{"id":29291,"date":"2024-10-15T15:54:48","date_gmt":"2024-10-15T19:54:48","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/?p=29291"},"modified":"2024-10-15T15:54:48","modified_gmt":"2024-10-15T19:54:48","slug":"back-in-action-the-ninth-forum-on-china-africa-cooperation-sees-renewed-relations-and-development-prospects","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/2024\/10\/15\/back-in-action-the-ninth-forum-on-china-africa-cooperation-sees-renewed-relations-and-development-prospects\/","title":{"rendered":"Back in Action: The Ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Sees Renewed Relations and Development Prospects"},"content":{"rendered":"
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Beijing, China. Photo by zhang kaiyv via Unsplash.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

By Tianyi Wu<\/a><\/span><\/p>\n

For those suggesting China has disengaged from its cooperation with Africa, Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent a clear message at the recent ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): China is back and reaffirming its commitment to <\/span>support \u201cmodernization<\/span><\/a>\u201d<\/span> in African countries, offering its own development model as an example.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

How will this \u201c<\/span>joint pursuit of modernization path<\/span><\/a>\u201d unfold? Analyzing key documents from the Ninth FOCAC, including <\/span>Xi\u2019s speech<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>the Beijing Declaration<\/span><\/a> and the <\/span>2025-2027 Action Plan<\/span><\/a>, in both English and Chinese, reveals China seeks to adjust its approach with Africa by forging strategic partnerships, compartmentalizing financial tools for various development projects and aligning its engagement with regional multilateral initiatives.<\/span><\/p>\n

At the Summit, Xi <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> pledges of $51.32 billion, including \u201cRMB 210 billion ($29.6 billion) in credit lines,\u00a0 RMB 80 billion ($11.8 billion) in assistance in various forms and RMB 70 billion ($9.87 billion) in investments from Chinese firms,\u201d plus a $50 million contribution to the China-World Bank fund. The speech did not detail the specifics, but based on historical credit instruments used by <\/span>Chinese development finance institutions (DFIs) and commercial banks<\/span><\/a>, credit lines are expected to include preferential export buyers\u2019 credits and commercial loans that are supported by insurance from Sinosure.<\/span><\/p>\n

The phrase \u201cassistance in various forms\u201d seems to be a translation of \u201c\u63f4\u52a9\u201d in the Chinese version of the speech, which actually means \u201caid.\u201d Based on this, the $11.8 billion in assistance will likely come from China\u2019s aid budget, which includes grants, interest-free loans and concessional loans with interest rates between 1 percent and 2 percent, as <\/span>specified<\/span><\/a> in China’s foreign development assistance regulations.<\/span><\/p>\n

Notably, this year\u2019s FOCAC marks the first rise in summit pledges since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, with dollar amounts rising to 2019 levels, as shown in Figure 1.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Figure 1: FOCAC pledges in 2019, 2021 and 2024<\/b><\/p>\n

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Source: Author\u2019s elaboration of data form Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
Strategic partnerships<\/b><\/h5>\n

Xi Jinping <\/span>announced<\/span><\/a> the elevation of China-Africa relations to an \u201call-weather community with a shared future,\u201d the first continental-level upgrade since 2015. \u201cAll-weather\u201d signals the close and lasting relationships Beijing aims to build with African countries. The concept of a \u201ccommunity with a shared future\u201d is tied to the emphasis on \u201cmodernization,\u201d positioning China\u2019s development pathway as a model for Africa.<\/span><\/p>\n

Strategic partnerships were <\/span>established or elevated<\/span><\/a> to higher levels with 30 African nations (see Table 1 for the hierarchy and interpretations of China\u2019s bilateral diplomatic relations), marking a significant diplomatic push, as shown in Figures 2 and 3. Notably, South Africa\u2019s relationship was <\/span>upgraded<\/span><\/a> to an all-round strategic cooperative partnership. China also strengthened its relationships with <\/span>Nigeria<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Republic of Congo<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Senegal<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Zimbabwe<\/span><\/a> by upgrading them to comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships and fostering a \u201ccommunity with a shared future\u201d with these nations. <\/span>Djibouti<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Togo<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Cameroon<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Rwanda<\/span><\/a> and <\/span>Burundi<\/span><\/a> also entered into comprehensive strategic cooperative partnerships with China.<\/span><\/p>\n

Table 1: Hierarchy and interpretations of China\u2019s bilateral diplomatic relations\u00a0<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
\u5916\u4ea4\u5173\u7cfb\u5c42\u7ea7<\/strong><\/th>\nLevel of Diplomatic Relations<\/strong><\/th>\nInterpretation<\/strong><\/th>\n<\/tr>\n
\u6218\u7565\u534f\u4f5c\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb<\/b><\/td>\n1. Strategic Partnership of Coordination<\/span><\/td>\nHighest level of foreign partnership with Beijing, cooperation on all front<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u6218\u7565\u5408<\/b>\u4f5c\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb<\/b><\/td>\n2. Strategic Cooperative Partnership<\/span><\/td>\nCoordination and corporation of wide-ranging issues, including strategic interests at geopolitical, political and economic levels<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u6218\u7565\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb<\/b><\/td>\n3. Strategic Partnership<\/span><\/td>\nCountries with strategic importance at political, economic, and geopolitical levels, Beijing aims to increase their level of engagement to navigate through existing frictions<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5408\u4f5c\u4f19\u4f34\u5173\u7cfb<\/b><\/td>\n4. Cooperative Partnership<\/span><\/td>\nEconomic cooperation as the main issue area<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
\u5408\u4f5c\/\u4f19\u4f34\/\u53cb\u597d\u5173\u7cfb<\/b><\/td>\n5. Cooperation<\/span>\/<\/span><\/p>\n

Partnership<\/span>\/<\/span>Friendship Relations<\/span><\/td>\n

Partnership is limited to specific issue and has room for further improvement<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Source: <\/span>Legarda (2021)<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>BBC China (2024)<\/span><\/a>,<\/span> China Institute of International Relations (2023)<\/span><\/a>.<\/span><\/p>\n

Figure 2: Diplomatic relations of African countries with China, post-FOCAC 2024<\/b><\/p>\n

 <\/p>\n

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Source: Author\u2019s elaboration of data form Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Figure 3: Countries with upgraded bilateral relations with China, post-FOCAC 2024<\/b><\/p>\n

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Source: Author\u2019s elaboration of data form Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
Compartmentalized financial approach<\/b><\/h5>\n

The FOCAC 2024 Beijing Action Plan suggests a compartmentalized approach in channelling various financial flows from China. A broad differentiation is drawn between projects funded through \u201cdevelopment assistance (\u63f4\u52a9)\u201d, which contain an aid-like flow <\/span>by definition<\/span><\/a> of Chinese foreign aid) and those funded through \u201cdevelopment finance \u878d\u8d44),\u201d which are leveraged non-aid like instruments by definition of Chinese foreign aid. According to the Action Plan, projects that improve \u201cpeople’s livelihoods\u201d will be in the budget line for development assistance, following the \u201c<\/span>small and beautiful<\/span><\/a>\u201d principle. Meanwhile, development finance that mixed \u201c(preferential) buyer\u2019s credit, commercial lending, equity investment and trade finance\u201d will support larger projects through \u201cmarket-oriented\u201d approaches, particularly in infrastructure, trade and industrial sectors.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Livelihood projects: Development assistance and \u201csmall and beautiful\u201d<\/b><\/h5>\n

Over the past three years, China\u2019s overseas development finance <\/span>has shifted<\/span><\/a> from large infrastructure projects to smaller, more focused initiatives due to domestic economic pressures and sovereign debt concerns. While this was evident during the post-COVID-19 period, the FOCAC 2024 Beijing Action Plan has clarified that this shift applies specifically to development assistance projects as well, following the \u201csmall and beautiful\u201d principle.<\/span><\/p>\n

This principle denotes that the focus of aid-like development assistance will be channelled to small-scale livelihood projects such as urban and rural development, gender equality, health, education and water management. Specifically, China will \u201cuse development assistance to deliver 1,000 \u2018small and beautiful\u2019 projects to improve people\u2019s livelihoods (<\/span>\u63f4\u52a9\u5b9e\u65bd1000\u4e2a\u5c0f\u800c\u7f8e\u6c11\u751f\u9879\u76ee<\/span><\/a>).\u201d This principle reflects a more cautious approach to allocating grants and concessional resources. Table 2 provides examples of recent livelihood pledges and projects.<\/span><\/p>\n

Table 2: Development assistance pledges on livelihood projects ($11.8 billion budget line)<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Pledges<\/b><\/td>\nDescription<\/b><\/td>\nValue<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Agriculture<\/b><\/td>\nEmergency in-kind, agriculture centers and technical assistance and capacity building programs.<\/span><\/td>\n$141.793 million<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Climate Change<\/b><\/td>\n17 climate mitigation and adaptation projects.<\/span><\/td>\nAmount not specified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Digital Economy<\/b><\/td>\n18 E-digital economy projects.<\/span><\/td>\nAmount not specified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Gender Equality<\/b><\/td>\nIn-kind support and capacity building for women.\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\nAmount not specified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Green Energy<\/b><\/td>\nPV installation and power storage.<\/span><\/td>\nAmount not specified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Military<\/b><\/td>\nCapacity-building and training.\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n$1.4 billion\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Source: <\/span>FOCAC Beijing Action plan (2025-2027)<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>\u4e2d\u975e\u5408\u4f5c\u8bba\u575b\u5317\u4eac\u884c\u52a8\u8ba1\u5212\uff082025-2027)<\/span><\/a>.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

Infrastructure, trade and investment: Development finance and a \u201cmarket-oriented approach\u201d<\/b><\/h5>\n

Similar to development assistance, the Action Plan also outlines how development finance will be channelled under the financing cooperation segment. Specifically, China aims \u201cto support infrastructure development, energy resources development, agricultural and manufacturing development, and the integrated development of the entire industrial chain in Africa through a combination of concessional loans, other types of loans, equity investment and trade financing.\u201d In essence, China is moving away from traditional DFI lending as the sole form of project-based finance and to a more blended-finance approach.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

The deals signed during FOCAC 2024, as shown in Table 3, also signal that China is not moving away from large-scale infrastructure and renewable energy projects in Africa but is using a new finance model that involves <\/span>public-private partnerships<\/span><\/a> (PPPs) and commercial creditors. These initiatives include Kenya\u2019s Standard Gauge Railway extension and Tanzania-Zambia Railway rehabilitation. In the energy sector, Chinese companies are advancing solar and hydroelectric projects in Zambia, Nigeria, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo, with renewable energy gaining prominence over traditional hydropower. China is also investing heavily in digital and ICT infrastructure, particularly in Cabo Verde and Egypt, enhancing tech capabilities and promoting innovation. Additionally, China has expanded market access for African goods through tariff reductions and signed multiple trade deals. Investment focus also includes critical minerals and industrial development in countries like Nigeria and Zambia.<\/span><\/p>\n

Table 3: Development finance deals on infrastructure, trade and investment at FOCAC 2024<\/b><\/p>\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n
Sector<\/b><\/td>\nCountry<\/b><\/td>\nProject Description<\/b><\/td>\nDeal Value<\/b><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Transportation<\/b><\/td>\nKenya<\/span><\/td>\nStandard Gauge Railway extension from Naivasha to Kisumu and Malaba<\/span><\/a><\/td>\n$5.3 billion<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nTanzania-Zambia<\/span><\/td>\nRehabilitation of Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA)<\/span><\/a><\/td>\n$1 billion<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nChad<\/span><\/td>\nConstruction of an international airport near N\u2019Djamena<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nMoU (amount not specified)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Energy<\/b><\/td>\nZambia<\/span><\/td>\nSolar power projects (rooftop solar systems, Kariba North and Kafue Lower solar plants)<\/span><\/a><\/td>\n$102 million (Kariba)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nNigeria<\/span><\/td>\nGwagwalada Independent Power Plant (350MW)<\/span><\/a><\/td>\n$2.9 billion<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nDemocratic Republic of Congo<\/span><\/td>\n200 MW Hydro Power Plant in Lualaba Province<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nMoU (amount not specified)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nNamibia<\/span><\/td>\n100 MW Solar Power Plant<\/span><\/a><\/td>\n$78.33 million<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Digital And Ict<\/b><\/td>\nCabo Verde<\/span><\/td>\nTechnology Park in Praia, digital innovation hub<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nInvestment (amount not specified)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nEgypt<\/span><\/td>\nTelecommunications and information technology cooperation<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nMoUs (5 deals signed)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
Trade, Investment and Industry<\/b><\/td>\nZimbabwe<\/span><\/td>\nTrade deal for avocados<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nUnspecified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nMozambique<\/span><\/td>\nTrade deal for pigeon peas<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nUnspecified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nZambia<\/span><\/td>\nTrade deal for soybeans<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nUnspecified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nNamibia<\/span><\/td>\nTrade deal for lamb and mutton<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nUnspecified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nCongo<\/span><\/td>\nTrade deal for Poria cocos<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nUnspecified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nNigeria<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Rwanda<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Chad<\/span><\/a>, <\/span>Malawi<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nTrade deal for peanuts\u00a0<\/span><\/td>\nUnspecified<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nBurundi<\/span><\/td>\nTrade deal for coffee<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nTrade deal<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nNigeria<\/span><\/td>\nIron Ore-to-Steel Project in Kogi State<\/span><\/a><\/td>\n$1 billion<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nNigeria<\/span><\/td>\nBrass Industrial Park<\/span><\/a><\/td>\n$3.3 billion<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n
<\/td>\nZambia<\/span><\/td>\nRedeveloped Mulungushi Textiles factory<\/span><\/a><\/td>\nInvestment (amount not specified)<\/span><\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n

Source: Author\u2019s elaboration.<\/span><\/p>\n

Anchoring engagement to multilateral initiatives<\/b><\/h5>\n

The <\/span>2024 FOCAC Beijing<\/span><\/a> declaration is anchored to multilateral initiatives including China\u2019s Global Development Initiative (GDI) and Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the African Union\u2019s Agenda 2063 and other regional initiatives. The focus is on forging strong synergies between China-led multilateral initiatives and Africa\u2019s regional development agendas. Infrastructure investments under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) are now integrated with Africa\u2019s Programme for Infrastructure Development (PIDA), focusing on regional connectivity. In the energy sector, China\u2019s <\/span>backing of renewable projects<\/span><\/a> aligns with Africa\u2019s Agenda 2063, shifting from hydropower to solar and wind to meet sustainability targets. Through the GSI, China supports Africa’s security cooperation for stability. China also aims to strengthen nuclear energy cooperation through multilateral initiatives including African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE). Additionally, China\u2019s involvement in health cooperation, particularly its support for the Africa Center for Disease Control (CDC), is also highlighted.\u00a0<\/span><\/p>\n

This shift is seen as a step towards greater <\/span>African agency<\/span><\/a> in addressing the imbalance in China-Africa relations, with China aligning itself to support Africa\u2019s agenda. However, these plans remain tied to Chinese initiatives, reflecting China\u2019s goal to engage Africa more comprehensively and position itself as a counterbalance to Western-led multilateralism. The extent to which this alignment truly reflects African agency remains uncertain. Still, it presents new opportunities for African policymakers to create more strategic and proactive roadmaps for their relations with China, leveraging China\u2019s recognition of the need to evolve its engagement. This could lead to deeper development synergies amid changing domestic and global dynamics.<\/span><\/p>\n

*<\/span><\/p>\n

Never miss an update:\u00a0<\/span><\/i>Subscribe to the Global China Initiative Newsletter<\/span><\/i><\/a>.<\/span><\/i><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

By Tianyi Wu For those suggesting China has disengaged from its cooperation with Africa, Chinese leader Xi Jinping sent a clear message at the recent ninth Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC): China is back and reaffirming its commitment to support \u201cmodernization\u201d in African countries, offering its own development model as an example.\u00a0 How will this […]<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":23716,"featured_media":29298,"comment_status":"closed","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":[],"categories":[75,398,156,72,1075],"tags":[4065,403,4573,395,394,2028,3496,4357,4358,1473,4574,4576,4575,4439],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29291"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/23716"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=29291"}],"version-history":[{"count":7,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29291\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":29307,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/29291\/revisions\/29307"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/29298"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=29291"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=29291"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/www.bu.edu\/gdp\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=29291"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}