moment of white Southern Democratic allegiance. We lose the ability to stratify the analysis by racial attitudes, but we gain higher-frequency measures of Americans' responses to political news.

Presidential approval. During the 1960s, Gallup asked the following question roughly every month: “Do you approve or disapprove of the way President _____ is handling his job as President?”³⁵ Figure 6 tracks Kennedy’s approval among whites, separately for the South and non-South, as well as the difference. The most striking element of the figure is the 35 percentage-point drop in Southern approval between the April 5 and June 23 surveys in 1963, more than half of which occurs between the two polls (May 25 and June 23) that surround Kennedy’s televised June 11 Civil Rights address. By contrast, non-Southern white approval is flat during the same period.³⁶ Thus this high frequency data provides evidence to pinpoint Spring 1963 as a critical moment for dealignment. Note, however, that even the smaller events in the Civil Rights timeline noted earlier (the Freedom Riders and James Meredith) create wobbles in Kennedy’s relative popularity in the South.

Table 2 presents related regression results. In col. (1) we regress respondents’ approval on the average number of articles per day mentioning Kennedy and “Civil Rights” during the week of the survey, allowing the effect to differ for Southerners and non-Southerners. The point estimates suggest that if a week were to average an additional article per day mentioning Kennedy and civil rights than some baseline period, then we should expect non-Southern white approval to fall by 1.53 percentage points and white Southern approval to fall by 7.13 percentage points relative to their baseline levels.³⁷

³⁵In most surveys the possible valid responses are only approve or disapprove.

³⁶Black approval (Appendix Figure A.6) slightly increases, but is subject to ceiling effects.

³⁷We have explored robustness of our results to varying respondents’ “memories.” The coefficient on *South* $\times$ *Article count* and its significance increases as we add previous days to the window up to about two weeks, and then starts to fall. When we include additional lags of search terms, the

Are the results in col. (1) driven by other events occurring around the same time as Kennedy’s Civil Rights actions? In col. (2) we add survey date fixed effects and a vector of interaction terms between *South* and article counts of Kennedy alongside nine “placebo” issues (the main effects of these placebo issue article counts as well as the Civil Rights article count are absorbed by the survey-date fixed effects). While Southern whites appear to react more positively (toward Kennedy) upon news related to the USSR, they react negatively on Cuba, making it hard to discern a consistent pattern on international relations or Communism. White Southerners react more positively to news linking Kennedy and agricultural policy (perhaps not a surprise given its differential importance in the South), but the coefficient is less than one-third the size of our Civil Rights interaction. The lack of divergent responses to issues other than Civil Rights foreshadows results we present in Section 6.1 that in the pre-period, whites in the South had few policy disagreements with whites elsewhere except for Civil Rights. More important to the question at hand, adding these controls in fact only increases the magnitude of the coefficient on the interaction between *South* and Civil Rights articles. In col. (3) we repeat the col. (2) analysis using the more expanded “Civil Rights terms” search. The interaction term remains negative and significant, though is about one-fourth smaller.

False positives could attenuate results. We thus had two RAs code, based on their own judgment, whether each article put Kennedy on the liberal side of the Civil Rights issue, on the conservative side, was mixed, or whether the article was a ‘false hit.’³⁸ Col. (4) suggests that, relative to baseline, an additional article per day placing Kennedy on the liberal side of Civil Rights (as judged by our RAs) reduces his relative support among white Southerners by over eleven percentage points, consistent with substantial attenuation bias in col. (3). Finally, in another attempt to address false positives but without relying on labor-intensive and potentially subjective hand-coding, in col. (5) we show that our col. (3) specification is robust to using the search term “Negro” instead of Civil Rights terms.

In Appendix Table A.7 we show that our results are robust to normalizing the number of Civil Rights articles by total number of articles and to including a *South* linear time trend.

association of hits and approval is smaller in magnitude in lagged weeks.

³⁸In fact, the RAs on average classify just over half of the expanded “Civil Rights terms” search as false hits, 32 percent as pro- Civil Rights, seven percent as against and six percent mixed. In debriefing the RAs after they submitted their scores, we concluded that they were quite conservative in judging an article to be pro Civil Rights. See Appendix C for further details, including the instructions we gave to the RAs. Both were blind to our hypothesis of Spring 1963 as the turning point.

The appendix table also shows that, beyond approval of Kennedy, *Democratic identification* among Southern whites also falls significantly relative to others upon news linking Kennedy to Civil Rights (though as party identification is a more stable outcome than presidential approval, the magnitudes are smaller).

Figure 7 displays the remarkable predictive power of (media coverage of) Kennedy’s Civil Rights initiatives, graphing predicted approval using the cols. (3) and (4) specifications of Table 2 (i.e., with and without RA coding) alongside actual approval, by region and survey date. Our predicted series captures 51% (56% with RA coding) of the actual variation.³⁹ When we perform the same exercise with each placebo issue, the best performing issue (Social Security) captures twenty percent and seven of the nine less than five percent. The overwhelming predictive power of Civil Rights in explaining regional differences in approval for Kennedy undercuts the argument that other issues were triggering dealignment during this key period.

Were Southerners reacting to Kennedy’s *policies*, as we argue, or were they merely blaming the incumbent for events that they found objectionable? Perhaps white Southerners would have graded poorly any executive who presided over the country during the unrest in Birmingham, regardless of the executive’s actions.⁴⁰ If Kennedy’s actual involvement was not pivotal, then the coefficients of interest in Table 2 should be sensitive to simultaneously controlling for interactions with *South* and article counts for Civil Rights news that does *not* necessarily mention Kennedy. In fact, as we show in Appendix Table A.7, adding this control barely affects our coefficient of interest. Similarly, the appendix table shows that results are also robust to using “Civil Rights” *and* “Martin Luther King” or “Civil Rights” *and* “Republican” in the same manner.

Hypothetical presidential match-ups. Another familiar Gallup question asks voters whom they would prefer in hypothetical election match-ups. Roughly once a month beginning in February of 1963, Gallup asks respondents for whom they would vote, Kennedy or Senator Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), with the final poll less than two weeks before Kennedy’s assassination. While earlier in his career Goldwater appeared open to Civil Rights, by as early as 1959 he had become one of the most vocal Republican opponents.⁴¹

³⁹Predictions based on col. 1 and col. 5 capture 51% and 54% percent of the actual variation, respectively.

⁴⁰See, e.g., Achen and Bartels (2004) on voters punishing incumbents for shark attacks (as well as subsequent papers on natural disasters). Similarly, Southern whites may have punished Kennedy even if in reality he did nothing to promote Civil Rights.

⁴¹See Schickler (2016), Chapter 10. For example, he opposed Eisenhower’s dispatching federal

Figure 8 shows Goldwater’s support among white Southerners at around 30% through the first week of March. Goldwater then enjoys a steady increase in Southern support through the Spring of 1963, reaching a plateau of around 60% in July. During our key period of the Spring of 1963, Kennedy goes from having a healthy, thirty percentage point lead over Goldwater in the region to being thirty points behind him. White non-Southerners, by contrast, remain rather aloof toward Goldwater over this entire period.

The result from the presidential match-ups suggests that Kennedy’s decline in approval documented in the previous subsection did not reflect mere short-term annoyance. As Kennedy began to intervene on the side of Civil Rights, *half* of his Southern white supporters rapidly shifted their backing to a candidate from a party they had shunned for a century but who opposed Civil Rights. As noted in the introduction, those arguing for Civil Rights as the trigger for Southern dealignment typically point to Johnson as the catalyst—our results suggest that Kennedy has been given too little credit (or blame?) for losing the South for his party.

6 Addressing alternative hypotheses

In the previous section we made our “positive case” for Civil Rights as the prime mover of Southern whites out of the Democratic Party. In this section, we more directly address the alternative hypotheses described in Section 2.

6.1 Rising party polarization

Over the past fifty years, the Democratic and Republican parties have moved further apart on most issues, in particular redistribution and social insurance (McCarty *et al.*, 2006). If Southern whites have always been more conservative—especially economically—than other whites, then rising polarization could lead to differential exodus of Southern whites from the increasingly more liberal party. Moreover, if our “black president” question is merely acting as a proxy for general conservatism, then our results could be an artifact of polarization that we mistakenly attribute to reaction to Civil Rights. We investigate both of these claims.

Were white Southerners more conservative than whites elsewhere? We focus on the 1956 ANES, which asks more than a dozen policy questions (some are repeated in

troops to integrate Little Rock High School and campaigned throughout the South in the late 1950s calling the *Brown* decision illegal.

1958 and 1960 and in those cases we pool surveys) scored on a scale from 1 to 5 (strongly agree to strongly disagree). The first panel of Table 3 focuses on economic policy preferences, providing both means and the fraction agreeing or strongly agreeing for each of seven questions. White Southerners are somewhat to the left of whites elsewhere, significantly so on the question of public health care (which would arise as a key issue in 1965, with the introduction of Medicare and Medicaid) and the influence of big business. Their opinions are essentially identical on whether unions have too much power (somewhat surprising to us, given Southern legislators’ support for the 1947 Taft-Hartley Act) and Southern whites are slightly to the right of other whites (though not significantly so) regarding regulation of housing and utilities.⁴²

The second panel shows some significant regional differences on foreign policy, but in no consistent direction (Southern whites want soldiers overseas to fight communism while also preferring politicians focus on domestic instead of foreign policy issues). Moreover, it is hard to categorize foreign policy positions as Democratic or Republican in the late 1950s, as both parties fought to be viewed as the more hawkish.

The third panel reports large and significant differences, as expected, on Civil Rights. Note that we include questions of federal aid for local school construction in this category because after the *Brown* decision federal funds could only be used for integrated schools and indeed every federal education bill from 1955 onward explicitly included language to that effect (and indeed never passed Congress, due to opposition by Southern legislators).⁴³

While Southerners’ (non race-related) policy preferences are not to the right of other whites in our pre-period, a related question is whether *changes* in policy preferences from the pre- to post-period can explain dealignment (though, as scholars point out, such changes may be endogenous to Civil Rights initiatives and thus difficult to interpret).⁴⁴ ANES does not have a question on policy preferences that is worded consistently throughout our sample

⁴²Katznelson (2013) argues that while Southern legislators supported the pro-Union Wagner Act in 1935, they then supported the anti-union Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 because in the interim period the labor movement had become more associated with Civil Rights. Our results suggest that Southern *voters* were less anti-union than their representatives.

⁴³Adam Clayton Powell (D-NY) added his so-called Powell Amendment to every school construction bill during this period. Indeed, he was once punched in the face by segregationist Cleveland Bailey (D-WV) on the House floor, with Bailey charging him with “trying to wreck the public school system” with his amendment (see “House Colleague Punches Powell,” *NYT*, July 21, 1955.)

⁴⁴See, e.g., Kousser, 2010 and Lee and Roemer, 2006, who argue that Civil Rights legislation, by giving blacks access for the first time to the federal social safety net in Southern states, would presumably reduce support for these programs among some racially conservative whites.

period; the question that comes closest to meeting that criterion asks respondents their views on the governments' role in guaranteeing jobs and a basic standard of living. As we show in Appendix Table A.9, no matter how flexibly we allow this variable to affect white voters' party identification, it explains essentially none of the large decline in Democratic identification in the South (see table notes for how we harmonized this question across years).

Overall, the analysis in this subsection provides no hint that, absent Democrats' introduction of Civil Rights legislation in 1963, white Southerners were on the verge of abandoning the Democratic party because of policy disagreements. Especially on economic policy, any differences between whites in the South and elsewhere would have predicted, if anything, an increasing loyalty to the Democratic party as it pushed public medical insurance and other safety net provisions.

Is “no black president” merely proxying for conservatism? Until now we have been interpreting our black president question as a measure of racial views, and indeed we showed in Appendix Table A.1 that it is highly correlated with other questions on racial equality in the GSS. There are at least two complications to address. First, recall that until 1960 all U.S. presidents had been white, Protestant men. As such, discomfort with a black president may simply be proxying for social or cultural conservatism—a desire to adhere to past norms—not opposition to racial equality *per se*. Second, recall that the question specifies that “your party” nominates a black man—a white Southerner would surely have assumed that had the Democrats nominated a black man, he would have been from the Northern, liberal wing of the party. As such, a white Southerner may have feared a black Democratic president would have been dismissive of regional issues beyond segregation (e.g., agricultural policy).

In many surveys in which Gallup asks the black president question, it also asks whether respondents would vote for a qualified female, Catholic or Jewish nominee from their party. In the 1960s, a president from any of these groups would have been a large break from tradition and thus refusal should correlate with social conservatism (perhaps especially for a female candidate). Moreover, had the Democratic party nominated a Jewish or Catholic candidate during this period, Southern whites could be very sure he would come from the Northern wing of the party. If our black president is merely proxying for social conservatism or regionalism, then our coefficient of interest should be quite sensitive to simultaneously controlling for views toward these three groups.

For each group $G \in \{Female, Jewish, Catholic\}$, Table 4 shows the results from four

regression specifications. We begin by estimating our standard equation (1) on the subsample of observations that include the “black president question” *as well as* the “president” question for group G , to estimate total pre- versus post-period white Southern dealignment for this subsample of our main regression sample (in all cases, the estimate is very similar to that of the baseline estimate in col. 3 of Table 1).

In the second column, we then estimate a version of equation (2) where we instead measure the share of total dealignment accounted for by white Southerners opposed to a candidate from group G . The third specification is our usual “black president” triple-interaction equation *on the subsample that includes the president question for group G* . The final specification performs a “horserace” to see if the decline is better explained by those Southerners against voting for blacks or those against voting for the other group.

The results of these exercises are very similar regardless of whether women, Jews or Catholics are the group G of interest. Comparing the first and second specifications for each group shows that almost none of the total Southern dealignment is explained by differential movement among Southerners unwilling to vote for members of these other groups. Dealignment among racially conservative white Southerners remains large for all three subsamples that also include the “president” question for the group in question (the third specification). Moreover, comparing the third and fourth specifications, when we simultaneously control for views toward blacks and views toward the other group (our “horserace” specification), the coefficients on our racial conservatism variables retain their statistical significance and in fact barely move. As such, Southern dealignment during the post-period is driven by those with conservative views on *racial* equality, even after we control for (highly correlated) views toward women and religious minorities.⁴⁵

6.2 Can economic development or changing demographics explain dealignment?

During our study period, the South grew faster than the rest of the country. While we showed in Table 1 that our main Gallup results were robust to flexibly and simultaneously controlling for education, occupation, age, and urbanicity, it is possible that they are confounded by insufficient controls for income. As noted, only one Gallup survey from our pre-period asks household income.⁴⁶ Given this limitation, we again turn to the ANES. From 1952 onward,

⁴⁵Correlations between the black president question and, respectively, the female, Jewish and Catholic president questions are 0.447, 0.402, and 0.455.

⁴⁶When we perform our standard analysis on the subsample of Gallup surveys that include the income variable, the coefficient of interest on our triple interaction term is not affected by whether

the ANES has the needed state identifiers as well as a consistent income measure: grouping households by where they fall in the U.S. income distribution (bottom 16 percent, between the 17th and 33rd percentiles, the middle third, between the 67th and 95th percentiles, or the top five percent).

Col. (1) of Table 5 estimates the differential decline in whites’ Democratic identification in the South versus elsewhere, using ANES data from 1952 to 1980 and retaining our usual 1963 pivot point (so 1964 is the first post-period year in the ANES). We find a 14 percentage-point relative decline in Southern Democratic identification (similar, as we would expect, to the analogous results from Gallup, col. 3 of Table 1). The remaining columns attempt to “explain away” the large, negative coefficient on *South* $\times$ *After*. Col. (2) adds fixed effects for the five ANES income categories. Some authors point to urbanization in the South as a reason whites leave the Democrats, so col. (3) adds fixed effects for the three urbanicity categories in the ANES. Col. (4) adds interactions for each of the urbanicity and income categories with both *South* and *After*. In none of these columns does the coefficient on *South* $\times$ *After* appreciably change. In short, economic development—even broadly and flexibly defined—cannot explain why Southern whites leave the Democratic party after 1963.

As detailed in Section 2, other authors argue that Northern migrants and younger cohorts—two groups which should have little natural loyalty to Southern segregation—drive dealignment. In col. (5) we introduce a “restricted sample”: we drop all respondents (in the South and non-South) born after 1941 as well as all respondents residing in the South at the time of the survey but born elsewhere. Relative to the baseline in col. (1), our restricted sample shows a post-period drop in Southern Democratic attachment that is 92% of the size of the drop in the full sample, and only grows in col. (6) when we add controls.⁴⁷

The regressions in Panel A of Table 5 impose our preferred turning point of 1963, but a distinct question is whether economic development can explain dealignment more generally. Panel B shows that, just as with *South* $\times$ *After*, almost none of the Southern linear time trend (roughly one percentage point per year on average during our sample period) is explained by any of the specification checks described above.⁴⁸ Appendix Tables A.11 to A.13 show income is included as a control.

⁴⁷Our results support the arguments of Stanley (1988) and Osborne *et al.* (2011) that any effect of migration or cohort-replacement would have simply been too small to explain such a large shift in party identification.

⁴⁸In fact, not only does economic development not explain overall Southern dealignment, but richer and non-rural Southerners (the so-called “New South”) did not drive dealignment (see Appendix Table A.10).

that the patterns in Table 5 hold when instead of party ID we use votes in presidential and congressional races as outcome variables.

6.3 Does the timing of dealignment undermine Civil Rights as the cause?

As Figure 1 shows, while white Southerners continue to trickle out of the Democratic party after 2000, much of the damage was complete by 1970. Between 1960 and 1970, Democrats lost on average over two percentage points per year among white Southerners relative to other whites, whereas there was no additional loss between 1970 and 1980 and the aggregate 1970-2004 rate was below 0.4 percentage points per year. This pattern is broadly consistent with the shock of the Democrats' 1960s Civil Rights engagement leading many racially conservative Southern whites to switch immediately and some amount of inertia that led others to switch later or to die out and be replaced by future non-Democrats.

What is, at first glance, less consistent with our story of 1963 as the turning point is the *earlier* evolution of party identification. We address two key questions. First, why did Kennedy's weakness in the South pre-date his 1963 Civil Rights moves? Second, what caused the (slower, but certainly substantial) pre-1960 dealignment among white Southerners?⁴⁹

What drove Kennedy's pre-1963 weakness in the South? In his razor-thin 1960 election victory, Kennedy significantly underperforms in the South relative to past Democratic candidates. Some authors argue that this dismal showing suggests that Civil Rights cannot explain 1960s Southern dealignment, as Kennedy had essentially no Civil Rights agenda until 1963. Below we provide a variety of quantitative evidence showing that his Catholicism substantially depressed his support among whites in the South while *raising* it elsewhere.⁵⁰

In a 1958 Gallup poll, 48 percent of Southern whites state unwillingness to vote for a Catholic president, compared to only 22 percent of whites elsewhere. In the 1960 post-election portion of the ANES, 29 percent of whites in the South said *the most important reason* they did not vote for Kennedy was his Catholicism, compared to 15 percent elsewhere. These percentages *include* (in the denominator) all those who *did* vote for him, suggesting anti-

⁴⁹Despite the earlier dealignment—which we analyze in detail in this subsection—the coefficient on *South* $\times$ *After* in cols. (1) and (3) of Table 1 remains negative and significant after adding a Southern linear time trend (results available upon request).

⁵⁰Southern opposition to a Catholic president during this era was so substantial that Kennedy delivered a now-famous speech to Southern ministers committing himself to secular government.

Catholic sentiment was a major factor in suppressing his Southern vote total.⁵¹

On the other hand, Catholic voters (94% of whom lived outside the South) mobilized in support of Kennedy, further shrinking the South-versus-non-South advantage Kennedy received relative to non-Catholic Democratic nominees.⁵² While in the other presidential elections from 1952 to 2000, white Catholics, relative to other whites, favor Democrats by roughly eleven percentage points, the advantage in 1960 was a huge outlier at over 45 percentage points (see Appendix Figure A.7). We can use the ANES to “correct” for this pro-Catholic effect by dropping all Catholics. In Appendix Figure A.8 we plot the South-versus-non-South difference in Presidential vote share for all white voters and for white *non-Catholic* voters. Consistent with past work, we find that Kennedy performs poorly in the South relative to previous Democratic candidates. But once we exclude Catholic voters, the candidate’s relative Southern performance is similar to previous Democratic nominees and the clear break emerges between the presidential elections of 1960 and 1964, consistent with our hypothesized 1963 turning point. As this graph can correct only for the pro-Catholic bias (almost entirely outside the South) and not for anti-Catholic bias (concentrated in the South), even the non-Catholic series in Appendix Figure A.8 almost surely understates how well Kennedy would have done among whites in the South versus elsewhere but for his religion.

While the 1960 presidential election has been a focus of the dealignment literature, the focus of our paper is party identification. In that regard, more concerning than Kennedy’s 1960 election performance is that, if one looks carefully at Figure 1, the steep period of decline in white Southern Democratic *party* identification begins in 1961, not 1963, as our hypothesis would predict. Unless white Southerners actually changed their party identification (as opposed to merely their presidential vote), at least temporarily, then the Democrats fielding a Catholic nominee in 1960 cannot explain why we see Southern *party* dealignment beginning in 1961 instead of 1963.

In fact, anti-Catholic sentiment indeed led Southerners to temporarily switch party identification in the early years of Kennedy’s administration. In Appendix Figure A.9, we plot the coefficients from regressing, separately for the South and elsewhere, Democratic identification on a *No Catholic Prez* variable for each survey date (i.e., the “no Catholic president” analogue to our main Figure 5). Indeed, 1961 (the first poll following his election) is a huge

⁵¹Note that the only other time before 1960 that Democrats fielded a Catholic candidate (Al Smith, in 1928), Democrats lost six Southern states that election, five of which had not voted Republican since Reconstruction.

⁵²State residence of Catholic voters is based on authors’ calculation from the 1960 ANES.

outlier in the South: those with anti-Catholic views are roughly 27 percentage points less likely to identify as Democrats than in a typical year. While anti-Catholic sentiment is often noted in the 1960 election, our analysis demonstrates that it also temporarily reduced Southerners’ Democratic party identification.⁵³

What drove pre-1960 Southern dealignment? As shown in Figure 1, between 1948 and 1952, the Democrats’ Southern advantage shrinks by nearly ten points, before slowing its decline for the remainder of the decade. It is not hard to fashion a historical account whereby Democrats’ positions on Civil Rights can explain the timing of this early dealignment and its eventual slowing.

The Democrats’ traditional support for (or at least tolerance of) white supremacy in the South softens by the late 1940s as Northern liberals gain power in the party.⁵⁴ On February 2, 1948, President Truman delivers the first-ever Civil Rights message to Congress, introducing a legislative package that the NAACP calls “the most uncompromising and specific pronouncement” made by a president on racial equality. Northern liberals then secure a strong Civil Rights plank in the party platform at the July convention that year, leading many Southern delegates to follow Senator Strom Thurmond (D-SC) in walking out of the convention and forming the States’ Rights Democratic Party (often referred to as the “Dixiecrat party”). A week later, Truman issues executive orders to desegregate the military and federal workforce.

Truman would nearly lose the election after Thurmond wins four states of the Deep South. A nascent Southern Republican party would begin to form in the early 1950s, with candidates generally running as strict segregationists. Democrats do their best to reassure Southerners by nominating in 1952 and 1956 Adlai Stevenson (a “moderate” on Civil Rights), choosing vice presidential nominees from the South, and softening the party platform on Civil Rights, and are able to stem the Southern losses they incurred under Truman.

But do the data support this historical narrative? While data are decidedly more limited during the 1940s and early 1950s (exacerbated by Gallup’s tendency to under-sample the South until it adopted more modern sampling procedures in 1950), what data do exist indeed support this chronology.

⁵³Not surprisingly, given that Appendix Figure A.9 shows that the connection between anti-Catholic sentiment and party identification is a one-off effect, anti-Catholic specific dealignment explains only (a statistically insignificant) 15% of total dealignment.

⁵⁴In concurrent work, we investigate to what extent black migration out of the South led Northern politicians to support Civil Rights, especially in areas where blacks were swing voters.

We begin by graphing Truman’s relative approval among whites in the South versus elsewhere as a function of articles linking him to Civil Rights, the analogue to the Kennedy analysis in Figure 6. The media does not link Truman to Civil Rights until February of 1948, timed exactly to his February 2nd Civil Rights action, and his connection to Civil Rights remains elevated the rest of his administration. Appendix Figure A.10 shows that his relative white approval in the South falls 15 percentage points between December 1947 and September 1949, the last survey before and the first survey after February 1948, respectively. While consistent with the hypothesis that Civil Rights led to Truman’s unpopularity in the South, the lack of any approval questions from 1948 itself obviously limits how tightly we can link his approval to his Civil Rights involvement.⁵⁵

We thus turn to another measure we expect to move at somewhat high frequency: vote intention for the 1948 presidential election, for which we have five surveys in 1947 and 1948. As Appendix Figure A.11 shows, support for Truman collapsed in the South just after his Civil Rights message and never recovers. While historians typically tie Truman’s 1948 electoral losses in the South to the July convention and its introduction of a Civil Rights plank into the platform, the data (though limited) suggest that the February Congressional actions were in fact pivotal.

Finally, Appendix A.12 graphs Democratic identification during Truman’s administration. Democratic identification is difficult to interpret during the 1948 election season, as Strom Thurmond’s third party was called the States’ Rights *Democratic* Party (our emphasis) and in Gallup data 89 percent of those saying they will vote for Thurmond call themselves Democrats. Nonetheless, the Democrats’ Southern advantage in party identification declines after the Civil Rights message and continues to do so after the 1948 election (with some noise during the Korean War).

While the timing suggests that Civil Rights caused this early episode of dealignment, was it in fact racially conservative Southern whites leading the exit? Had “the Dixiecrats of 1948 . . . loosened the inhibition against bolting the Democrats” and voting Republican or Independent was “the only vehicle for a protest vote against the national Democrats?” (Tindall, 1972). Or were these “earliest steps of the Southern realignment . . . an outgrowth of economic development?” (Trende, 2012). Lacking racial attitudes questions in the Gallup data that span our key 1948 date, we turn instead to the ANES.

The 1952 ANES not only has a question on racial views but also several questions we can

⁵⁵See Appendix B for more detail on survey quality from the 1940s.

use to proxy *defection* from the Democratic Party. In Appendix Table A.14 we ask whether conservative racial views predict defection among white Southerners (consistent with the “protest vote” story). Being against ensuring fair employment opportunities for Negroes predicts both intragenerational defection (i.e., having once identified as a Democrat but now identifying as a Republican or Independent) and intergenerational defection (having grown up with parents who were Democrats but now identifying as a Republican or Independent), though has little predictive power for defection in terms of current Democrats voting for Eisenhower. In most cases, these correlations retain statistical significance after controlling for fixed effects for the age, gender, education, urbanicity and income categories provided in the ANES. Despite the larger sample sizes, Appendix Table A.15 shows that racial views are typically *insignificant* predictors of Democratic defection among whites outside the South, again consistent with the effects in the South being due to lingering anger at the party’s 1948 Civil Rights actions.

In Appendix Table A.16 we explore whether richer Southern whites were differentially leaving the Democratic party. While richer respondents indeed tend to defect from the Democrats (perhaps not surprising, given its redistributive policies), this tendency is often insignificant and moreover is no more marked than in the North. In short, we find evidence that, in the waning days of the Truman administration, it is conservative racial views, not income, that predicts the differential decline in Democratic identification among whites in the South versus elsewhere.

Republican Dwight Eisenhower succeeds Truman as president in January 1953. It has been argued that any movement among Southerners toward Republicans under Eisenhower repudiates racial views as the primary trigger of Southern dealignment because Eisenhower was a progressive on Civil Rights.

While historians continue to debate Eisenhower’s legacy on Civil Rights, we put that discussion aside and instead focus on white respondents’ contemporaneous reaction to moments during his administrative when he was linked with Civil Rights.⁵⁶ Appendix Figure A.13 and Appendix Table A.17 are the Eisenhower analogues to the Kennedy analyses in Figure 6 and Table 2, tracking his relative popularity in the South alongside newspaper articles linking him to Civil Rights. As with Kennedy, even small increases in media mentions would lead

⁵⁶See, e.g., Schickler (2016), Chapter 10, for arguments that Eisenhower pulled the Republican party in the direction of racial conservatism. Eisenhower was the first Republican in decades to campaign in the South, often alongside strict segregationists. While he signed the 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts, neither had any enforcement provision nor did he campaign for them.

to wobbles in his support in the South, and his sending of federal troops to integrate Little Rock High School in September 1957 led to a complete cratering.

In summary, we find no evidence that income growth was pushing Southern whites out of the Democratic party. Moreover their (non-race-related) policy preferences from the late 1950s and early 1960s suggested no coming rift. While data from the 1940s and 1950s are more limited, we find that racially conservative whites were leaving the party in the early 1950s, just after Democratic President Truman advocated for some Civil Rights initiatives in the late 1940s. Just as with Truman, Southern whites reacted negatively toward Eisenhower whenever he put himself on the side of Civil Rights.

7 Conclusion

The exodus of Southern whites from the Democratic party is one of the most transformative—and controversial—political developments in twentieth-century American history. Using newly available data, we conclude that defection among racially conservative whites just after Democrats introduce sweeping Civil Rights legislation explains essentially all of the party’s losses in the region. We find essentially no role for either income growth in the region or (non-race-related) policy preferences in explaining why Democrats “lost” the South.

A large literature explores the relative importance of economic versus ethnocentric concerns in determining how individuals form partisan loyalties, develop policy preferences and decide whether and how to vote. We expect this literature to grow, given recent political developments, and we hope that future scholars find our paper useful. However, important differences, both in methodology and context, would likely arise between our study and research on, say, current politics in many wealthy democracies. While data on racial attitudes is of much higher quality today (both in terms of frequency and question consistency), so, we suspect, is the social desirability bias against admitting racially conservative views. We benefited from high-frequency variation in media coverage of race-related events; today, media coverage can be measured at even higher frequency, but the media landscape has become more fragmented. While racial divisions in our context were binary, in developed countries today they are often multipolar. The traditional black-white divide still exists, but the rise of immigration in both the US and Europe has created new concerns (whether perceived or real) among native residents: competition over scarce jobs, loss of “national culture” and, especially in Europe, the possibility of domestic terrorism.

Nonetheless, examining these more modern political settings will still face the central


challenge—that we attempted to address in this paper—of separating the effects of these and similar sentiments from that of a changing economic landscape.

References

- ABRAMOWITZ, A. I. and SAUNDERS, K. L. (1998). Ideological realignment in the us electorate. *The Journal of Politics*, **60** (03), 634–652.
- ACEMOGLU, D. and ROBINSON, J. A. (2008). The persistence and change of institutions in the americas. *Southern Economic Journal*, **75** (2), 282.
- ACHEN, C. H. and BARTELS, L. M. (2004). Blind retrospection: Electoral responses to drought, flu, and shark attacks.
- ALESINA, A. and GLAESER, E. L. (2004). *Fighting poverty in the US and Europe: A world of difference*, vol. 26. Oxford University Press Oxford.
- ALSTON, L. J. and FERRIE, J. P. (1993). Paternalism in agricultural labor contracts in the us south: Implications for the growth of the welfare state. *The American economic review*, pp. 852–876.
- BESLEY, T., PERSSON, T. and STURM, D. M. (2010). Political competition, policy and growth: theory and evidence from the us. *The Review of Economic Studies*, **77** (4), 1329–1352.
- BOUSTAN, L. P. (2010). Was postwar suburbanization” white flight”? evidence from the black migration. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, **125** (1).
- (2016). *Competition in the Promised Land: Black Migrants in Northern Cities and Labor Markets*. Princeton University Press.
- CAMPBELL, A., CONVERSE, P. E., MILLER, W. E. and DONALD, E. (1966). Stokes. 1960. the american voter.
- CARMINES, E. G. and STIMSON, J. A. (1989). *Issue evolution: Race and the transformation of American politics*. Princeton University Press.
- COLLINS, W. J. (2003). The political economy of state-level fair employment laws, 1940–1964. *Explorations in Economic History*, **40** (1), 24–51.
- FISHBACK, P. and CULLEN, J. A. (2013). Second world war spending and local economic activity in us counties, 1939–58. *The Economic History Review*, **66** (4), 975–992.
- FRYER, R. G. and LEVITT, S. D. (2012). Hatred and profits: Under the hood of the ku klux klan. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, p. qjs028.
- GIMPEL, J. G. and SCHUKNECHT, J. E. (2001). Interstate migration and electoral politics. *Journal of Politics*, **63** (1), 207–231.
- GREEN, D. P., PALMQUIST, B. and SCHICKLER, E. (2004). *Partisan hearts and minds: Political parties and the social identities of voters*. Yale University Press.
- JACKSON, K. T. (1985). *Crabgrass frontier: The suburbanization of the United States*. Oxford University Press.
- JAWORSKI, T. (2015). World war ii and the industrialization of the american south. *THE ECONOMIC HISTORY SOCIETY*, p. 256.
- KATZNELSON, I. (2013). *Fear itself: The new deal and the origins of our time*. WW Norton & Company.


- KEY JR, V. O. (1949). Southern politics. new york: Alfred a.
- KOUSSER, J. M. (2010). The immutability of categories and the reshaping of southern politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, **13**, 365–383.
- KUKLINSKI, J. H., COBB, M. D. and GILENS, M. (1997). Racial attitudes and the ‘new south. *The Journal of Politics*, **59** (02), 323–349.
- LEE, W. and ROEMER, J. E. (2006). Racism and redistribution in the United States: A solution to the problem of American exceptionalism. *Journal of Public Economics*, **90** (6), 1027–1052.
- LIPSET, S. M. (1997). *American exceptionalism: A double-edged sword*. WW Norton & Company.
- LUTTMER, E. (2001). Group loyalty and the taste for redistribution. *Journal of Political Economy*, **109** (3), 500–528.
- MARGO, R. A. (1995). The south as an economic problem: Fact or fiction? *The South as an American problem*, pp. 164–180.
- MCCARTY, N., POOLE, K. T. and ROSENTHAL, H. (2006). *Polarized America: The dance of ideology and unequal riches*, vol. 5.
- MCVEIGH, R., CUNNINGHAM, D. and FARRELL, J. (2014). Political polarization as a social movement outcome: 1960s Klan activism and its enduring impact on political realignment in Southern counties, 1960 to 2000. *American Sociological Review*, p. 0003122414555885.
- MELTZER, A. and RICHARD, S. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. *The Journal of Political Economy*, **89** (5), 914–927.
- OSBORNE, D., SEARS, D. O. and VALENTINO, N. A. (2011). The end of the solidly democratic south: The impressionable-years hypothesis. *Political Psychology*, **32** (1), 81–108.
- PERLSTEIN, R. (2009). *Before the storm: Barry Goldwater and the unmaking of the American consensus*. Nation Books.
- SCHICKLER, E. (2016). *The Civil Rights Realignment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- SHAFFER, B. E. and JOHNSTON, R. (2009). *The end of Southern exceptionalism: class, race, and partisan change in the postwar South*. Harvard University Press.
- STANLEY, H. W. (1988). Southern partisan changes: Dealignment, realignment or both? *The Journal of Politics*, **50** (01), 64–88.
- SUGRUE, T. J. (2008). *Sweet land of liberty: The forgotten struggle for civil rights in the north*. Random House.
- TINDALL, G. B. (1972). *The Disruption of the Solid South*. Athens: University of Georgia Press.
- TRENDE, S. (2012). *The Lost Majority: Why the Future of Government Is Up for Grabs-and Who Will Take It*. Macmillan.
- VALENTINO, N. A. and SEARS, D. O. (2005). Old times there are not forgotten: Race and partisan realignment in the contemporary south. *American Journal of Political Science*, **49** (3), 672–688.
- WATTENBERG, M. P. (1991). The building of a republican regional base in the south the elephant crosses the mason-dixon line. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, **55** (3), 424–431.
- WRIGHT, G. (2013). *Sharing the Prize*. Harvard University Press.

Figure 1: Share of whites identifying as Democrats, by region




Notes: Individual-level data from Gallup polls (see Section 3 for more detail). South is defined throughout as the eleven states of the former Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Democratic identification is coded throughout as one if the respondent identifies with the Democratic party and zero otherwise (so independent is coded as zero).

Figure 2: Share of whites willing to vote for a black president, by region




Notes: Data come from Gallup (1958-2003) and GSS (1974-2010). Here and throughout the paper, we code “Yes” as one and “No” and (rare) “Don’t know” as zero. We use the provided survey weights—the GSS for all years and Gallup for 1968 forward—to adjust for sampling error.

Figure 3: Whites' views of which party will push for school integration, by region




Notes: Data are from the ANES 1960, 1964 and 1968 individual year files. Responses to the 1960 question, which asks “which party is more likely to stay out” of school integration, are reoriented so that answers align with the 1964 and 1968 questions, which ask which party “is more likely to want the government to see to it” that white and black children go to the same schools. We have dropped missing observations, so *Dem + Rep + “No difference between the parties”* (not plotted) sum to 100%.

Figure 4: Count of *NYT* articles mentioning “President Kennedy” and Civil Rights terms




Notes: The “Civil Rights” search counts the number of articles that include the phrase “President Kennedy” and “Civil Rights.” The “Civil Rights terms” search counts articles that include the phrase “President Kennedy” and any of the following: “Civil Rights,” any form of the word “integrate” and any form of the word “segregate.”

Figure 5: Coefficient from regressing *Democratic ID* on *NoBlackPres* (whites only), by survey date and region




Notes: Each point plotted is the estimated $\hat{\beta}$ from the regression $Democrat_i = \beta NoBlackPres_i + e_i$, separately for each survey date and each region (South and non-South). Circles denote that the coefficient comes from a Gallup survey and triangles denote a GSS survey. The vertical line marks our ‘pre-’ and ‘post-periods.’

Figure 6: Whites’ approval of Kennedy versus articles linking him to Civil Rights




Notes: “Article count” is identical to the “Civil rights terms” series in Figure 4 (to limit clutter we suppress the axis for this variable). Approval (from Gallup) is coded as one if a respondent approves of Kennedy and zero if he disapproves or (rare) has no opinion. We define the survey date of each Gallup poll as the midpoint of the period it is in the field. The figure maps approval on a given survey date to the number of *NYT* articles three days before through three days after (as the modal survey is in the field for six days and we do not know a respondent’s exact interview date).

Figure 7: Predicted vs. actual regional approval differences for Kennedy (whites in Gallup)



Notes: The “actual” difference is identical to that in Figure 6. Predicted (no RA coding) and predicted (RA coding) come from predicting Kennedy’s approval based on *NYT* articles linking him to Civil Rights (in the latter case using research assistants’ assessment of whether the article clearly suggests that Kennedy was pushing for Civil Rights). Specifically, we collapse by region and survey date the predicted approval values generated from cols. (3) and (4), respectively, of Table 2. See text for further detail.

Figure 8: Support for Kennedy versus Goldwater (whites in Gallup)



Notes: Data come from Gallup polls asking individuals whom they would support in the upcoming 1964 presidential election, if the Democrats nominated Kennedy and the Republicans nominated Barry Goldwater. We count “lean toward” a candidate as supporting that candidate.

Table 1: Democratic Party identification among whites as a function of region and racial views

	Dep't variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat (all other responses coded as zero)										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
South	0.230*** [0.0485]	0.0835 [0.0688]									
South x Aft	-0.150** [0.0657]	-0.00129 [0.0690]	-0.165** [0.0658]	0.00281 [0.0597]	-0.156** [0.0633]	-0.00294 [0.0652]	-0.112 [0.133]	-0.167** [0.0625]	-0.00423 [0.0588]	-0.195*** [0.0520]	-0.0431 [0.0623]
No Bl prez		0.0199 [0.0178]		0.00649 [0.0158]		-0.00904 [0.0150]	-0.00405 [0.0147]		0.00761 [0.0157]		0.00903 [0.0157]
South x No Bl prez		0.160** [0.0657]		0.188*** [0.0575]		0.167*** [0.0572]	0.160* [0.0807]		0.193*** [0.0575]		0.184*** [0.0611]
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.0215 [0.0244]		-0.0123 [0.0242]		-0.00886 [0.0233]	-0.0134 [0.0230]		-0.00740 [0.0227]		-0.0175 [0.0200]
South x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.161* [0.0813]		-0.187** [0.0750]		-0.174** [0.0749]	-0.181* [0.0943]		-0.175** [0.0721]		-0.148** [0.0720]
Mean, dep. var.	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.452	0.435	0.435	0.391	0.391
State FE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	No	No
Interactions?	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Max year	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	2000	2000
GSS?	No	No	No	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20192	20192	20192	20192	18537	18537	18537	25235	25235	41588	41588

Notes: Survey date fixed effects included in all regressions. *Aft* is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963. “No Bl prez” is an indicator variable for reporting unwillingness to vote for a qualified black presidential candidate (“don’t know” and “no” are both coded as one). “Controls” indicate that fixed effects for age (in ten-year intervals), gender, education categories (six), city-size categories (twelve) and occupation categories (thirteen) have been added. “Interactions” take age, and dummies for living in a city greater than 50,000 people, finishing high school, having a high-skill occupation (business manager, professional or sales), and being a farmer or farm laborer and interacts each of these variables with *South*, *Aft*, and *South* $\times$ *After*. “Max year” indicates the end point of the sample period (in all cases, the first year of the sample period is 1958) and “GSS” indicates where GSS data have been added to the regression. We use provided survey weights (see notes to Figure 2 for more detail on survey weights). Standard errors clustered by state.

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 2: Approval of Kennedy as function of Civil Rights coverage (whites in Gallup)

	Search terms employed: “President Kennedy” and...				
	“Civil rights”		Civil rights terms		“Negro”
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Article count	-0.0153** [0.00693]				
Article count x South	-0.0560*** [0.00743]	-0.0591*** [0.00441]	-0.0465*** [0.00484]	-0.114*** [0.00863]	-0.0587*** [0.00743]
Conf x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War		0.0101 [0.00832]	0.0197** [0.00816]	0.00623 [0.00914]	0.0162 [0.0121]
Conf x Placebo: Crime, Drugs		-0.00720 [0.0272]	-0.0147 [0.0354]	0.0172 [0.0270]	-0.0136 [0.0249]
Conf x Placebo: USSR		0.0208*** [0.00677]	0.0323*** [0.00751]	0.0157** [0.00646]	0.0194** [0.00901]
Conf x Placebo: Cuba, Castro		-0.0147 [0.00941]	-0.00849 [0.00957]	0.00676 [0.0102]	-0.00657 [0.0100]
Conf x Placebo: Communism, Socialism		-0.00353 [0.00683]	-0.0125* [0.00662]	-0.0142 [0.00961]	-0.00583 [0.0129]
Conf x Placebo: Taxes, Budget		0.0136 [0.00894]	0.0183** [0.00870]	-0.0125 [0.0107]	0.0147 [0.0122]
Conf x Placebo: Employment		0.00288 [0.0120]	-0.0220 [0.0151]	0.0134 [0.0126]	-0.0172 [0.0144]
Conf x Placebo: Social Security		-0.00576 [0.0132]	0.00706 [0.0124]	0.0341* [0.0166]	0.00685 [0.0227]
Conf x Placebo: Agriculture		0.0178** [0.00721]	0.0191** [0.00731]	0.0177** [0.00785]	0.0182* [0.00964]
Mean, dept. var.	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673
Survey date FE?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
RA coding?	No	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365

Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy coded as one if respondent approves of Kennedy’s performance (all other responses coded as zero). State fixed effects in all regressions. “Civil Rights” denotes the frequency of *NYT* articles containing “President Kennedy” and “civil rights.” “Civil Rights terms” adds to that count articles that contain “President Kennedy” and any form of the word “segregate” or “integrate.” “Negro” refers to the frequency of articles containing “President Kennedy” and “negro.” Placebo searches are articles containing “President Kennedy” and terms related to the coefficient labels. We average these daily count over seven days centered on the midpoint of the time the survey is in the field. In col. (4), we use data generated by two research assistants reading each article and judging whether it painted Kennedy as pro-Civil Rights (and average their determinations so that coefficients are comparable to other columns). Appendix C provides additional detail on the newspaper searches and RA hand-coding procedures. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 3: Pre-period policy differences between whites in South and non-South (ANES)

	South	<i>N</i>	Non-South	<i>N</i>	Diff
<i>—Economic policy</i>					
Gov't should guarantee jobs	3.59	777	3.56	2791	0.032
Agree that gov't should guarantee jobs	0.62	777	0.60	2791	0.018
Gov't sd not cut taxes if causes cuts elsewhere	3.54	288	3.47	1042	0.066
Agree gov't should not cut taxes	0.58	288	0.57	1042	0.011
Gov't sd help ppl get medical care at low cost	3.66	541	3.52	1845	0.14*
Agree gov't sd help with medical care	0.64	541	0.59	1845	0.049**
Gov't sd limit pol. influ. of big business	4.03	257	3.83	938	0.20*
Agree that gov't should limit infl. of business	0.74	257	0.69	938	0.053
Gov't sd. *not* limit pol. influ. of unions	2.19	258	2.21	985	-0.020
Agree gov't sd. *not* limit infl. of unions	0.25	258	0.25	985	-0.0057
Gov't sd *not* leave utilities, housing to priv. biz.	2.36	643	2.44	2371	-0.082
Agree that gov't sd *not* leave...to priv biz.	0.28	643	0.30	2371	-0.026
<i>—Foreign policy, communism</i>					
Gov't cannot fire suspected communists	3.72	306	3.78	1090	-0.062
Agree gov't cannot fire susp. communists	0.65	306	0.68	1090	-0.029
Keep soldiers abroad to help countries fight comm.	4.22	745	4.05	2566	0.17***
Agree we sd keep soldiers abroad....	0.81	745	0.76	2566	0.044**
Country better off if focus domestically	2.34	777	2.16	2782	0.18***
Agree that country better of if focus domestically	0.29	777	0.24	2782	0.051***
We sd give aid to poor countries even if can't pay back	3.39	766	3.43	2645	-0.043
Agree we sd. give aid to poor countries	0.57	766	0.56	2645	0.0077
Give for. aid even if country not anti-communist	2.75	267	2.85	934	-0.096
Agree give for. aid even if country...	0.38	267	0.40	934	-0.019
Best way to deal with commun. countries is get tough	4.06	277	4.14	1056	-0.082
Agree best way is to get tough	0.75	277	0.77	1056	-0.013
<i>—Civil rights</i>					
Gov't sd enforce fair jobs/housing for Negroes	3.28	756	3.91	2691	-0.63***
Agree that gov't should enforce fair...	0.56	756	0.73	2691	-0.17***
Fed gov't sd. get involved in sch. integration	1.84	607	3.13	1994	-1.29***
Agree that fed gov't sd get involved...	0.19	607	0.50	1994	-0.31***
Fed gov't sd help finance local school construction	3.59	801	3.79	2783	-0.21***
Agree fed gov't sd help finance schools	0.63	801	0.68	2783	-0.056***

Notes: All questions taken from the 1956, 1958 and 1960 ANES. If the ideological orientation of an economic policy question is obvious, we reorient the question if needed so that answers are *increasing* in the *liberal* position. The wording we use to label each question has been lightly edited to limit total characters while retaining the meaning of the question. Each question is presented in two ways: first, as continuous agreement with the statement from one to five and second, as a binary variable indicating agreement or strong agreement. "Don't know" responses are dropped. Sample sizes vary because while all questions appear in 1956, only some are repeated in 1958 and 1960. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 4: Do views toward other minority groups $G \in \{Female, Jewish, Catholic\}$ explain white Southern dealignment?

	$G = Female$				$G = Jewish$				$G = Catholic$			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
South x Aft	-0.188*** [0.0662]	-0.166** [0.0673]	-0.0295 [0.0799]	-0.0167 [0.0782]	-0.173** [0.0664]	-0.180** [0.0671]	-0.00374 [0.0617]	-0.0105 [0.0582]	-0.174** [0.0661]	-0.167** [0.0716]	-0.00761 [0.0628]	-0.00744 [0.0550]
No G president		-0.0391 [0.0243]		-0.0434 [0.0259]		-0.0184 [0.0164]		-0.0251 [0.0184]		-0.158*** [0.0237]		-0.167*** [0.0249]
South x No G prez		0.00749 [0.0527]		-0.00248 [0.0554]		0.0302 [0.0329]		0.00476 [0.0368]		0.125** [0.0537]		0.109* [0.0575]
No G prez x Aft		0.0488 [0.0295]		0.0525* [0.0296]		-0.0174 [0.0180]		-0.0120 [0.0223]		-0.0633** [0.0297]		-0.0662* [0.0342]
South x No G prez x Aft		-0.0595 [0.0708]		-0.0482 [0.0745]		0.0462 [0.0484]		0.0870 [0.0583]		0.0702 [0.0506]		0.101* [0.0587]
No Black president			0.0144 [0.0209]	0.0228 [0.0224]			0.00696 [0.0159]	0.0158 [0.0178]			0.00696 [0.0157]	0.0377** [0.0168]
South x No Bl prez			0.162** [0.0686]	0.163** [0.0708]			0.186*** [0.0599]	0.185*** [0.0680]			0.181*** [0.0620]	0.165** [0.0742]
No Bl prez x Aft			-0.00934 [0.0278]	-0.0198 [0.0281]			-0.0130 [0.0250]	-0.0125 [0.0283]			-0.0131 [0.0246]	-0.00759 [0.0266]
South x No Bl prez x Aft			-0.182* [0.0922]	-0.171* [0.0945]			-0.190** [0.0795]	-0.220** [0.0848]			-0.186** [0.0813]	-0.199** [0.0909]
Mean, dept. var.	0.447	0.447	0.447	0.447	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456	0.456
Observations	11693	11693	11693	11693	18883	18883	18883	18883	18884	18884	18884	18884

Notes: Dependent variable is a dummy variable for Democratic identification. State and survey date FE included. For each group G we form a sample for which a question for voting for a president from group G and the black president question are non-missing. In all three cases, the resulting sample periods run from 1958 to 1978, but Gallup occasionally skips the female president question. Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Table 5: Explanatory power of income and urbanicity in explaining white Southern dealignment (ANES, 1952-1980)


	Dep't variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A (Diff-in-diff spec.)						
South x After	-0.142*** [0.0425]	-0.141*** [0.0408]	-0.150*** [0.0434]	-0.150*** [0.0377]	-0.130** [0.0528]	-0.155*** [0.0477]
Panel B (Diff. trend spec.)						
South x (Year/100)	-0.967*** [0.179]	-0.950*** [0.171]	-1.000*** [0.184]	-0.964*** [0.166]	-0.816*** [0.230]	-0.886*** [0.211]
Dept. var mean	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.416	0.442	0.442
Income FE?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
City-size FE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Interactions?	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Restricted sample?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	19543	19543	19543	19543	13523	13523

Notes: The twelve coefficients above are each from a separate regression. Regressions from Panel A take the form $Dem_{its} = \beta South_s \times After_t + \gamma X_{its} + \mu_s + \eta_t + e_{its}$ and regressions in Panel B take the form $Dem_{its} = \beta South_s \times Year_t + \gamma X_{its} + \mu_s + \eta_t + e_{its}$. $South_s$ is an indicator for residing in one of the states of the former Confederacy; μ_s and η_t are state and year fixed effects, respectively; Aft_t is an indicator variable for being surveyed after April 1963; $Year_t$ is a linear time trend; interaction terms are coded naturally; and X_{its} is a vector of controls that we vary to test robustness. Income (five categories) and city-type (three categories) fixed effects are included where specified in the table footer. Where “Interactions” are specified, income and city-type fixed effects have each been interacted with *South* and (separately) with *After* (when $South \times After$ is the explanatory variable of interest) or *Year* (when $South \times Year$ is the explanatory variable of interest). The “Restricted” sample used in cols. (5) and (6) excludes those younger than 21 years in 1963 and current Southern residents who were not born in the South. (These specifications, therefore, exclude those with missing values for place of birth.) Standard errors clustered by state.

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix A. Supplementary figures and tables noted in the text


Appendix Figure A.1: Would vote for a black president (including non-white respondents)




Notes: Data from Gallup polls 1958-2003 and GSS surveys 1974-2010. The ‘o’ symbol denotes data from Gallup and the ‘x’ symbol data from the GSS.

Appendix Figure A.2: “Civil Rights” articles by month, Southern papers (1963)

(a) *Dallas Morning News*




(b) *N. Orleans Times-Picayune*



Notes: We count articles that include the phrase “Civil Rights.” Searches performed in the summer of 2014 using Library of Congress state newspapers as well as Yale University subscriptions to ProQuest Historical Newspapers and 20th Century American Newspapers.

Appendix Figure A.3: Percent of respondents identifying Civil Rights as the nation’s most important issue




Notes: Gallup polls 1950-1979. This item has at least four limitations to note. First, it is not asked on a regular schedule. The question is fielded six times in 1962 but only once in the key year of 1963. Second, we are unable to produce analysis by race and region. In order to retain as many data points as possible, we graph the frequencies using the website Gallup Brain rather than reading in the data ourselves, which would mean losing those surveys without usable data on iPoll. Third, in some surveys Gallup allows individuals to provide more than one response to the most important problem question, which adds noise to our analysis. Finally, Gallup does not code the responses consistently from survey to survey. In some surveys the frequency responding “civil rights” is reported alone. In other surveys “civil rights” responses are grouped with, “racial problems, discrimination and states rights,” in other surveys with “integration,” and in still others with “demonstrations.” For each survey, we graph the frequency responding to the category that includes “civil rights,” so inconsistencies arise year-to-year.

Given these data limitations, we cannot replicate the analysis for all surveys by race and region, but below we do so for four key surveys: two from the low-importance early 1960s and two from the high-importance mid-1960s.

	Pre-period		Post-period	
	Feb. 1961	June-July 1962	Apr. 1964	June 1964
Whites, South	.095	.140	.400	.510
Blacks, South	.310	.270	.640	.730
Whites, Non-South	.036	.058	.380	.420
Blacks, Non-South	.170	.230	.650	.670


The levels differ in the expected manner. Southern whites rate Civil Rights as more important than non-Southern whites, consistent with the targets of proposed Civil Rights legislation—discrimination in public accommodations and voting—existing only in the South and thus affecting only Southern whites. Not surprisingly, blacks care more about the issue than whites, regardless of region.

Appendix Figure A.4: Coefficient from regressing *Democratic identification* on *NoBlackPrez* by region and survey date (Figure 5 with 95-percent confidence intervals)




Notes: Data taken from Gallup (circle symbol in figure) and the GSS (triangle). See notes to Figure 5 for more detail.

Appendix Figure A.5: Coefficient from regressing *Supports Democrats in Congress* on *NoBlackPrez* by region and survey date (whites in Gallup)




Notes: Each point plotted is the estimated $\hat{\beta}$ from the regression $Supports\ Dems.\ in\ Congress_i = \beta NoBlackPrez_i + e_i$, separately for each survey date and each region (South and non-South). *Supports Dems. in Congress* is a binary variable coded as one if and only if the respondent says he wants the Democrats to win Congress. “Sure” codes Democratic identification as one only if the respondent feels “sure” about this position, whereas “Sure plus lean” codes as one if the respondent is unsure but says he is “leaning” toward Democratic support. *NoBlackPrez* is coded as one if a respondent is against or unsure about voting for a qualified black nominee from his party.

Appendix Figure A.6: Approval of President Kennedy among black Gallup respondents, 1961-1963




Notes: We plot approval by survey date, calculated as the midpoint of the window that each survey was in the field. The dotted vertical line marks June 11, 1963, the date of Kennedy's televised Civil Rights address.

Appendix Figure A.7: Democrats' advantage among Catholics in presidential elections




Notes: Data are from the cumulative ANES, 1952-2008, only white respondents. Respondents reporting support for the Democratic candidate are coded as one, and all other responses (Republican, Independent, "don't know") are coded as zero.

Appendix Figure A.8: Democratic presidential vote shares (South minus non-South), comparing non-Catholic whites to all whites




Notes: Data come from ANES cumulative file. Votes for the Democratic (Republican or Independent) presidential candidate are coded as one (zero).

Appendix Figure A.9: Coefficient from regressing *Democratic identification* on *NoCatholicPres*; by region and year (whites in Gallup)




Notes: Data from Gallup 1958-1980. As with *NoBlackPres* we code *NoCatholicPres* as one if the respondent is unwilling to vote or unsure about voting for a qualified Catholic nominee from his party.

Appendix Figure A.10: White approval (South minus non-South) of Truman as a function of *NYT* articles containing his name alongside Civil Rights terms




Notes: Approval data from Gallup. The first newspaper series counts articles that include the terms “President Truman” and “Civil Rights” anywhere in the article. The second counts articles with “President Truman” and *any* of the following terms: “Civil Rights,” “lynching,” any form of the word “segregate” and any form of the word “integrate.”

Appendix Figure A.11: Share of whites (South minus non-South) who plan to vote for Truman in 1948 election as a function of *NYT* articles containing his name alongside Civil Rights terms




Notes: For details on NYT data, see notes to Appendix Figure A.11. Hypothetical vote data are from Gallup (see Appendix B for more detail). Note that the choices of candidates in the survey, as in the actual election, is evolving. Our first two surveys pit Truman against Gov. Thomas Dewey (R-NY), our second two also include Henry Wallace, the Progressive party nominee and staunch integrationist and our final survey includes, for Southern respondents only, the segregationist Strom Thurmond (D-SC), the Dixiecrat nominee on the ballot only in Southern states. As Southerners are not offered an explicitly segregationist choice until September 1948 but the first large spike in articles occurs in February, we suspect the late addition of Truman would *obscure* the relationship between media coverage of Truman’s Civil Rights activities and his declining support in the South. Respondents planning to support Truman are coded as one and all other responses (“don’t know,” Dewey, Thurmon, etc) as zero. When we run regressions parallel to the Kennedy approval analysis in col. (1) of Table 2 using these data, the Southern interactions are always negative and significant at at least the five-percent level (with standard errors bootstrapped to adjust for the small number of survey dates on which we are clustering). Results available from the authors.

Appendix Figure A.12: Democratic identification among whites during Truman presidency (vertical lines mark February 1948 Civil Rights message and June 1950 start of Korean War)



Notes: Data taken from Gallup.

Appendix Figure A.13: Regional differences in whites' approval of Eisenhower (South minus non-South) versus articles linking him to Civil Rights



Notes: Article count data from *New York Times* daily searches. We count the number of articles with the term “Eisenhower” and any of the following: “Civil rights” or any form of the words “integrate” and “segregate.” Approval data from Gallup.

Appendix Table A.1: Do whites' responses to black president question predict other racial views in both South and non-South?

Dependent variable	Coefficient estimates		
	No black prez.	South	S x No black prez
–Strongly agree that blacks shouldn't push themselves where they are not wanted	0.301*** [0.0225]	0.0998*** [0.0211]	-0.0209 [0.0367]
–Agree that government does too much to improve condition of blacks	0.273*** [0.0204]	0.00327 [0.0162]	-0.0268 [0.0316]
–Against busing of black and white school children from one district to another	0.0700*** [0.0135]	0.0452*** [0.0117]	0.000231 [0.0214]
–Agree that white and black children should go to separate schools	0.206*** [0.0173]	0.0958*** [0.0172]	0.169*** [0.0290]
–Object to sending children to a school where a few of the children are black?	0.0892*** [0.00881]	0.0127* [0.00763]	0.118*** [0.0140]
–Favors laws against marriages between blacks and whites	0.308*** [0.0185]	0.140*** [0.0165]	0.100*** [0.0297]
–Would object to family member bringing black friend for dinner	0.327*** [0.0196]	0.0988*** [0.0181]	0.0690** [0.0320]

Notes: Data come from whites in the GSS, 1974-1980. GSS survey weights (variable *wtss*) used in all summary statistics. Each row represents a separate regression, where the dependent variable is regressed on a dummy for unwillingness to vote for a black president, a South dummy, and the interaction between these two variables. Sample sizes range from 3,800 to 6,600. * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.2: Comparison of demographics of main Gallup analysis sample to IPUMS

	Gallup data		1960 comparison		1970 comparison	
	Pre-p'd	Post-p'd	Gallup	IPUMS	Gallup	IPUMS
<i>–Southern states</i>						
Age	47.63	47.06	47.63	45.07	46.76	45.93
Female	0.506	0.526	0.506	0.522	0.525	0.529
Completed HS	0.367	0.490	0.367	0.416	0.517	0.514
Attended some HS	0.620	0.697	0.620	0.634	0.710	0.738
College graduate	0.0645	0.125	0.0645	0.0773	0.119	0.108
Urban	0.423	0.595	0.423	0.603	0.568	0.647
No black president	0.891	0.607	0.891		0.524	
Identifies as Democrat	0.669	0.502	0.669		0.490	
<i>–Non-Southern states</i>						
Age	47.06	46.50	47.06	46.17	46.04	46.50
Female	0.513	0.524	0.513	0.520	0.519	0.529
Completed HS	0.502	0.589	0.502	0.459	0.616	0.587
Attended some HS	0.698	0.754	0.698	0.674	0.780	0.779
College graduate	0.0963	0.127	0.0963	0.0807	0.142	0.115
Urban	0.668	0.730	0.668	0.721	0.741	0.739
No black president	0.542	0.363	0.542		0.296	
Identifies as Democrat	0.427	0.425	0.427		0.402	
Observations	6578	12189	6578	942529	2568	1060077

Notes: Gallup weights and IPUMS person-weights used in all summary statistics. Gallup statistics reported above are limited to surveys that include the *black president* question and fall within two years of the given Census year. In particular, for 1960, we have two surveys from 1958 and one each from 1959 and 1961. For 1970 we have one each from 1969 and 1971. Our earlier Gallup surveys tended to have larger samples. Gallup and IPUMS have different definitions of urban, so comparing trends across time and space is more useful than comparing levels. Note that Gallup typically asks education questions in terms of “graduation” whereas IPUMS asks in terms of grades completed (so, we infer graduating from high school as completing grade twelve and from college as completing at least four years of college).

Appendix Table A.3: Votes in the House of Representatives for the 1957, 1960 and 1964 Civil Rights Acts, by region and party

	1957 CRA			1960 CRA			1964 CRA		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Democrat	-0.336*** [0.0912]	-0.143** [0.0714]	-0.132* [0.0693]	-0.221*** [0.0687]	-0.213 [0.226]	-0.194 [0.225]	-0.159** [0.0788]	0.0851*** [0.0317]	0.135** [0.0555]
Dep. v. mean	0.659	0.00943	0.00943	0.671	0.0874	0.0874	0.671	0.0762	0.0762
Regions	All	South	South	All	South	South	All	South	South
State FE?	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
BS st. errors?	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	434	106	106	429	103	103	431	105	105

Notes: Data taken from voteview.com. We do not analyze the Senate because until 1961 there was not a single Republican Senator in the South. Standard errors clustered by state (and standard errors are bootstrapped when we examine the South in isolation, given only eleven clusters in those regressions). * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.4: Testing for composition bias in main regression results

	Dep't variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
South x Aft	-0.161** [0.0690]	0.00507 [0.0646]	-0.165** [0.0712]	0.506*** [0.127]	0.420*** [0.115]	0.374*** [0.109]
No Bl prez		0.00635 [0.0157]				
South x No Bl prez		0.178*** [0.0584]				
No Bl prez x Aft		-0.00889 [0.0279]				
South x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.188** [0.0763]				
No Bl prez (pr.)				0.0579 [0.0815]	-0.0124 [0.0411]	-0.0146 [0.0404]
South x No Bl prez (pr.)				0.383*** [0.133]	0.380*** [0.106]	0.378*** [0.102]
No Bl prez (pr.) x Aft				-0.0707 [0.0581]	-0.0302 [0.0433]	-0.0326 [0.0438]
South x No Bl prez (pr.) x Aft				-0.743*** [0.147]	-0.666*** [0.133]	-0.613*** [0.125]
Mean, dept. var	0.458	0.458	0.457	0.457	0.457	0.457
Fixed sample?	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Prediction vars:						
Background	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	Yes	Yes
Other views	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	Yes	Yes
Age interactions	N/A	N/A	N/A	No	No	Yes
R-sq for prediction				0.189	0.290	0.296
SEs bootstrapped?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	17642	17642	17130	17130	17130	17130

Notes: Survey date and state fixed effects in all regressions. The first two columns replicate cols. (3) and (4) of Table 1 but truncate the post-period at 1969. Col. (3) replicates (2) but drops any observation missing a prediction variable used in cols. (4)-(6). We predict *No Bl prez (pr.)* using the *pre-period* sample and allowing separate predictions for the South and non-South, and then projecting the prediction model onto the post-period. Results are shown using various sets of predictors: “background” (gender, age in deciles, education, city-size, occupation for household head, household size, and religion), “other views” (on hypothetical Jewish or Catholic presidents), and “age interactions” (interacting occupation and education categories with a dummy for being above age 40). As (continuous) predictions are imperfect predictors of the binary “black president” question, they are biased toward the “black president” mean and thus have substantially (about two-thirds) less variance than do the original (binary) variable and thus regression coefficients using predicted answers to the black president question are scaled differently than coefficients using actual answers. Bootstrapped standard errors (clustered by state) based on 200 repetitions.

* $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.5: Robustness of main triple-interaction results to estimating model, control group and outcome variable

	Dependent variable: Respondent identifies as a....											
	Democrat										Republican	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
South x Aft (d)	-0.165** [0.0643]	0.00267 [0.0607]	-0.178** [0.0697]	-0.00226 [0.0739]	-0.153** [0.0682]	-0.0162 [0.0615]	-0.162** [0.0687]	0.00183 [0.0634]	-0.148* [0.0727]	0.0690 [0.0797]	0.0779** [0.0312]	0.00642 [0.0733]
No Bl prez (d)		0.00686 [0.0164]		-0.0239 [0.0344]		0.0469 [0.0400]		0.0161 [0.0220]		-0.0757 [0.0696]		0.0483*** [0.0151]
South x No Bl prez (d)		0.195*** [0.0587]		0.211*** [0.0696]		0.136* [0.0755]		0.180*** [0.0599]		0.250** [0.0909]		-0.131** [0.0574]
No Bl prez x Aft (d)		-0.0129 [0.0249]		0.0203 [0.0691]		-0.0541 [0.0320]		-0.0317 [0.0197]		0.0862* [0.0443]		0.0118 [0.0238]
South x No Bl prez x Aft (d)		-0.185*** [0.0682]		-0.211* [0.107]		-0.131 [0.0812]		-0.177** [0.0723]		-0.262*** [0.0886]		0.0616 [0.0787]
Mean, dept. var.	0.452	0.452	0.478	0.478	0.504	0.504	0.459	0.459	0.565	0.565	0.296	0.296
Model	Probit	Probit	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS	OLS
Regions used as control group	All	All	NE	NE	West	West	MW	MW	South	South	All	All
Observations	20192	20192	9660	9660	7651	7651	10639	10639	5511	5511	20192	20192

Notes: These specifications replicate cols. (3) and (4) of Table 1 (i.e., survey date and state fixed are included; the sample period starts in 1958, with 1963 as the first year of the ‘after’ period, and continues through 1980). Note that probit specifications cannot be compared directly to linear probability results. Control groups in cols. (3) through (10) are based on U.S. Census definition of region (‘NE’ being Northeast, ‘MW’ being the Midwest, and ‘South’ in this case referring to the *Census* definition of the South, so the control group are those states of the peripheral South counted as Southern *in the Census*, but were not part of the Confederacy). Standard errors clustered by state in brackets. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.6: Main results, clustering by survey date (note: observations *not* weighted)

	Dep't variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
South	0.338*** [0.0810]	0.168* [0.0872]						
South x Aft	-0.137** [0.0537]	0.0505 [0.0747]	-0.139*** [0.0440]	0.0326 [0.0652]	-0.140*** [0.0500]	0.0349 [0.0654]	-0.161*** [0.0508]	-0.00640 [0.0619]
No Bl prez		-0.000529 [0.0142]		-0.0126 [0.0165]		0.000305 [0.0143]		0.00323 [0.0133]
South x No Bl prez		0.205*** [0.0291]		0.188*** [0.0246]		0.207*** [0.0280]		0.193*** [0.0245]
No Bl prez x Aft		0.000381 [0.0279]		-0.00445 [0.0259]		0.000746 [0.0218]		-0.00827 [0.0169]
South x No Bl prez x Aft		-0.221*** [0.0504]		-0.206*** [0.0506]		-0.200*** [0.0383]		-0.160*** [0.0293]
State FE?	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls?	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	No
Max year	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	1980	2000	2000
GSS?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	20192	20192	19787	19787	25235	25235	41588	41588

Notes: Survey date and state fixed effects in all regressions. The regressions reported here are, in order, based on cols. (3) to (8) and cols. (10) to (11) of Table 1, with two differences. First, standard errors are clustered by survey date instead of state (and because of the fewer number of survey dates we bootstrap standard errors). Second, we do not use survey weights (Stata's bootstrap command does not allow them). * $p < .1$, ** $p < .05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.7: Whites' approval of Kennedy as a function of *NYT* Civil Rights articles, 1961 to 1963 (additional regressions)

	Dependent variable equal to...						
	Approval						Dem ID
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
South x (JFK + Civil Rights)	-0.0591*** [0.00441]	-0.0653*** [0.00220]	-21.66*** [3.050]	-0.0549*** [0.00417]	-0.0579*** [0.00401]	-0.0593*** [0.00424]	-0.0113** [0.00474]
South x Civil Rights				-0.0121** [0.00499]			
South x (Civil Rights + MLK)					-0.132 [0.0958]		
South x (Civil Rights + Republican)						-0.00780 [0.0159]	
Mean, dept. var.	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.469
Southern time trend	No	Yes	No	No	No	No	No
Article count measurement	Absolute	Absolute	Relative	Absolute	Absolute	Absolute	Absolute
Observations	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365	80805

Notes: This table provides robustness checks of the results in Table 2. Data from Gallup and *NYT* searches (see Section 5.2 for more detail). To provide a baseline, col. (1) replicates col. (2) of Table 2 (that is, we include state and survey date fixed effects as well as a vector of *South* times placebo search interactions (but do not report these coefficients in the interest of space). All remaining specifications include these controls as well. In col. (2) we add a *South*-specific linear time trend. In col. (3), instead of using the absolute number of *NYT* articles mentioning “Civil Rights” (or placebo topics) during the survey window, we divide this absolute number by the total number of *NYT* articles (on any subject) during the window (note that coefficient units are no longer comparable). In col. (4) we return to our absolute measures of articles, but now include as a control *South* × *NYT* articles mentioning “Civil Rights,” *regardless of whether they also mention Kennedy*. A similar check is performed in col. (5), where we add to the col. (1) specification the interaction between *South* and *NYT* articles that mention “Civil Rights” and “Martin Luther King.” Col. (6) is identical, but instead includes the interaction between *South* and *NYT* articles that mention “Civil Rights” and “Republican.” Finally, col. (7) is identical to col. (1) but an indicator variable for whether the Gallup respondent identifies as a Democrat is the outcome variable. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.8: Do racially conservative views predict pre-period policy preferences in the South v. elsewhere?

Dependent variable	Expl. var: No fair jobs/housing		Expl. var: No school integration	
	South x Continuous	South x Binary	South x Continuous	South x Binary
Govt should guarantee jobs	0.0816	0.0207	0.0573	0.0964
Agree that govt sd. guarantee jobs	0.0231	0.0209	0.0223	0.0681
Govt sd *not* cut taxes if causes cuts elsewhere	-0.0754	-0.175	-0.0126	0.0377
Agree govt sd. *not* cut taxes...	-0.0574**	-0.128**	0.00408	0.0638
Govt sd help ppl get medical care at low cost	-0.0249	-0.0387	0.0531	0.132
Agree govt sd help with medical care	-0.0277*	-0.0349	0.0132	0.0676
Govt sd limit pol. influ. of big business	0.151**	0.233	0.0106	0.159
Agree govt sd. limit infl. of business	0.0286	0.0278	0.0227	0.116*
Govt sd. *not* limit pol. influ. of unions	-0.130*	-0.245	0.0112	0.170
Agree govt sd. *not* limit infl. of unions	-0.0288	-0.0437	0.0148	0.111**
Govt sd *not* leave utilities, housing to priv. biz.	0.0337	0.0497	0.0478	0.206
Agree that govt sd *not* leave...to priv biz.	0.00529	0.0279	0.0245	0.1000*
Fed govt sd help finance local school construction	-0.00737	-0.00673	0.0993*	0.327*
Agree fed govt sd help finance schools	-0.00746	-0.0101	0.0222	0.0951
Govt cannot fire suspected communists	-0.0987	-0.239	0.00259	-0.0860
Agree govt cannot fire susp. communists	-0.0307	-0.0710	0.000960	0.0270
Keep soldiers abroad to help countries fight comm.	-0.0385	0.00981	0.0419	0.0780
Agree we sd keep soldiers abroad...	-0.0264*	-0.00937	0.00622	0.00782
Sd give aid to poor countries even if cant pay back	-0.0286	-0.0602	-0.00609	-0.0963
Agree we sd give aid to poor countries...	-0.00814	0.00429	0.0189	0.0896
Give for. aid even if country not anti-communist	-0.0521	-0.177	0.0773	0.204
Agree give for. aid even if country...	-0.0157	-0.0480	0.0376**	0.135**
Best to get tough with commun. countries	0.164**	0.296	0.0556	0.214
Agree best to get tough...	0.0518**	0.165**	0.0342*	0.134**

Notes: We estimate 96 regressions of the form $y_{is} = \beta_1 South_s \times X_i + \beta_2 X_i + \eta_s + e_{is}$, where y is the policy preference listed in each row, X is the racial attitude question listed in the columns, $South$ is a dummy for residence in the South, and η_s are state fixed effects. Each entry in the table is the estimate for β_1 . “No fair jobs/housing” is short-hand for being *against* the idea that the government should enforce fair treatment for negroes in jobs and housing, and is measured both continuously and as a binary (agree/disagree) variable. “No school integration” is short-hand for agreeing that the federal government should stay out of the question of whether white and colored children attend the same schools. Average N for the 96 regressions is 1459 (min. N is 1175, max. N is 1601).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.9: Does controlling for economically liberal preferences explain white Southern dealignment?

	Dep't var: Identifies as a Democrat					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
After	-0.160*** [0.0436]	-0.134*** [0.0420]	-0.162*** [0.0379]			0.0414* [0.0218]
Economically liberal		0.0717*** [0.0164]	0.0278 [0.0429]		0.159*** [0.0165]	0.170*** [0.0242]
After x Econ. lib.			0.0674 [0.0524]			0.0213 [0.0197]
South x After				-0.158*** [0.0450]	-0.154*** [0.0460]	-0.216*** [0.0438]
South x Econ. lib.						-0.151*** [0.0437]
South x After x Econ. lib.						0.0522 [0.0478]
Dept. var. mean	0.604	0.604	0.604	0.506	0.506	0.506
Regions in sample	South	South	South	All	All	All
Year FE?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
State FE?	No	No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	3495	3495	3495	15052	15052	15052

Notes: Data are from 1952-1980 cumulative ANES. "Economically liberal" is based on an ANES question about whether the government should provide everyone who seeks to work a job and (in some years) a basic standard of living. Besides changes in wording regarding the content of the question, the manner in which the question is asked also changes over time. In some years respondents can only disagree or agree, in some years strong agreement or disagreement is offered as an option and in still other years respondents can place themselves on a 1-7 scale. We classify someone as economically liberal if they agree or strongly agree or place themselves on the liberal side of the 1-7 scale (so the middle option of 'four' would thus be coded as zero).

* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.10: Did richer, non-rural whites drive Southern dealignment (1952-1980)?

	Dept. variable: Respondent identifies as a Democrat							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Rich x South x Aft	-0.0187 [0.0478]	-0.0968 [0.0709]						
Rich x South x Year			-0.00123 [0.00217]	-0.00496 [0.00351]				
Nonrural x South x Aft					0.0299 [0.0805]	-0.104 [0.0746]		
Nonrural x South x Year							0.00213 [0.00403]	-0.00273 [0.00397]
South x After	-0.138*** [0.0496]	-0.106 [0.0648]			-0.157*** [0.0535]	-0.110* [0.0623]		
South x Year			-0.923*** [0.196]	-0.694** [0.276]			-1.022*** [0.241]	-0.730** [0.283]
Mean, dept. var.	0.416	0.442	0.416	0.442	0.413	0.439	0.413	0.439
Restricted sample?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	19543	13523	19543	13523	20594	14180	20594	14180

Notes: Data from ANES. State, year FE and lower-order terms of interactions included in all regressions. “Rich” defined as being in top third of U.S. household income distribution. “Nonrural” defined as living in a city or suburb. “Restricted samples” excludes those younger than 21 years in 1963 and current Southern residents who were not born in the South. See Table 5 for more detail. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.11: Explanatory power of income and urbanicity in explaining white Southern dealignment (ANES, Presidential elections, 1952-1980)

	Dep't variable: Voted for Democratic presidential candidate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A (Diff-in-diff spec.)						
South x After	-0.132** [0.0547]	-0.135** [0.0550]	-0.145*** [0.0554]	-0.141** [0.0646]	-0.158*** [0.0611]	-0.169** [0.0734]
Panel B (Diff. trend spec.)						
South x (Year/100)	-0.452* [0.245]	-0.455* [0.244]	-0.508** [0.244]	-0.437 [0.306]	-0.628** [0.317]	-0.629 [0.404]
Dept. var mean	0.420	0.420	0.420	0.420	0.419	0.419
Income FE?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
City-size FE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Interactions?	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Restricted sample?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	8286	8286	8286	8286	6439	6439

Notes: Identical analysis to Table 5 except for outcome variable. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.12: Explanatory power of income and urbanicity in explaining white Southern dealignment (ANES, Senate elections, 1952-1980)

	Dep't variable: Voted for Democratic Senate candidate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A (Diff-in-diff spec.)						
South x After	-0.279*** [0.0659]	-0.282*** [0.0618]	-0.292*** [0.0630]	-0.306*** [0.0612]	-0.245*** [0.0641]	-0.264*** [0.0542]
Panel B (Diff. trend spec.)						
South x (Year/100)	-1.794*** [0.290]	-1.790*** [0.280]	-1.853*** [0.271]	-1.952*** [0.299]	-1.713*** [0.325]	-1.821*** [0.328]
Dept. var mean	0.525	0.525	0.525	0.525	0.517	0.517
Income FE?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
City-size FE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Interactions?	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Restricted sample?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	7460	7460	7460	7460	5860	5860

Notes: Identical analysis to Table 5 except for outcome variable. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.13: Explanatory power of income and urbanicity in explaining white Southern dealignment (ANES, House elections, 1952-1980)

	Dep't variable: Voted for Democratic House candidate					
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Panel A (Diff-in-diff spec.)						
South x After	-0.166*** [0.0463]	-0.169*** [0.0457]	-0.178*** [0.0488]	-0.174*** [0.0494]	-0.148*** [0.0551]	-0.154** [0.0605]
Panel B (Diff. trend spec.)						
South x (Year/100)	-1.026*** [0.269]	-1.023*** [0.273]	-1.079*** [0.286]	-0.967*** [0.293]	-0.885*** [0.276]	-0.821*** [0.299]
Dept. var mean	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.540	0.532	0.532
Income FE?	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
City-size FE?	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Interactions?	No	No	No	Yes	No	Yes
Restricted sample?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Observations	11244	11244	11244	11244	8349	8349

Notes: Identical analysis to Table 5 except for outcome variable. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.14: Do conservative racial views predict defection from Democratic party (Southern whites, 1952 ANES)?

Dep't var. (N , mean)	Sample restrictions	Explanatory vars.: Preferred gov't role in employment discrimination					
		Wants anti-Negro employment laws		Anti-Negro laws or no gov't role		Anti-Negro laws or no <i>Fed.</i> gov't role	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switched from Democrats ($N=403$, $\mu = .0471$)	None	0.0827* [0.0433] ($\mu=0.0814$)	0.0854* [0.0470] ($\mu=0.0814$)	0.0572** [0.0252] ($\mu=0.371$)	0.0572** [0.0282] ($\mu=0.371$)	0.0473* [0.0252] ($\mu=0.590$)	0.0422 [0.0277] ($\mu=0.590$)
Switched from Democrats ($N=298$, $\mu = .0637$)	Ex. never-Dems	0.0942* [0.0538] ($\mu=0.0813$)	0.0979* [0.0590] ($\mu=0.0813$)	0.0727** [0.0313] ($\mu=0.354$)	0.0734** [0.0357] ($\mu=0.354$)	0.0571* [0.0312] ($\mu=0.585$)	0.0607* [0.0347] ($\mu=0.585$)
Republican or independent ($N=403$, $\mu = .3076$)	Parents were Dems	0.0488 [0.0910] ($\mu=0.0814$)	0.0610 [0.0932] ($\mu=0.0814$)	0.136*** [0.0525] ($\mu=0.371$)	0.112** [0.0556] ($\mu=0.371$)	0.0986* [0.0528] ($\mu=0.590$)	0.103* [0.0544] ($\mu=0.590$)
Will vote for Eisenhower ($N=188$, $\mu = .3085$)	Current Dem	-0.251 [0.165] ($\mu=0.0520$)	-0.224 [0.187] ($\mu=0.0520$)	-0.0412 [0.0779] ($\mu=0.341$)	-0.0850 [0.0891] ($\mu=0.341$)	0.0126 [0.0780] ($\mu=0.601$)	-0.0140 [0.0886] ($\mu=0.601$)
Controls?		No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Each entry represents the results from a separate regression of the form $Defection_{is} = \beta Racial\ views_i + \eta_s + \gamma X_i + e_{is}$, where *Defection* takes the various forms of leaving or voting against the Democratic party (listed in the row titles), *Racial views* (listed in column titles) are various views on government's proper role in addressing anti-Negro employment discrimination, η_s are state fixed effects, and X are controls (which we vary to probe robustness). For each regression we report the estimate and standard error of β and the mean μ of *Racial views*. The explanatory variable for cols. (1) and (2) is coded as one iff the respondent favors government action to *enforce* anti-Negro employment discrimination; the dependent var. for cols. (3) and (4) is the same except "government (federal or state) should stay out entirely" is also coded as one; the dependent var. for cols. (5) and (6) is the same as (3) and (4) except "national gov't should stay out; state gov't can take action" is also coded as one. Even-numbered cols. include fixed effects for gender as well as each education, urbanicity, income and age category used in the ANES. We code missing observations for these controls as a separate category, so the samples within each pair of columns (and in fact across an entire row) are identical. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.15: Do conservative racial views predict defection from Democratic party (non-Southern whites, 1952 ANES)?

Dep't var. (<i>N</i> , mean)	Sample restrictions	Explanatory vars.: Preferred gov't role in employment discrimination					
		Wants anti-Negro employment laws		Anti-Negro laws or no gov't role		Anti-Negro laws or no <i>Fed.</i> gov't role	
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Switched from Democrats (<i>N</i> =1364, $\mu = .1422$)	None	-0.0139 [0.0444] ($\mu = 0.0523$)	-0.000491 [0.0453] ($\mu = 0.0523$)	0.00864 [0.0231] ($\mu = 0.247$)	-0.00384 [0.0235] ($\mu = 0.247$)	0.0220 [0.0204] ($\mu = 0.403$)	0.00134 [0.0210] ($\mu = 0.403$)
Switched from Democrats (<i>N</i> =745, $\mu = .2604$)	Ex. never-Dems	0.00897 [0.0809] ($\mu = 0.0462$)	0.0624 [0.0807] ($\mu = 0.0462$)	0.0313 [0.0406] ($\mu = 0.234$)	0.0000418 [0.0406] ($\mu = 0.234$)	0.0760** [0.0356] ($\mu = 0.367$)	0.0549 [0.0357] ($\mu = 0.367$)
Republican or independent (<i>N</i> =1364, $\mu = .5960$)	Parents were Dems	0.0438 [0.0614] ($\mu = 0.0523$)	0.0561 [0.0606] ($\mu = 0.0523$)	0.0397 [0.0320] ($\mu = 0.247$)	0.0201 [0.0314] ($\mu = 0.247$)	0.0944*** [0.0281] ($\mu = 0.403$)	0.0692** [0.0280] ($\mu = 0.403$)
Will vote for Eisenhower (<i>N</i> =470, $\mu = .1638$)	Current Dem	0.0293 [0.0882] ($\mu = 0.0460$)	0.0864 [0.0921] ($\mu = 0.0460$)	-0.0540 [0.0443] ($\mu = 0.225$)	-0.0720 [0.0475] ($\mu = 0.225$)	0.0425 [0.0393] ($\mu = 0.338$)	0.0286 [0.0419] ($\mu = 0.338$)
Controls?		No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Identical to Appendix Table A.14 except that non-Southern instead of Southern whites are sampled. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.16: Does income predict defection from Democratic party in early 1950s (1952 ANES)?

Dep't variable	Sample restrictions	South		Non-South	
		Top half inc. dist.	Income (categorical)	Top half inc. dist.	Income (categorical)
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Switched from Dem	None	0.0249 [0.0259]	0.00961* [0.00564]	0.0342* [0.0206]	0.00717 [0.00500]
Switched	Ex. never-Dems	0.0315 [0.0318]	0.0112 [0.00711]	0.0665* [0.0350]	0.00869 [0.00897]
Republican or Independent	Parents were Dems	0.0275 [0.0550]	-0.00215 [0.0120]	0.0515* [0.0285]	-0.00126 [0.00692]
Will vote for Ike	Current Dem	0.123 [0.0762]	0.0335* [0.0182]	0.000286 [0.0378]	0.00799 [0.0103]
Controls?		No	No	No	No

Notes: Each entry represents the results from a separate regression of the form $Defection_{is} = \beta Income_i + \eta_s + \gamma X_i + e_{is}$, where $Defection$ takes the various forms of leaving or voting against the Democratic party (listed in the row titles). Income is parameterized in two ways (listed in column titles). We use either a linear measure taking the midpoints of the nine categories used in the 1952 ANES (and 0.75 and 1.25 times the lowest and highest category) or a binary variable for being in the top half of the distribution. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix Table A.17: White approval of Eisenhower as a function of Civil Rights coverage

	Search terms employed: “President Eisenhower” and...					
	“Civil rights”		Civil rights terms		“Negro”	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Article count	-0.0168 [0.0128]		-0.0187*** [0.00667]		-0.0145 [0.0129]	
South x Article count	-0.0225 [0.0142]	-0.0378*** [0.0140]	-0.0282** [0.0113]	-0.0293*** [0.00774]	-0.0586** [0.0233]	-0.0525*** [0.0148]
South x Placebo: Foreign Policy, War		0.0172*** [0.00568]		0.0167*** [0.00481]		0.0132*** [0.00449]
South x Placebo: Crime, Drugs		0.0520 [0.0376]		0.0419 [0.0308]		0.0321 [0.0325]
South x Placebo: USSR		-0.0316*** [0.00865]		-0.0277*** [0.00719]		-0.0224*** [0.00578]
South x Placebo: Cuba, Castro		-0.00397 [0.00730]		-0.00971 [0.00766]		-0.00743 [0.00574]
South x Placebo: Communism, Socialism		-0.00869 [0.00934]		-0.00483 [0.00782]		-0.00460 [0.00679]
South x Placebo: Taxes, Budget		0.00134 [0.00701]		-0.00370 [0.00760]		-0.00719 [0.00634]
South x Placebo: Employment		-0.00289 [0.00980]		0.00292 [0.0102]		-0.00772 [0.00981]
South x Placebo: Social Security		0.00682 [0.0136]		0.00235 [0.0125]		0.00650 [0.0118]
South x Placebo: Agriculture		0.000297 [0.0104]		0.00302 [0.00982]		0.00153 [0.00897]
South x Placebo: Korea		0.0111 [0.00940]		0.00768 [0.00833]		0.0180** [0.00777]
South x Placebo: Highways		0.0810* [0.0432]		0.0698* [0.0373]		0.0848** [0.0336]
Dept. var. mean	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651	0.651
Survey date FE?	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Observations	83963	83963	83963	83963	83963	83963

Notes: Data are from Gallup surveys during Eisenhower administration (Jan 1953-Jan 1961). State fixed effects included in all regressions. The “Civil Rights” variable is the number of *NYT* articles containing “President Eisenhower” and “civil rights” anywhere in the article. “Civil Rights Terms” is identical except articles containing “President Eisenhower” and any of a list of Civil Rights terms (“civil rights,” “integration,” “segregated,” etc) are counted. “Negro” is the number of articles containing “President Eisenhower” and “negro.” We average this daily count over the seven day period whose midpoint includes the midpoint of the time (typically six days) the survey is in the field. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix B. Data appendix

Our main source of data comes from Gallup surveys downloaded from the Roper Center:

<http://ropercenter.cornell.edu/ipoll-database/>.

Access is free to members of subscribing institutions. For some datasets, only cross-tabulations are given. For most others, however, codebooks and raw data are provided.

Gallup surveys were either recorded originally in (1) *ascii* or (2) *binary* and then *converted to ascii* by Roper. Roper provides codebooks from which we created dictionary files to read the *ascii* .dat files into Stata. The codebooks warn that the .dat files converted from *binary* into *ascii* may have errors (e.g, stray characters that are hard to decipher).

Our main analysis centers around the Gallup survey question asking whether a respondent would be willing to vote for a qualified black candidate nominated by their party. *All Gallup surveys that ask this question were originally recorded in ascii and thus we do not have to worry about stray errors arising in the conversion process.* As such, *our main results in Table 1 and Figure 5 do not depend on whether one decides to use only those surveys originally recorded in ascii or to also include the surveys originally recorded in binary.*

We make the choice in this paper to only include datasets originally recorded in *ascii*, a choice that affects other figures in the paper. We make this choice for a few reasons. First, we have greater confidence in the data quality from the surveys originally recorded in *ascii*. Second, as we typically had many non-binary files also available, it would seem unlikely that adding binary files would have changed the results. Third and related, the time cost of reading in binary files (because one needs to hand-check for stray characters) would not seem to have a sufficiently high return.

The figures for which this decision leads us to exclude datasets because they were recorded in *binary* are Figure 1, Figure 6, Figure 7, Figure A.13 and Figure 8. Even though we only use data originally recorded in *ascii* in these figures, each figure displays very high-frequency and thick data and thus would be unlikely to change if we added the binary files.

The *ascii* versus *binary* standard precludes us from examining presidential approval of Truman as we do in Figure 6 and Appendix A.13 for Kennedy and Eisenhower, respectively. We could not look at presidential approval because there are no usable (non-binary) Gallup surveys on *ipoll* that include presidential approval between December 1947 and September 1948, a period capturing the peak of Truman’s Civil Rights engagement.

Note that for Figure 1 we also limit the number of files from 1980-2004. After 1980 Gallup surveys become more frequent and we choose just one per quarter to limit the burden of reading-in raw data files and because the post-1980 period is not our focus.

Appendix C. Details on media searches

C.1 NYT searches (during Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations)

The full code (in *R*) used to generate the article counts is available upon request. Table C.1 provides the exact search terms used for each of the Civil Rights searches as well as the searches for “placebo issues” during Kennedy’s administration (parallel information for

searches during the other administrations is available upon request). Searches were performed for each date of a given administration.

C.2 Research assistant article coding (Kennedy administration only)

Each RA received a spreadsheet that included the title of the article and its link (which they read via the *NYT* TimesMachine option). Both RAs were unaware of our hypothesis of a Spring 1963 turning point in Kennedy’s position on Civil Rights. The instructions were given via email as follows (note that, sadly, typos indeed appear in the original):

Please skim each article. We are interested in your assessment of the article after reading the headline, first few paragraphs, and skimming the rest.

Please categorize each article into one of the following four categories:

1. False hit (main subject of article is NOT civil rights).
2. Pro civil-rights (article suggests that Kennedy administration or Democrats more generally are pushing toward greater racial equality, that Southerners are unhappy about JFK/Dem stance on this issue, that Southerners worry that JFK/Dems are about to push forward on this issue, etc.)
3. Anti civil-rights (article suggests that Kennedy administration or Democrats are holding the status quo on the issue of racial equality, that Southerners are NOT worried or are even pleased about JFK/Dems on this issue relative to Republicans, etc.)
4. Mixed (article suggests that JFK/Dem efforts on issue of racial equality are mixed or unclear)

Note that there many articles will probably offer at east some “on the one hand....on the other” analysis, but when possible try to decide if it is general more “pro” or “anti” (though certainly if you feel it is truly mixed, you should categorize it as such).

Excel instructions:

1. For “false hit” enter “F”
2. For “pro civil rights” enter “P”
3. For “anti civil rights” enter “A”
4. For “mixed” enter “M”

Thank you!

A basic summary of the RAs’ coding outcomes is presented in Table C.2. In the regressions, we always average their counts so that regression coefficients are comparable to those without RA hand-coding. That is, for each day j of our sample period, we generate the variables $articles_j^c = \frac{RA1_j^c + RA2_j^c}{2}$, the total number of articles from day j that the first RA

put in category c plus the total number that the second RA put in category c , divided by two.

After their task was complete, we asked the RAs for feedback on how they went about their task. Our biggest ex-post regret is that we did not make clearer that articles *not literally about Civil Rights but that nonetheless would have made racially conservative Southerners worried about Kennedy’s loyalty* should have been coded as “pro” Civil Rights and instead were coded as false hits (not about Civil Rights). For example, RA1 wrote: “I was moderately literal in interpreting the instructions—in the case of a black artist visiting [the White House] I probably would have marked that as false [hit] unless the article said something like ‘this is a step forward re: civil rights.’ ” As such, it is not surprising that Southern whites react negatively to articles that our RAs coded as false hits (Appendix Table C.3).

Appendix Table C.1: Details on *NYT* article searches

Category	Search terms
“Civil Rights” (narrow)	“Civil Rights”
Civil Rights terms (broad)	“civil rights,” “segregation,” “segregate,” “segregated,” “integration,” “integrate,” “integrated”
Negro	“Negro”
Foreign Policy, War	“war,” “peace,” “atomic,” “security,” “defense,” “foreign policy,” “international relations,” “international tensions”
Crime, Drugs	“crime,” “juvenile delinquency,” “narcotics”
USSR	“russia,” “soviet,” “soviets,” “russian,” “ussr”
Cuba, Castro	“cuban,” “cuba,” “castro”
Communism, Socialism	“communism,” “socialism,” “communist,” “socialist”
Taxes, Budget	“tax,” “taxes,” “budget”
Employment	“Employment,” “recession,” “unemployment,” “cost of living,” “wages,” “inflation”
Social Security	“Social security,” “social services,” “welfare,” “old age”
Agriculture	“farm,” “agriculture,” “agricultural”

For each search, “President” and “Kennedy” was also appended. Full code available upon request. Searches are not case-sensitive.

Appendix Table C.2: Statistics from RA hand-coding of *NYT* article content

	Daily Average (RA1)	Daily Average (RA2)	Total
Anti	0.0821	0.218	0.150
False positive	1.121	1.238	1.179
Mixed	0.165	0.105	0.135
Pro	0.786	0.593	0.690

Notes: Results from RA hand-coding of 2,290 articles over the 1,036 days of the Kennedy administration (roughly 2.15 per day).

Appendix Table C.3: Predicting approval of JFK using RA's article codes

	RA1		RA2		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Anti	-0.103 [0.0797]	-0.103 [0.0811]	0.0316 [0.0487]	0.0626 [0.0538]	-0.0333 [0.0699]
False Positive	-0.0358* [0.0200]	-0.0708*** [0.00945]	-0.0369** [0.0144]	-0.0435*** [0.0133]	-0.0734*** [0.0171]
Mixed	0.0426 [0.0608]	0.0823 [0.0506]	-0.00777 [0.0379]	-0.0546 [0.0595]	0.000518 [0.0520]
Pro	-0.00988 [0.00761]	-0.00782 [0.00674]	-0.00734 [0.00985]	-0.00610 [0.0123]	0.00800 [0.0203]
South × Anti	0.0519 [0.109]	0.0288 [0.0959]	0.147** [0.0633]	0.165** [0.0753]	0.0182 [0.123]
South × False Positive	-0.0480** [0.0198]	-0.0901*** [0.0219]	-0.0687*** [0.0166]	-0.0726*** [0.0133]	-0.0681** [0.0325]
South × Mixed	0.138* [0.0730]	0.250*** [0.0669]	0.0894 [0.0711]	0.110 [0.0732]	-0.107 [0.131]
South × Pro	-0.0836*** [0.00693]	-0.100*** [0.00635]	-0.109*** [0.0127]	-0.150*** [0.0137]	-0.0766** [0.0347]
Observations	81365	81365	81365	81365	81365
Search	Civil Rights	Civil Rights	Civil Rights	Civil Rights	Negro
Mean	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673	0.673

Notes: Each RA classified an article as: suggesting that Kennedy was against Civil Rights (“anti”), unrelated to Civil Rights (“false hit”), suggesting that Kennedy was giving mixed signals on Civil Rights (“mixed”) or that Kennedy was moving in favor of Civil Rights (“pro”). RA1 had already been informed of the hypothesis by the time that we decided to classify all articles from the “Negro” search, so only RA2 performed that classification. Regressions use all Gallup surveys that contain presidential approval question between January 1961 and November 1963. Standard errors clustered by survey date. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$