{"id":29438,"date":"2024-11-13T09:54:39","date_gmt":"2024-11-13T14:54:39","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/?p=29438"},"modified":"2024-11-13T09:54:39","modified_gmt":"2024-11-13T14:54:39","slug":"gdp-center-round-up-29th-united-nations-climate-change-conference-cop29","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/2024\/11\/13\/gdp-center-round-up-29th-united-nations-climate-change-conference-cop29\/","title":{"rendered":"GDP Center Round-Up: 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29)"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Baku, Azerbaijan. Photo by Lloyd Alozie via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

By Tim Hirschel-Burns<\/a><\/p>\n

The 29th<\/sup> United Nations Climate Change Conference<\/a> (COP29), taking place from November 11-29, 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan, has been dubbed the \u201cFinance COP\u201d and is expected to deliver a new climate finance goal, known in COP jargon as the New Collective Quantified Goal<\/a> (NCQG).<\/p>\n

This NCQG will succeed the climate finance goal set in 2009, which committed developed countries to providing developing countries with $100 billion per year in climate finance by 2020. The NCQG will have to improve upon this goal, which was not only plagued by substantial ambiguities<\/a> but developed countries also failed to meet<\/a> it on time. Even as negotiators gather in Baku, however, major issues remain to be\u00a0<\/span>negotiated<\/a>, with an uncertain future of US commitment to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) process further complicating matters.<\/span><\/p>\n

The size of this new climate finance goal is the biggest such issue\u2014developing countries\u2019 climate investment needs are in the trillions<\/a> per year, and the real value of the goal will depend significantly on how it counts grants and loans based on their level of concessionality\u2014while developed countries are also pushing for the \u201ccontributor base\u201d to expand to include countries like China. Whatever happens, much of the finance under the goal will come from sources outside the UNFCCC, like multilateral development banks<\/a> (MDBs), and negotiators should be prepared to account for this largely untapped potential.<\/span><\/p>\n

The NCQG will have major implications for Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), the national emissions reduction plans that sit at the core of the Paris Agreement. The new round<\/a> of five-year plans are due between November and February, and developing countries will be far less likely to submit ambitious NDCs if they cannot count on financial support via the NCQG.<\/p>\n

Other noteworthy issues on the agenda<\/a> for COP29 include clarifying rules on carbon markets, transparency<\/a> in climate reporting, and the Loss and Damage Fund, which is nearly operational but severely lacking<\/a> in funding.<\/p>\n

The stakes for COP29 are high: Failure to agree ambitious outcomes at COP29 would mark a major blow for a global climate regime already marred by distrust between developed and developing countries as well as climate action that is lagging<\/a> behind the pace needed to achieve the Paris Agreement. But if COP29 produces a fit-for-purpose NCQG matched by meaningful delivery, it could catalyze strong NDCs, a successful outcome at the highly-anticipated COP30, and the rapid and just emissions reductions needed by 2030.<\/p>\n

Below, see a summary of the latest research on the role of MDBs in the NCQG, reforms for a climate-transformed International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s global energy finance and more:<\/p>\n

\n
A Golden Opportunity: Selling a Small Share of the IMF\u2019s Gold Reserves to Replenish the Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust<\/a><\/h5>\n
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International Monetary Fund Headquarters, Washington, DC. Photo by Mark Van Scyoc via Shutterstock.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The IMF holds 90.5 million ounces of gold on its balance sheet, a legacy from its founding in 1944 when member countries paid their quotas in gold. This idle gold is sitting on the IMF\u2019s balance sheet at a historical cost of $45 per ounce, compared to $2,600 per ounce on global markets.<\/p>\n

Meanwhile, the Fund\u2019s Catastrophe Containment and Relief Trust (CCRT), which provides grants to eligible countries to help cover debt service payments after a natural disaster, is in desperate need of replenishment and reform. Currently, only 30 members qualify for CCRT access, while the cash balance hovers at approximately just $103 million.<\/p>\n

A\u00a0<\/span>new policy brief\u00a0by\u00a0<\/span>Marina Zucker-Marques<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>and\u00a0<\/span>Rishikesh Ram Bhandary<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>explores how CCRT access could be expanded and replenished using the proceeds of an IMF gold sale to meet the needs of climate-vulnerable developing countries.\u00a0The authors find that by selling just 4 percent of its gold, the IMF could provide debt relief for 86 low-income and climate-vulnerable countries. Read the policy brief.<\/strong><\/em><\/a><\/p>\n

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\u2018Small\u2019 Belt, \u2018Beautiful\u2019 Road: China\u2019s Cautious Return to Global Energy Finance<\/a><\/h5>\n
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Antananarivo, Madagascar. Photo by Brent Ninaber via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

A new update to the<\/span>\u00a0<\/span>China\u2019s Global Energy Finance (CGEF) Database<\/b><\/a>, managed by the GDP Center, estimates that from 2000-2023, China\u2019s two development finance institutions (DFIs)\u2014the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (CHEXIM)\u2014provided 367 loans, totaling $209 billion to 118 public borrowers in 68 <\/span>countries<\/span>\u00a0for energy projects around the world.<\/span><\/p>\n

For the year 2023, the CGEF Database recorded three new energy-related loan commitments from CHEXIM, totaling $502 million, to three African government borrowers \u2013 Madagascar, Burkina Faso and Uganda \u2013 marking a cautious comeback after a one-year hiatus. Yet, the amount committed in 2023 is only 5 percent of the average annual lending total amount ($10 billion) for 2000-2022.<\/span><\/p>\n

A\u00a0<\/span>new policy brief\u00a0by\u00a0<\/span>Jiaqi Lu<\/span><\/a>,\u00a0<\/span>Diego Morro<\/span><\/a>, Shengheng Li and Thang Ha analyzes the state of China\u2019s global energy finance from 2000-2023. Their findings suggest that the next phase of China\u2019s overseas energy finance will likely reveal the true extent of its commitment to renewable energy and sustainable development. While China\u2019s move away from coal (and potentially, all fossil fuels) demonstrates a remarkable change, the scope and scale of its future investments will ultimately determine its contribution to the global energy transition. Explore the data<\/a><\/strong><\/em> and read the policy brief<\/a><\/strong><\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

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Negotiating in the Dark? How to Account for the Multilateral Development Banks in the New Collective Quantified Goal<\/a><\/strong><\/h5>\n
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Baku, Azerbaijan. Photo by Orkhan Musayev via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

At COP29, parties are expected to agree on a NCQG to replace the $100 billion climate finance goal set in 2009.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The $100 billion \u2013 in addition to being met two years late \u2013 left open significant questions on what counts as climate finance, the meaning of mobilization, distribution of responsibility among contributors and allocation to recipients, sources of finance, and how to differentiate between grants, concessional loans and non-concessional loans.<\/p>\n

A\u00a0<\/span>recent policy brief\u00a0<\/span>from\u00a0<\/span>Tim Hirschel-Burns<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>argues that the NCQG must account for the nuances\u00a0<\/span>of MDBs climate finance if negotiators are to agree upon an ambitious and effective new global climate finance goal. He finds that without a solid understanding of the role of MDBs in climate finance, UNFCCC members will be negotiating in the dark. Read the policy brief.<\/a><\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

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Energizing MDB Financing Capacity: Identifying and Filling Gaps to Raise Ambition for the 2030 Agenda and Beyond<\/a><\/strong><\/h5>\n
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Bangkok, Thailand. Photo by SiravitPlug via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

The global community is running out of time and falling behind on financing shared climate and development goals, with the United Nations warning that 85 percent of the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are either off track, stagnant or regressing. The economic and social costs of inaction will be catastrophic.<\/p>\n

MDBs have a central role to play in raising ambition to get the international community back on track. But do they have the necessary policies and processes to regularly assess how they can increase financing to meet shared development and climate goals by 2030 and beyond?<\/p>\n

A new report\u00a0<\/span>by the Boston University Global Development Policy Center finds that while MDBs have made important strides toward increasing their lending headroom, more ambition will be necessary to achieve development and climate goals in a timely and affordable manner. <\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

The report was commissioned by the Brazilian Presidency to the Group of 20 (G20) as an input for the \u2018G20 Roadmap towards Better, Bigger, and more Effective MDBs.\u2019\u00a0Read the report<\/a>\u00a0<\/strong><\/em>and\u00a0read the summary blog<\/a>.<\/strong><\/em><\/p>\n

\n
IMF 2030: A Transformative Action Agenda for Achieving Climate and Development Goals<\/a><\/strong><\/h5>\n
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Nagercoil, India. Photo by Milin John via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

With just six years until 2030, there is an urgent need to unlock investments and mobilize affordable climate finance in a fiscally sound and financially stable manner.<\/p>\n

The IMF has a vital role to play, and proposals to reform the international financial architecture all involve reforms to the IMF. Yet, despite notable recent strides at the Fund, a transformation is necessary for aligning the international financial architecture with shared development and climate change goals.<\/p>\n

A new report\u00a0from the\u00a0<\/span>Task Force on Climate, Development and the IMF<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>pushes for a faster and deeper evolution of the IMF that is both development-centered in its approach to climate and embraces an investment push as a priority goal. It presents three core policy recommendations animated by an\u00a0<\/span>IMF 2030 Action Agenda, comprised of concrete reforms to be implemented over the next 12 months. Read the report<\/strong><\/em><\/a> and read the summary blog<\/strong><\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n
The International Monetary Fund and Deforestation: Analyzing the Environmental Consequences of Conditional Lending<\/a><\/strong><\/h5>\n
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Amazonas, Brazil. Photo Paralaxis via Shutterstock.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

International financial institutions (IFIs) have in recent years increased the volume of their financing in an effort to support national and global policy challenges\u2014yet surprisingly little is known about the environmental impacts of their finance.<\/p>\n

A\u00a0new technical paper\u00a0<\/span>from the\u00a0<\/span>Task Force on Climate, Development and the IMF<\/a>\u00a0<\/span>investigates the environmental implications of the IMF’s lending toolkit by documenting its advice on forest management and examining the association between IMF programs and deforestation.<\/p>\n

Deforestation is a key driver of biodiversity loss and the\u00a0<\/span>third largest source\u00a0<\/span>of carbon dioxide emissions in the world economy. The authors find that each IMF loan is, on average, associated with a decrease in forest area of 258km2<\/sup>, almost the size of the Maldives. Read the technical paper<\/strong><\/em><\/a> and read the summary blog<\/strong><\/em><\/a>.<\/p>\n

\n
Sustainable Trade and Sustainable Supply Chains<\/a><\/h5>\n
\"\"<\/a>
Shenzhen, China. Photo by asharkyu via Shutterstock.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

As the demand for low-carbon technologies (LCTs) surges globally, countries are increasingly recognizing the economic opportunities of a low carbon transition. These opportunities are particularly evident in international trade, where policy support and international cooperation significantly influence the diffusion and adoption of these technologies. <\/span><\/p>\n

In particular, China has emerged as a global leader in the production and export of LCTs, underscoring the shifting dynamics of the international LCT market.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

In a\u00a0<\/span>new special policy study\u00a0by the\u00a0<\/span>China Council for International Cooperation on the Environment and Development<\/span><\/a>\u00a0(CCICED), a team of Chinese and international policy experts and researchers explore the development of global LCT trade over the past three decades to identify and analyze key economic factors that shape countries<\/span>\u2019<\/span> LCT trade with China. By compiling an original dataset using from sources such as the IMF and the United Nations Statistical Division\u2019s Commodity Trade Statistics (Comtrade) database, the experts identify significant shifts in export and import patterns, trade balances and the evolving roles of high-income countries and emerging market and developing economies. Read the special policy study<\/a><\/strong><\/em> and read the summary blog<\/a><\/strong><\/em>.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
Safeguarding Decades of Development: The International Monetary Fund’s Role in Addressing Loss and Damage<\/span><\/a><\/h5>\n
\"\"
San Jos\u00e9, Costa Rica. Photo by Eelco Bo\u0308htlingk via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Climate-induced loss and damage can affect the macroeconomic health and general well-being of climate vulnerable economies, rolling back decades of development gains. For members of the Vulnerable 20 Group of Finance Ministers (V20) alone, climate-induced losses amounted to 20 percent of their gross domestic product (GDP) over the last two decades.<\/span><\/p>\n

As the global institution charged with maintaining fiscal and financial stability, the IMF has an important role to play in addressing climate-induced loss and damage.<\/span><\/p>\n

A recent policy brief\u00a0from the\u00a0<\/span>Task Force on Climate, Development and the IMF<\/a>\u00a0proposes a \u2018loss and damage package\u2019 at the IMF that spans its surveillance, lending toolkit and global policy coordination. Read the policy brief.<\/strong><\/em><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

*<\/p>\n

Never miss an update: Subscribe to the Global Development Policy Center newsletter<\/a>.<\/em><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Tim Hirschel-Burns The 29th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP29), taking place from November 11-29, 2024 in Baku, Azerbaijan, has been dubbed the \u201cFinance COP\u201d and is expected to deliver a new climate finance goal, known in COP jargon as the New Collective Quantified Goal (NCQG). This NCQG will succeed the climate finance goal […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":22894,"featured_media":29501,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[398,66,55,156,77,144,1074],"tags":[4065,4449,4448,4034,1531,4596,459,1514,558,1413,1416,4446,4447,1243,3907,1526],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29438"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/22894"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29438"}],"version-history":[{"count":14,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29438\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":29653,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29438\/revisions\/29653"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/29501"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29438"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29438"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29438"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}